Waltz

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THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior*

By ARNOLD L. HORELICK

IN A television interview not long after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, President Kennedy observed that both the United States and the Soviet Union had made serious miscalculations in the Cuban affair. "I don't think we expected that he [Khrushchev] would put the missiles in Cuba," he said, "because it would have seemed such an imprudent action for him to take. . . . He obviously thought he could do it in secret and that the United States would accept it."[1]

As it turned out, of course, deploying strategic missiles in Cuba *was* an imprudent thing for Khrushchev to do, and his expectation that the United States would accept it proved to be mistaken. In the first few weeks after the immediate crisis was resolved by Khrushchev's withdrawal of the Soviet missiles, Soviet affairs specialists turned their attention to the puzzling questions raised by his behavior: (1) Why did Khrushchev deploy strategic weapons in Cuba? (2) What led him to believe he could succeed? (3) Why did he withdraw the weapons so precipitately?

In the months that have elapsed since the first post-crisis flurry of speculation and analysis, a great deal of valuable new information has come to light, particularly in testimony before Congressional committees by high Administration officials. In mid-December 1962, Khrushchev broke the silence he had maintained for some six weeks and presented before the USSR Supreme Soviet the first in a series of detailed explanations of his actions.[2]

Although the new American and Soviet materials for the most part bear only indirectly on the questions posed above, they provide an improved basis for attempting to answer them. One minor participant in

* This article is an abridgment of a RAND Corporation Memorandum written by the author as part of the research program sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project RAND. However, views or conclusions contained in this article are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the United States Air Force.

[1] *Washington Post,* December 18, 1962.

[2] *Pravda,* December 13, 1962. The continuing drumfire of Albanian and Chinese criticism obliged Khrushchev to return to the subject repeatedly, particularly in his East German SED Congress speech (*Pravda,* January 17, 1963) and his Supreme Soviet election speech (*Pravda,* February 28, 1963).

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the events of October 1962, Fidel Castro, reportedly told a friendly French correspondent that the answers to these questions are "a mystery" which may perhaps be unraveled by historians "in 20 or 30 years."[3] Yet if we are to derive any useful foreign policy and defense lessons from the Cuban missile crisis, we can hardly wait that long. Though these questions cannot now be resolved definitively, we must at least arrive at some provisional answers that can be tested against Soviet behavior in the coming months and years. If we fail to do this, we reduce the momentous U.S.-Soviet Caribbean confrontation of October 1962 to mere episodic proportions.

I. Soviet Objectives

Unfortunately, much of the early post-crisis discussion of Soviet objectives was strongly conditioned by observers' attitudes toward the policy pursued by the U.S. Government in dealing with the crisis and by their appraisals of the probable consequences of its outcome. Among those who criticized the Administration for acting recklessly as well as among those who regarded its policy as too cautious, the argument was encountered that the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly, had achieved much of what it intended.[4] In part, perhaps, what brought critics of

[3] Conversation with Claude Julien, *Le Monde*, March 22, 1963.

[4] Professor Leslie Dewart, who argued that the President played into Khrushchev's hands by *over*-reacting, wrote that "yielding was the essence of the [Soviet] scheme." "The conclusion appears reasonable that Russia set up missile bases in Cuba in full knowledge or expectation of the consequences. It is those very consequences [to compel a shift from "rigidity to negotiableness" in U.S. foreign policy] which she can be presumed to have sought." ("Russia's Cuban Policy and the Prospects of Peace," *Council for Correspondence Newsletter*, No. 21 [October 1962], 17, 21.)

Stuart Chase has similarly suggested that "it is not impossible" that the withdrawal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba "was part of a plan, more political than military, to secure a pledge against invasion." ("Two Worlds," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XIX [June 1963], 20.)

Those who criticized the Administration for reacting too cautiously tended to regard the outcome of the crisis as coinciding less with specific Soviet intentions than with general Soviet interests. For example, David Lowenthal wrote: "It is what he [the President] could have done but did *not* do that will most strongly impress our Communist foes. He forced them to retract the move, and for a brief while aired their malice before the world. But he did nothing to penalize an action aimed at inflicting an almost mortal wound on us, and he even made a noninvasion pledge that had never been given before. ... We did not even get the *status quo ante*." ("U.S. Cuban Policy: Illusion and Reality," *National Review*, January 29, 1963, 63.)

Along related lines, Robert D. Crane wrote: "The USSR might conclude that the United States was content with a vague promise of the verified removal of an indefensible Communist military gain. The Soviets on the other hand, demanded — and apparently believed they had received — an assurance against an invasion of Cuba by any country in the Western Hemisphere, which under the circumstances could amount to the creation of a new doctrine strongly resembling a Monroe-Doctrine-in-reverse." ("The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet Policy," *Orbis*, VI [Winter 1963], 547-48.)

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widely divergent political persuasions to similar conclusions was a shared image, born of Sputnik, of the ten-foot tall Russians who rarely do anything wrong, and a complementary, equally erroneous image, fostered by the U-2 and the Bay of Pigs debacles, of U.S. Administrations that rarely do anything right. But to regard the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis as coinciding in any substantial way with Soviet intentions or interests is to mistake skillful salvage of a shipwreck for brilliant navigation. If the success achieved by the United States in October 1962 proved to be more limited in scope than many believed it would be or had to be, the outcome hardly constituted a net gain for the Soviet Union.

Some observers have imputed to the Soviet Union precisely those objectives they believe that Khrushchev achieved: the securing of desired political concessions from the United States, such as a public pledge by the President not to invade Cuba; or more generalized political gains, including credit for having saved the peace. Even if they had been fully achieved, these objectives would have been blatantly disproportionate to the means expended, and to the costs and risks incurred by the Soviet Union in the undertaking. The Chinese and Albanian Communists, and Castro, too, have correctly — from the Communist point of view — drawn attention to the emptiness of mere verbal pledges by the enemy.[5] Moreover, the U.S. Government has withheld a formal pledge, since one of the conditions for it set forth in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, on-site verification, has not been satisfied. Khrushchev has publicly treated the President's conditional pledge as if it were in full force because he has little else to show for his efforts. While Castro has complained formally to UN Secretary-General U Thant that "officials of the U.S. Government declare that they do not consider themselves bound by any promise,"[6] Khrushchev has prudently chosen to ignore these statements.

As to any credit Khrushchev may have gained for saving the peace, it is doubtful whether his "reasonableness" persuaded many observers of his dedication to peace who were not so persuaded before the crisis. It is more likely that his decision to withdraw the weapons served only to restore the confidence in him of those whose faith was shaken by the

[5] "In no circumstances," the Peking *People's Daily* editorialized on October 31, 1962, can the people of the world trust "the empty promises of the U.S. aggressor." Tirana Radio chimed in the following day: "The Cuban people know from their own experience — the experience of the Bay of Pigs and of all that is happening around them — that Kennedy and the imperialist monopolies represented by Kennedy cannot be trusted." And Castro has said: "We do not believe in the words of Kennedy; but, moreover, Kennedy has not given any word. And if he gave it, he has already retracted it." (Havana Radio, January 16, 1963.)

[6] *New York Times,* November 17, 1962.

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disclosure — or rather by Khrushchev's belated acknowledgment — that the Soviet Union had deployed strategic missiles and bombers in Cuba. On the other hand, the ranks of those, both in the Communist camp and outside of it, who regard Khrushchev as an "adventurer" or "capitulator" have certainly been augmented.[7] The growth of such beliefs about Khrushchev is not likely to enhance his future political effectiveness.

Finally, to achieve the limited political objectives imputed to them by those who contend that the outcome of the crisis was the one intended by the USSR, the Soviet leaders need not have invested so heavily or risked so much. At least 42 IL-28 bombers and an equal number of strategic missiles were brought into Cuba by Soviet ships; nine missile sites were established, six of them with four launchers each for the MRBM's, and three of them, fixed sites for the IRBM's, each designed to include four launching positions.[8] Yet a token force of a few conspicuously deployed MRBM's would alone doubtless have sufficed to provoke a U.S. demand that the Soviet Union remove them from Cuba.

The magnitude and character of the Soviet strategic weapon deployment in Cuba cast doubt also on a related hypothesis — namely, that the Soviet Union sought merely to compel the United States to withdraw its missiles from Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Since the United States had only one squadron (15 missiles) of Jupiters deployed in Turkey,[9] only a third the number of MRBM's with a 1,100-mile range known to have been shipped to Cuba would have sufficed to make such a trade seem quantitatively plausible. The costly and essentially unsalvageable fixed sites that were being prepared to receive IRBM's with a 2,200-mile range were altogether superfluous to any intended Cuba-Turkey missile-base exchange since the United States had no equivalent missiles in Turkey, or anywhere else for that matter.

Of course, a mutual withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and Turkey was explicitly proposed by Khrushchev in his October 27 letter to President Kennedy. But the mere fact that Khrushchev proposed such an exchange at one point during the crisis, after the United States had demanded the withdrawal of Soviet strategic weapons, no more proves that this was his objective from the start than his subsequent withdrawal of the missiles without such a *quid pro quo* proves that his ultimate ob-

[7] The Chinese Communists have accused him of being both.

[8] Briefing by John Hughes, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964*, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington 1963), Part 1, 7; hereinafter cited as *Hearings*.

[9] *Missiles and Rockets*, January 7, 1963, 26.

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jective was simply to get President Kennedy to promise not to invade Cuba. It is true that the withdrawal of U.S. strategic weapons from Turkey, under apparent Soviet duress, would have given Khrushchev a more tangible return for his trouble than a conditional verbal pledge by the United States not to invade Cuba.[10] It is one thing for the United States and an allied host country to decide jointly to substitute for some bases other means of defense, such as Polaris submarines in adjacent waters; it is quite another for the United States, under Soviet duress, to withdraw from its bases, regardless of the wishes of its allies.

It seems questionable, however, that the Soviets would accept the costs and risks of deploying missiles in Cuba merely in order to remove them in return for the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey. The phasing out of U.S. missiles deployed overseas, without a Soviet *quid pro quo,* was already known to have been under consideration long before the October 1962 crisis,[11] though the Soviet leaders may not have been certain regarding U.S. intentions. Moreover, because of geographic considerations and the large U.S. advantage in intercontinental nuclear delivery capabilities, a strategic missile base in Cuba was a far more valuable military asset to the Soviet Union than a comparable base in Turkey to the United States. Finally, as pointed out earlier, if the Soviet leaders intended no more than to lay the groundwork for an agreement on the mutual withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet strategic missiles from Turkey and Cuba, they need not have deployed more than a token force of MRBM's and need not have constructed installations for IRBM's at all. It is more likely that the base-exchange proposal was an improvised or perhaps even a prepared fall-back position to cover unfavorable contingencies, but not the Soviet-preferred culmination of the Cuban venture.[12]

Khrushchev's official rationale is that Soviet strategic weapons were deployed in Cuba solely to defend the island against U.S. attack; and that once the threat of such an attack was removed (by the President's

[10] Had the United States accepted the Soviet base-exchange proposal of October 27, Khrushchev would also have received such a U.S. pledge since a reciprocal exchange of no-invasion pledges was part of the proposed bargain.

[11] Secretary McNamara has testified that the long-standing program to replace the obsolete Thor and Jupiter missiles dated from early 1961. (*Hearings,* 57.)

[12] If the base-exchange proposal was a *prepared* fall-back position, the Soviet leaders failed to prepare their propagandists for it. On the same day (October 28, 1962) that it front-paged Khrushchev's base-exchange proposal letter to the President, the Soviet Government newspaper, *Izvestiia,* printed on an inside page a commentary which stated: "There are those in the U.S.A. who speculate that in exchange for denying Cuba the ability to repel American aggression, one might 'give up' some American base close to Soviet territory. . . . Such 'proposals,' if you can call them that, merely serve to betray the unclean conscience of the authors." The editor of *Izvestiia* is Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law.

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conditional undertaking not to launch one), the Soviet weapons, having served their purpose, were withdrawn and peace was preserved. Of course, even on its own terms this rationale is deficient, for Khrushchev also acknowledged, presumably to demonstrate that his decision to withdraw the missiles was not a needless concession, that he took that decisive step only when urgent word reached him that a U.S. attack on Cuba appeared imminent.

Far from deterring the "imperialists," by giving them, in Khrushchev's words, "a more realistic idea of the danger of thermonuclear war," the discovery of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba provoked a U.S. naval quarantine, a rapid build-up of U.S. Army and Tactical Air Forces in the southeastern part of the country, and a world-wide alert of the Strategic Air Command. Thus, it would seem, the deployment of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba did not succeed, as Khrushchev said he had anticipated, "in bringing the aggressors to their senses." In his words: "In the morning of October 27 we received information from our Cuban comrades *and from other sources* which directly stated that this [U.S.] attack would be carried out within the next two or three days. We regarded the telegrams received as a signal of *utmost alarm,* and this alarm was justified. Immediate actions were required in order to prevent an attack against Cuba and preserve peace."[13]

The action, of course, was Khrushchev's proposal to the President to withdraw from Cuba all the weapons "which you regard as offensive" in exchange for cessation of the quarantine and a pledge by the President not to invade Cuba. It must have appeared to Khrushchev, then, that the United States had not only been prepared to attack Cuba *despite* the presence of Soviet weapons, but precisely *because* the weapons had been brought in, since evidently only by agreeing to withdraw them did Khrushchev believe he could secure from the President assurances that the United States would not attack. Presidential statements, made repeatedly in the months preceding the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, that the United States did not intend to invade if offensive weapons were *not* deployed in Cuba, had apparently not been deemed sufficient; only when such an assurance was made conditional on the removal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba, with appropriate international verification, did it become acceptable.

The strange logic of Khrushchev's face-saving explanation of Soviet motives and behavior does not in itself disprove his contention that Soviet missiles were deployed in Cuba solely to deter a U.S. attack; it

[13] *Pravda,* December 13, 1962; emphasis supplied. The "other sources" may have included the U.S. Government.

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only indicates that if deterrence of a U.S. attack on Cuba was the sole Soviet objective, the plan backfired: the Soviet weapons provoked rather than deterred.[14]

But there are other reasons for doubting Khrushchev's account of Soviet objectives. These have to do with the appropriateness of the weapons selected to be deployed in Cuba for the ostensible purpose of deterring a U.S. attack on that country. Surely a threat to destroy several southeastern U.S. cities, or even Miami alone, *if credible,* would have been adequate to deter such an attack. For this, tactical missiles with a range of several hundred miles would have sufficed. It could have been claimed that such weapons were designed to strike at airfields and marshaling and embarkation points in the Florida area from which a U.S. invasion might be mounted. Perhaps by employing a high lofting technique, the MRBM's that were deployed and the IRBM's that were being prepared could have been used to strike close-in targets, but such long-range missiles are not designed for that purpose. Whatever marginal incremental value for local deterrence (of an attack on Cuba) might have been obtained by deploying missiles with ranges in excess of several hundred miles was more than outweighed by the added provocation they offered.

Had the Soviet missiles remained in Cuba, declarations regarding the control arrangements established for them would have been important indicators of the objectives the Soviet Union sought to pursue. To maximize the effectiveness of Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba as a deterrent against a U.S. attack on Cuba and to reduce the risk that their employment, in the event of such an attack, would bring down U.S. nuclear retaliation against the USSR, it might have been desirable for Khrushchev to have the U.S. Government believe that the Soviet missiles were at Castro's disposal and under his control.

In the United States Castro had gained a reputation for impulsive, irresponsible behavior. Whether authentic or not, the post-crisis remarks attributed to Che Guevara, that the Cubans were prepared, in the event of a U.S. attack, to strike "the very heart of the United States, including New York,"[15] conformed to the image of the Cuban leadership that was

[14] Khrushchev referred obliquely to this miscalculation in his speech at the 6th Congress of the SED (East German Party) in Berlin on January 16, 1963, when he acknowledged that "this enforced measure [stationing Soviet missiles in Cuba] had the effect of a shock *(shok)* on the imperialists," but argued that only such measures were capable of inducing U.S. statesmen "to make a more sober assessment of the objective reality." (*Pravda,* January 17, 1963.)

[15] According to Theodore Draper, these remarks were reportedly made by Guevara in an interview with a London *Daily Worker* correspondent, but did not appear in the version published on December 4, 1962. ("Castro and Communism," *The Reporter,* January 17, 1963, 44.)

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widely held in the United States. Once an operational missile capability was established in Cuba, such beliefs on the part of Americans might have lent substantial deterrent value to the missiles deployed in Cuba.

On the other hand, to bring Cuba-based missiles to bear in support of Soviet interests in confrontations with the United States (for example, in Berlin), belief that the missiles were at the disposal of the Soviet leaders would have been essential. Until such time as the Soviet Union might wish to bring the missiles so to bear, however, the Soviet leaders probably would have preferred to keep the question of control in an ambiguous state. Vague, generalized statements, such as characterize most Soviet strategic threats, might have been employed.

A consideration of probably lesser importance may have been that a premature explicit announcement on control would have obliged Khrushchev to accept certain political liabilities, regardless of whether he claimed that the Soviet Union retained control over the missiles or not. In either case, Khrushchev would have had to acknowledge that the Soviet Union was engaging in a military practice that he had repeatedly denounced: establishing a strategic base on foreign territory, if he claimed control for the Soviet Union; proliferation of nuclear strategic weapons, if he announced that the missiles had been turned over to Cuba.

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy impaled Khrushchev on one of the horns of this dilemma by unilaterally resolving the ambiguity: "... it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union."[16]

Initially, the Soviet Union attempted to evade the issue by refusing to acknowledge that it had emplaced strategic weapons in Cuba, while affirming in its first official statement on the crisis (October 23) that Cuba alone had the right to decide what kinds of weapons were appropriate for the defense of Cuba.[17] But the same statement, without acknowledging that the military equipment provided to Cuba by the USSR included strategic weapons, also reflected Soviet concern that the U.S. Government might feel impelled to strike quickly to prevent operational missiles from falling into Castro's hands. Thus, the following

[16] *New York Times,* October 23, 1962. The phrase *"full* retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union" may have implied to the Soviet leaders not only that the United States would not treat the Soviet Union as a sanctuary area if the Cuba-based missiles were fired, but that it did not intend to restrict itself to a limited strategic response ("tit for tat" retaliation).

[17] *Pravda,* October 24, 1962.

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oblique reassurance was offered: "Nuclear weapons, which have been *created by the Soviet people and which are in the hands of the people,* will never be used for the purpose of aggression."[18]

On the same day, privately, Khrushchev made this reassurance explicit during a three-hour conversation in Moscow with Westinghouse Electric Vice-President William E. Knox, through whom he presumably wished to communicate informally with the U.S. Government. According to Knox, Khrushchev acknowledged that Soviet ballistic missiles had been furnished to Cuba, but were completely controlled by Soviet officers. "But the Cubans were very volatile people, Mr. Khrushchev said, and all of the sophisticated hardware furnished for their defense was entirely under the control of Soviet officers; it would be used only in the event that Cuba was attacked, and it would never be fired except on his orders as Commander in Chief of all of the Soviet Union."[19]

Finally, in his October 27 letter to President Kennedy, the first published Khrushchev letter during the crisis, the Soviet Premier informed the President that "the weapons in Cuba that you have mentioned and which you say alarm you are in the hands of Soviet officers." "Therefore," he went on, "any accidental use of them whatsoever to the detriment of the United States is excluded."[20]

It thus seems clear that despite the advantages to be gained from ambiguity regarding control of the missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev felt compelled to reassure the President explicitly that Castro could not order the missiles to be fired and that there was therefore no need for the United States to make an immediate attack before the missiles became operational[21] in order to forestall a possible irrational act by the "volatile" Cubans. Whatever value the Soviet weapons may have been intended to have as a deterrent of a local U.S. attack on Cuba was seriously diminished by this reassurance.

It is questionable, however, whether deterrence of a local U.S. attack on Cuba was ever regarded by the Soviet leaders as more than a subsidiary and derivative effect of a venture intended primarily to serve other ends. Certainly the size and character of the intended deployment indicate that it was meant to achieve some broader purpose.[22] Castro

[18] *Ibid.;* emphasis supplied.

[19] *New York Times,* November 18, 1962.

[20] *Pravda,* October 28, 1962. The implication is that if the weapons had been under Cuban control, the possibility that they might be "accidentally used" could *not* be excluded.

[21] This did not occur for all MRBM systems until October 28; the IRBM's never achieved operational status, nor, apparently, did the IL-28 bombers. (*Hearings,* 12, 16.)

[22] For example, while the threat posed by MRBM's to cities, including Washington, D.C., in the southeastern part of the United States would, if credible, have been adequate

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has been quoted by a friendly source, the correspondent for *Le Monde*, Claude Julien, as having said that the Cuban leaders had considered among themselves the possibility of requesting that the USSR furnish Cuba missiles, but had not come to any decision when Moscow proposed to emplace them: "They explained to us that in accepting them we would be reinforcing the socialist camp the world over, and because we had received important aid from the socialist camp we estimated that we could not decline. This is why we accepted them. It was not in order to assure our own defense, but first of all to reinforce socialism on the international scale. Such is the truth even if other explanations are furnished elsewhere."[23]

Although Castro subsequently issued a refutation of an American press agency version of the Julien interview (not of the original *Le Monde* article),[24] this quotation has the ring of truth. Of course, the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, to the extent that it would have strengthened the Soviet position in its "world-wide" confrontation with the United States, would also have added credibility to Soviet strategic threats, including the threat to defend Cuba against U.S. attack. In fact, the implication of the official Soviet rationale for deploying strategic weapons in Cuba — namely, that the threat posed to the United States by Soviet weapons *based in the USSR* lacked sufficient credibility to deter a U.S. attack on "socialist" Cuba — is one of the troublesome embarrass-

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to deter a U.S. attack on Cuba, most U.S. strategic bomber and missile bases would have been beyond the range of those weapons. These bases could have been covered by IRBM's.

[23] *Le Monde,* March 22, 1963.

[24] Havana, *Prensa Latina,* March 22, 1963. Specifically, Castro denied only that "I expressed myself in an unfriendly way at any time about Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev." Castro's general refutation pointedly referred only to the UPI version of *Le Monde's* article: "I do not believe that Julien, whom we consider a friend of Cuba, can be guilty of untruths like *some* of the statements the UPI attributes to him." (Emphasis supplied.) The March 22 TASS version of Castro's denial *omitted* both of the statements quoted above.

After this article was written, Castro was questioned by two other journalists regarding the origination of the plan to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba. According to Herbert L. Matthews (*Return to Cuba*, Stanford University *Hispanic American Report* series [1964], 16), Castro stated flatly on October 23, 1963, that "the idea of installing the nuclear weapons was his, not the Russians'." However, three weeks later, according to Jean Daniel's account of his interview with the Cuban Premier, Castro appeared to confirm the account given earlier in the Julien interview: "We thought of a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. . . . They [the Russians] reasoned that if conventional military assistance was the extent of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to instigate an invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this would inevitably touch off a world war. . . . Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans refuse to share the risks taken to save us?" (Jean Daniel, "Unofficial Envoy: An Historic Report from Two Capitals," *New Republic*, December 14, 1963, 18-19.) Matthews writes that he telephoned Castro after Daniel's account was published and was again told: "We were the ones who put forward the idea of the missiles" (*Return to Cuba*, 16).

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ments with which Khrushchev has had to deal since the Cuban missile crisis.[25]

Before the crisis, Khrushchev's expressions of strategic support for Cuba were framed in notably cautious and equivocal terms: the USSR's capability to defend Cuba with Soviet-based missiles was affirmed, but a commitment to do so was carefully avoided.[26] Cuban leaders, however, consistently interpreted Khrushchev's words as if they represented a firm, though tacit, commitment. For example, according to Guevara, in January 1961 it was already "well known that the Soviet Union and all the socialist states *are ready to go to war* to defend our sovereignty and that *a tacit agreement* has been reached between our peoples."[27]

It may be assumed that the Cuban leaders had pressed Khrushchev for an explicit and unequivocal commitment to defend Cuba with Soviet-based weapons in the event of a U.S. attack. It was presumably to secure such a commitment, which the Soviet Union was evidently reluctant to give, that Castro in effect volunteered Cuba for membership in the "socialist camp" in 1961. As between an explicit and unequivocal Soviet guarantee, on the one hand, and the stationing of Soviet strategic weapons on Cuban soil, on the other, Castro might well have preferred the former under certain circumstances. To the extent that Castro (1) could have had confidence that the Soviet Union would honor such a commitment; or (2) believed that it would be credited to some serious extent in the United States; or (3) believed that a U.S. attack was unlikely in any case, he might not have deemed it necessary to request the Soviet Union to establish strategic missile bases in Cuba and might have been wary of the political consequences of such a move at home, throughout Latin America, and in the United States.

[25] Khrushchev handled this question gingerly in defending his Cuban policy against Chinese and Albanian criticism in his speech at the Congress of the SED in Berlin on January 16, 1963: "One may object that, under the influence of the most unrestrained incitement, the U.S. imperialists will not keep their promise and will again turn their arms against Cuba. But the forces which protected Cuba now exist and are *growing in strength every day*. It does not matter where the rockets are located, in Cuba, or elsewhere. They can be used with equal success against any particular aggression." (*Pravda,* January 17, 1963; emphasis supplied.) The implicit question is: If so, why were Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba in the first place? The implicit answer is: Soviet-based strategic power was not *then* great enough to deter a U.S. attack, but it is "growing in strength every day" and soon will be (or will appear to be).

[26] In July 1960, Khrushchev said that "figuratively speaking, in case of need, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire. . . ." (*Pravda,* July 9, 1960.) The conditional form of this threat ("can," not "will," support) was retained in the Soviet Government's statement on Cuba on September 11, 1962, which asserted that the USSR *"has the capability* from its own territory to render assistance to any peace-loving state." (*Pravda,* September 11, 1962.)

[27] *Obra Revolucionaria,* January 25, 1961, quoted by Draper, "Castro and Communism," 39. (Emphasis supplied.)

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For the *Soviet Union* to propose that its strategic weapons be deployed in Cuba, however, may have been another matter. Let us assume that, regardless of the real intentions of the U.S. Government, Castro believed the probability of a U.S. attack was not negligible. He may have agreed to the Soviet proposal not only because of his dependence on the Soviet Union, but also because, from the Cuban point of view, if the Soviet leaders believed their "world-wide" position vis-à-vis the United States was such that it required reinforcement by drastic means, the reliability of Soviet pledges to defend Cuba with Soviet-based weapons—equivocal pledges to begin with—must have seemed seriously compromised.[28]

What was the "world-wide" position of the Soviet Union that needed to be reinforced by the emplacement of strategic weapons in Cuba? Despite boastful Soviet efforts to conceal it, the fact is that throughout the cold war the Soviet Union's capacity to strike the United States with nuclear weapons has been very much smaller than the U.S. capacity to strike the USSR. From the start, the bulk of the USSR's strategic nuclear capability has been effective only out to ranges of about 2,000-2,500 miles. The Soviet Union acquired a very potent nuclear capability against Western Europe, first with medium bombers and then with medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles of the type it tried to emplace in Cuba. But the Soviet heavy bomber and ICBM forces—that is, the long-range weapons required to reach the United States—did not attain the strength levels that Western observers anticipated they would reach in the 1960's. Inflated beliefs in the West, actively promoted by misleading and deceptive Soviet claims, that the Soviet Union was rapidly acquiring a large intercontinental strike force tended, until the fall of 1961, to deprive continued and even growing U.S. strategic superiority of much of its *political* value. But, in the second half of 1961, the "missile gap" was found, in Secretary McNamara's words, to be "a myth."[29] Confidence in U.S. strategic superiority was restored in the West; moreover, it became apparent, both from Soviet behavior and from the

[28] In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the pre-crisis positions of the Soviet Union and Cuba on the firmness of Soviet pledges to defend Cuba were sharply reversed. Whereas the Soviet leaders, presumably to placate Castro, offered increasingly strong pledges to defend Cuba, Cuban leaders ignored them and vowed to resist any U.S. attack with their own resources. Later, however, as Soviet-Cuban relations recovered from the estrangement of the fall of 1962, Cuban leaders began to welcome Soviet pledges with great public enthusiasm.

[29] Quoted in an interview by Stewart Alsop, "Our New Strategy: The Alternatives to Total War," *Saturday Evening Post,* December 1, 1962, 18.

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modification of Soviet strategic claims, that the Soviet leaders knew that the West had been undeceived about the strategic balance.[30]

The deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba may have recommended itself to the Soviet leaders as a "quick fix" measure to achieve a substantial, though far from optimal, improvement in Soviet strike capabilities against the United States. Of course, a large increase in the programmed Soviet-based ICBM force would have provided the Soviet leaders with a military capability far more effective (certainly for second-strike purposes) than could be achieved by the emplacement of highly vulnerable MRBM's, IRBM's, and light bombers in Cuba. But such an expansion of the ICBM (and missile-launching nuclear submarine) force could be achieved only gradually and at far greater cost. The Cuban deployment may not have been undertaken as a substitute for such a build-up, but as a stopgap measure, pending its completion.

Certainly the deployment of limited numbers of MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba would not have solved the Soviet Union's strategic problem. The evident deficiencies of such a force have led some observers to conclude that military considerations were of little importance in the Soviet decision to emplace strategic weapons in Cuba. It is true that the missile sites were soft, very close to the United States, and, after detection, under close and constant surveillance. They would presumably have been highly vulnerable to a U.S. first strike, even with conventional bombs. As a Soviet first-strike force, the Cuba-based force deployed or being readied as of October 1962 was in itself too small to destroy the U.S. strategic nuclear strike force. Even together with the larger long-range strategic force based in the USSR, it seems most unlikely that the force would have been adequate in the fall of 1962; moreover, there would have been a problem, though perhaps not an insurmountable one, of coordinating salvoes from close-in and distant bases so as to avoid a ragged attack. By the same token, however, the installation of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba would have complicated a U.S. first strike, improved Soviet capabilities to launch a preemptive attack, and hence reduced the credibility of U.S. strategic deterrence of local Soviet aggression, say, in Europe. As to the first-strike potential of Cuba-based Soviet missiles, they could have brought a substantial portion of U.S. nuclear

[30] Soviet strategic pronouncements after the fall of 1961 shifted from claims of superiority to efforts to deprive American claims to superiority of political value by emphasizing the adequacy of Soviet retaliatory capability. Soviet leaders began explicitly to declare their readiness to accept strategic parity as the basic assumption from which political settlements should proceed (e.g., Marshal Malinovsky's *Pravda* interview, January 25, 1962). The emphasis in claims regarding the USSR's strike capability against the United States shifted from the *high level* of destruction that could be inflicted to the *certainty* that some unspecified level of retaliation would occur.

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striking power under an attack essentially without warning; moreover, there is no assurance that the build-up would have stopped with the sites already completed or under construction when the Soviets were compelled to abandon the operation.

Whatever their strategic shortcomings, the additional capabilities with which Cuba-based missiles would have provided the Soviet leaders were not insignificant. It is difficult to conceive of any other measure that promised to produce so large an improvement in the Soviet strategic position as quickly or as cheaply. That the Cuban missile deployment would not in itself have provided the Soviet Union with a retaliation-proof first-strike capability against the United States is hardly a reason for dismissing it as of limited strategic importance, as some observers have attempted to do. As the President subsequently said, the Soviet leaders tried materially to change the balance of power. Certainly, the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, in his words, "would have politically changed the balance of power; it would have appeared to [change it] and appearances contribute to reality."[31]

The "world-wide" position of the Soviet Union that needed to be reinforced in the fall of 1962 was not only its strategic position vis-à-vis the United States, but also its position in a range of political issues upon which the strategic imbalance in favor of the United States was having some important bearing. It had become evident, since at least the second half of 1961, that the forward momentum of the Soviet Union in international affairs had largely exhausted itself without yielding the gains which the Soviet leaders had anticipated and the West had feared since the mid-1950's.

These expectations had been fed by mounting evidence of the growing military, scientific, technological, and economic power of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the West. Some of this evidence was real enough, but much of it, particularly in the realm of strategic power, was illusory. In the framework of the cold war, precisely this realm was central. The effects of other striking achievements, as, for example, in space exploration, were amplified, sometimes out of all proportion to their intrinsic political and military worth, by their presumed bearing on the strategic balance. With the discovery that the "missile gap" had failed to materialize, or had actually materialized in reverse, there was a perceptible change in the world political climate. Western self-confidence was restored and Soviet anxieties must have grown.

[31] *Washington Post,* December 18, 1962.

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Moreover, confident Soviet expectations of a few years earlier in regard to dividends from Soviet military and economic aid to the underdeveloped countries failed to materialize. Western European prosperity had reached a new peak, and despite de Gaulle's intransigence the prospects for growing European economic and political unity must (then, at least) have looked distressingly good to Moscow. At the same time, the unity of the Communist camp was being shattered by the escalating conflict between its two most powerful members. Indeed, the Chinese Communist attack on Khrushchev centered precisely on the unfavorable trend in the cold war which the Chinese attributed to Khrushchev's faulty and overcautious leadership.

Finally, there was the long-smoldering, still unresolved problem of Berlin. After almost four years of threats and retreats, Khrushchev had still not succeeded in compelling the West to accept a Berlin settlement on Soviet terms. Khrushchev may therefore have sought some quick and dramatic means for achieving a breakthrough that would strengthen the USSR's position — militarily, diplomatically, and psychologically — on a whole range of outstanding issues, and particularly on Berlin.[32]

Rarely, if ever, are such fateful ventures as the Soviet strategic deployment in Cuba undertaken to achieve narrow or isolated objectives. Where nuclear weapons are involved, even small risks are acceptable only if important interests can be advanced by assuming them. It is most unlikely that the Soviet leaders drew up a precise blueprint or detailed timetable for exploitation of the improved military-political position they would have attained had the Cuban venture been successful. But they probably anticipated that the emplacement of strategic missiles in Cuba and their acceptance by the United States would contribute in some degree to the solution of a whole range of military-political problems confronting the Soviet Union and would alter the environment of the cold war in such a manner as to promote new opportunities for political gain whose nature could not be precisely foreseen.

[32] A link between the Cuban missile deployment and Khrushchev's Berlin strategy was suggested by the Soviet Government's statement of September 11, 1962, in which the USSR acknowledged that it was providing military assistance — though of a strictly defensive type — to Cuba, and warned that a U.S. attack on Cuba might unleash the beginning of a thermonuclear war, but at the same time declared a moratorium on new moves in Berlin until after the U.S. Congressional elections. (*Pravda,* September 11, 1962.) Khrushchev may have hoped to discourage any new U.S. action in regard to Cuba until after the elections (i.e., until after the MRBM's, at least, became operational), by offering, in return, to desist from fomenting a new crisis in Berlin, and then, after establishing a strategic base in Cuba, to use this new leverage to press for a favorable settlement in Berlin.

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II. Soviet Pre-crisis Calculations

Granted that the stationing of strategic missiles in Cuba promised to be advantageous to the Soviet leaders for a variety of reasons; granted even that the pay-offs seemed so alluring as to justify the assumption of greater risks than they had taken in previous cold war maneuvers, still the question remains: What led the Soviet leaders to believe they could succeed?

With the benefit of hindsight, many Western observers have concluded that Khrushchev's bold move in Cuba was doomed to failure from the start. This in turn has led to the conjecture that Khrushchev never intended to leave the missiles in Cuba, but wished merely to exact political concessions from the United States in return for their withdrawal. This supposition has already been examined and rejected. Others, who also believed the odds against success for the Soviets were very high, concluded that Khrushchev's Cuban gamble explodes one of the articles of faith of Kremlinologists about Bolshevik behavior—namely, the tenet that holds that good Bolsheviks will not engage in adventurism, adventurism being defined as the taking of even small risks of large catastrophes, such as the destruction of the citadel of communism, the Soviet Union. Certainly if it were true that Khrushchev, in undertaking to deploy strategic missiles in Cuba, consciously and deliberately accepted the risk that by this action alone he might bring down a thermonuclear attack upon the Soviet Union, this indeed would have signified a sharp and very dangerous break with past Soviet practice, perhaps the initiation of a new and more ominous phase of the cold war.

But while the Soviet leaders evidently did accept some unusually high military and political risks in embarking on the Cuban venture, the risk of an immediate U.S. thermonuclear response against the Soviet Union was almost certainly not one of them. Moreover, whatever errors they may have made in anticipating the character and intensity of the U.S. response, they were doubtless correct in excluding that one. This established a very crucial upper limit on the risks they did willingly accept.

Given the considerable margin of American strategic superiority which the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba was intended to reduce, on what grounds could the Soviet leaders be confident that the United States would not launch a first strike against the USSR in order to forestall an unfavorable change in the strategic balance? Throughout the cold war, Soviet leaders have demonstrated great confidence in their ability to control the danger of thermonuclear war by means other than

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the possession of very large intercontinental strategic capabilities. This was true when the strategic balance was far more unfavorable to the Soviet Union than it was in October 1962.

In part this confidence has been based on the powerful indirect deterrent threat of Soviet military power, at first only conventional, and then nuclear, poised to strike Western Europe, the hostage. Later it was reinforced by the threat of even a quantitatively modest intercontinental strike force and of growing U.S. uncertainty regarding the size of that force and the possible upper limits of damage that it could inflict upon the United States. But chiefly the grounds for this confidence have been political. Even when the United States enjoyed decisive strategic superiority, its leaders showed themselves to be strongly disinclined to initiate general war so long as the Soviet Union avoided extreme measures of provocation that could not be dealt with by other means. Increasingly it must have appeared to the Soviet leaders that nothing short of the actual *application* of violence against the United States or an important U.S. ally would risk a U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Of course, lesser forms of provocation might create a situation in which the danger of thermonuclear war might be raised to higher levels, but in such cases the Soviet leaders have always allowed themselves ample room for maneuver, and, if necessary, retreat (as in Berlin). They have evidently estimated that sufficient *time* would be available to permit them to extricate themselves from a dangerous situation before it could become uncontrollably dangerous.

The history of the cold war demonstrates that the Soviet leaders have sufficient reason for such an estimate. This estimate is crucial for assessing Soviet risk calculations in Cuba. If one excludes from Soviet precrisis calculations serious concern that the United States, even if it detected the missile build-up before completion, would launch a thermonuclear attack against the Soviet Union, then the venture no longer appears to have been a reckless long-shot gamble, but a more familiar calculated and limited risk accepted for sufficiently weighty stakes. This does not mean that as the crisis unfolded the Soviet leaders did not become concerned that a situation might be arising in which a real danger of nuclear war might be created. In fact, the quick withdrawal of their missiles, as we shall see, may be interpreted as a decision to end the crisis quickly before it became necessary to accept even greater losses which could be avoided, if at all, only at the cost of facing serious risk of nuclear war.

Confidence that their action would not directly provoke nuclear war was a prerequisite for embarking on the Cuban missile venture, but it

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could not be a sufficient condition for success. What then, aside from their belief that the United States would not respond by striking the Soviet Union, were the calculations that led the Soviet leaders to believe their venture could succeed?

Undoubtedly, the Soviet leaders' understanding (or misunderstanding) of U.S. Cuban policy was a major factor in their decision. The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion attempt of April 1961, while it may have demonstrated the depths of U.S. hostility toward Castro, may have also suggested to the Soviet leaders that U.S. reluctance to engage its own forces directly in military action against Cuba was so great that even the emplacement of Soviet strategic weapons on the island would be tolerated, or at least resisted by means short of the direct use of U.S. armed forces. At the same time, the fact that the United States had attempted, even though ineffectually, through the use of Cuban exile proxies, to overthrow Castro, both increased Castro's desire for Soviet military assistance and made such assistance seem legitimate to many third countries.

The U.S. Government's apparent acceptance of increasingly open Soviet involvement in Cuban affairs after the Bay of Pigs incident, including particularly the Soviet military involvement, may have strengthened the belief of the Soviet leaders that the United States would engage in armed intervention only in response to the actual use of Cuba-based weapons against some Western Hemisphere country.

The Soviet arms build-up in Cuba was conducted in fairly distinct phases, beginning with the delivery of basic conventional weapons, then working up to more sophisticated weapon systems of a tactical type, and finally to advanced SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, which had been at least partially deployed before strategic missiles were introduced into the island in September 1962. Doubtless the U.S. reaction to the arrival of each new type of weapon was closely observed in Moscow. However, the problem of interpretation must have become increasingly difficult over time, because as the character of the weapons shipped to Cuba grew more complex, their delivery and deployment became increasingly covert; hence, there must have been some uncertainty as to whether the U.S. Government was tacitly accepting the presence of new Soviet weapons or had not yet learned of their arrival. If so, the Soviet leaders evidently resolved these uncertainties in favor of assuming U.S. toleration.

However, if the Soviet leaders had placed a permissive interpretation on generalized statements by U.S. leaders during July and August 1962, regarding "defensive" (acceptable) and "offensive" (unacceptable) Soviet weapons in Cuba, the President on September 4 and again on Sep-

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tember 13 explicitly placed surface-to-surface missiles in a category which the U.S. Government considered "offensive," and, hence, unacceptable.[33] Moreover, the President stated specifically on the second occasion that U.S. action would not have to await some overt act, but would occur "if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States."

The President's first explicit statement on surface-to-surface missiles came several days before the earliest date that the first Soviet missiles and associated equipment, clandestinely transported to Cuba in the holds of large-hatch Soviet ships, are estimated to have reached Cuban ports—around September 8.[34] The second statement, which warned that the mere presence of such weapons, even without any overt act, would require the U.S. Government to act, was made before the earliest estimated date for the initiation of site construction and deployment activity, between September 15 and 20.[35] Thus, the Soviets had two opportunities, shortly before their plan to emplace strategic missiles in Cuba entered its final and decisive phases, to reconsider their decision in the light of evidence of a U.S. commitment to oppose. The President's warnings may have raised anxiety in Moscow, but they clearly did not deter the Soviet leaders. Why?

Assuming that the Soviet leaders regarded the President's statements as a commitment by the U.S. Government to take some kind of action to oppose the emplacement of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba, they may have believed that, at least initially, the United States would restrict itself to diplomatic means. They may further have relied on their ability to achieve an operational capability with the missiles quickly enough to ensure the success of the venture. The deployment was carried out with a rapidity that the U.S. intelligence community found "remarkable."[36] Had the Soviets succeeded in achieving their evident objectives of attaining an operational capability clandestinely and then confronting the United States with a *fait accompli,* the outcome *might* have been different. (However, the difference that a *fait accompli* need have made should not be exaggerated.)[37] Speaking of the week-long deliberations

[33] *New York Times,* September 5 and 14, 1962.
[34] *Hearings,* 25. [35] *Ibid.*
[36] Testimony of John Hughes, Defense Intelligence Agency, *ibid.,* 6.
[37] Actually, if the same U.S. policy had been adopted for dealing with the situation, the outcome need not have been different even if the Soviet missiles had been operational at the time of their detection. The missile sites would still have been highly vulnerable to attack and Soviet reluctance to initiate a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange would presumably still have been sufficiently great to make the threat of a U.S. attack on Cuban bases highly credible. However, sufficient doubt might have arisen on the U.S. side so as to cause a different U.S. policy to be adopted for dealing with the crisis.

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that preceded the President's crucial decision in October, Theodore C. Sorensen, special counsel to the President, said that the pressure of time was keenly felt: "For all of us knew that, once the missile sites under construction became operational, and capable of responding to any apparent threat or command with a nuclear volley, the President's options would be drastically changed."[38]

However, the Soviet leaders may not have relied entirely on avoiding detection before completion of the missile deployment, although this was doubtless their preference. Given the difficulties involved in maintaining complete secrecy and the apparent willingness of the Soviets to trade off some possible measures of concealment for greater speed, they could not exclude the possibility that some evidence of the deployment would be at the disposal of the U.S. Government before it could be completed. Allegations, sometimes attributed to Cuban refugees and sometimes even to unnamed members of the intelligence community, that Soviet strategic missiles were present in Cuba had been publicized in the United States even before the first shipment of these weapons is believed to have arrived in Cuba. From the Soviet point of view, the airing of these charges may not have been harmful. Since the Administration was obliged publicly to deny these allegations and to insist repeatedly that the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba posed no threat to U.S. security, the Soviet leaders might have calculated that the President and his advisers, having thus gone on record, would hesitate to charge the Soviet Union with installing offensive weapons in Cuba so long as the evidence placed before them was ambiguous. Moreover, the Soviet leaders may also have believed that the Administration would be reluctant to expose the Soviet Union publicly on the eve of national elections out of concern for unfavorable domestic political repercussions that might be expected if the elections were held with the missiles still in Cuba and no Soviet commitment to withdraw them.

In general, the Soviet leaders probably believed that time worked in their favor and that it was therefore necessary to utilize deception and diplomacy to gain it. They could hardly have expected to be able to maintain their deception indefinitely; indeed, the objectives they pursued required at some point that the new Soviet military capabilities be discovered or revealed. In the event of premature detection, the Soviet leaders may have relied on diplomacy to take over from deception. They probably viewed the likelihood of a strong U.S. reaction as declining over time as numbers of Soviet strategic missiles became operational

[38] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows* (New York 1963), 31.

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and the American people and their government grew "accustomed" to the fact of their presence in Cuba.

The Soviet leaders may have come to the conclusion, based on their past experiences with and understanding of the U.S. decision-making process, that the ability of the U.S. Government to assess the situation rapidly and to plan and implement a policy for dealing with it quickly was severely constrained. They may also have counted for time on the likelihood that the U.S. Government would first have to consult with its NATO allies, who could be expected, at the least, to take a less urgent view of the situation than the U.S. Government. They may also have expected that there would be some significant opposition in the Organization of American States to any U.S. proposals for immediate joint action requiring the use of military forces. In short, the Soviet leaders probably estimated that the likelihood of prompt unilateral action by the United States was small. Moreover, they may have reckoned on reducing this probability even more by presenting the United States with a *fait accompli* of such a nature that the prompt unilateral action to reverse it would appear to the U.S. Government to require the initiation of violence.

If these were some of the calculations of the Soviet leaders, events proved them to be wrong on almost every point. This must have come as a great shock to them. The collapse of confidence which evidently caused Khrushchev on October 26 to send off to President Kennedy a private communication in which he reportedly indicated that he was prepared to yield may have been the culminating point of a whole series of disappointed expectations.[39] Because these expectations were not realized, however, does not necessarily mean they were without reasonable bases. Many observers in the West, too, were surprised—though pleasantly—at the speed and efficiency with which the U.S. Government moved, once reliable evidence of the Soviet strategic weapon build-up in Cuba became available.

One other consideration that may have weighed heavily in Soviet planning must be mentioned here—Berlin. If, contrary to probable Soviet expectations, the U.S. Government deemed military action to be an appropriate response, and if the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba,

[39] Apparent inconsistencies and contradictions in communications received in Washington from Moscow and in Soviet press treatment of the crisis suggest that Soviet decision-making was being conducted in an environment of considerable uncertainty and perhaps even sharp controversy among political and military elite groups. (See Roman Kolkowicz, *Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations: 1962-1963*, The RAND Corporation, RM-3760-PR, August 1963.)

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even supposing them to be operational, proved in itself insufficient to deter such action, the Soviet leaders may still have hoped that the United States would be restrained by fear of possible Soviet retaliation in Berlin. Eighteen months earlier, at the time of the landings in the Bay of Pigs, Khrushchev had in his first letter to President Kennedy obliquely invoked the threat of Soviet retaliation in another part of the world in response to U.S. intervention in Cuba: "We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others choose to aggravate it, we shall reply in full measure. And in general, it is hardly possible to handle matters in such a way as to settle the situation and put the fire out in one area while kindling a new conflagration in another area."[40]

Whether the Soviet leaders were actually prepared to retaliate in Berlin in October 1962 is another matter, which we shall later consider. But there was no lack of evidence available to the Soviet leaders to make it appear plausible to them that U.S. policy on Cuba might be influenced critically by U.S. concern over the threat to West Berlin.

For example, in his press conference of August 29, 1962, President Kennedy directly linked U.S. policy on Cuba with U.S. obligations in West Berlin: "The U.S. has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin . . . , and therefore I think that in considering what appropriate action we should take we have to consider the totality of our obligations and also the responsibilities we bear in so many different parts of the world."[41]

That U.S. planners were concerned during the Cuban crisis about possible Soviet counteraction in Berlin has been widely reported.[42] In his October 22 speech, the President made a special point of warning the Soviet leaders against such a course of action: "This latest Soviet threat or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed, including in particular the brave people of West Berlin, will be met by whatever action is needed."[43]

If the Soviet leaders had hoped that such concerns would inhibit a strong U.S. reaction to their deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba, events, of course, proved them to be mistaken. But, again in this regard, their expectations were not entirely without foundation.

[40] *Pravda,* April 19, 1961. The reference at that time was presumably to Laos.
[41] *New York Times,* August 30, 1962.
[42] See, for example, the chronological account of the Cuban crisis published in *ibid.,* November 3, 1962.
[43] *Ibid.,* October 23, 1962.

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III. Soviet Crisis Calculations

We have now arrived at the third of the three questions posed at the beginning of this paper: Why did Khrushchev change course so precipitately and withdraw his strategic missiles and bombers from Cuba? Implicitly, some reasons have been adduced in the preceding discussion of probable Soviet pre-crisis miscalculations. It remains to make these points explicit and to amplify them.

(1) The Soviet leaders had evidently hoped to present the United States with a *fait accompli* in Cuba (like the hastily erected Berlin wall in August 1961). As it turned out, however, the Soviet deployment was not yet completed when the President instituted the quarantine and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet strategic weapons. The U.S. Government had more freedom of choice and action than the Soviet leaders probably foresaw.

(2) By effectively preserving secrecy regarding the response it had chosen to make, the U.S. Government, on October 22, was able to present the Soviet Union with what was, in some sense, an American *fait accompli*: the quarantine.[44]

(3) The character of the U.S. response, as set forth by the President on October 22, apparently confounded the Soviet leaders. By imposing a quarantine on strategic arms shipments to Cuba as the first in a series of measures designed not only to prevent a further build-up, but to secure the removal of weapons already on the island—the other measures remained deliberately unspecified—the United States in some sense shifted on to the Soviet side the immediate burden of decision regarding the precipitation of violence. As an initial response the quarantine was considerably less than a direct application of violence, but considerably more than a mere protest or verbal threat. The U.S. Navy placed itself physically between Cuba and Soviet ships bound for Cuban ports. Technically, it might still have been necessary for the United States to fire the first shot had Khrushchev chosen to defy the quarantine, though other means of preventing Soviet penetration might have been employed. But once the quarantine was effectively established—which was done with great speed—it was Khrushchev who had to make the next key decision: whether or not to risk releasing the trip-wire.

In dealing with the quarantine itself, the Soviet leaders essentially had

[44] Speaking of the deliberations which led up to the President's October 22 speech, Theodore Sorensen said that "all of us knew that, once the Soviets learned of our information and planning, our prospects for surprise and initiative would be greatly lessened." (*Decision-Making in the White House*, 31.)

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three choices, all of them unpleasant, and one of them quite dangerous: (1) They could submit to the quarantine by permitting their vessels to be stopped, searched, and, if they carried contraband, to be seized; or (2) they could avoid a showdown by keeping their ships out of the quarantine area—which, with the exception of an oil tanker clearly identifiable as such, is what they actually did;[45] or (3) they could precipitate the use of violence by attempting to violate the quarantine, perhaps with the aid of submarines. Soviet prospects for success in such an undertaking were very poor; and the outlook could not have appeared any brighter to them at any of the successively higher local levels of violence that could be contemplated.

(4) U.S. success in securing prompt and unanimous support for the quarantine in the OAS and the active participation of naval elements from some Latin American countries in the operation must have made the Soviet leaders pessimistic about the chances of bringing diplomatic pressure effectively to bear on the United States to lift the quarantine.[46] This may have caused the Soviet leaders to regard a "waiting strategy" as less promising diplomatically than they had anticipated, while the U.S. military preparations also made such a strategy appear increasingly risky.

(5) The President's decision to confront the Soviet Union directly and to ignore Castro also compelled the Soviet leaders to determine their course of action quickly. It removed the ground from under any Soviet effort to involve the United States in negotiations with the Cuban Government, as the Soviet leaders subsequently attempted unsuccessfully to do in connection with the IL-28 bombers. Diplomatically and morally, the U.S. decision to confront the Soviet Union directly made it possible to separate the specific issue of the menacing Soviet weapon deployment in Cuba from the broad and controversial issue of U.S.-Cuban relations.

(6) Finally, there was the speed and evident resolution with which the U.S. Government acted in the Cuban missile crisis. This refers not only to the prompt and successful implementation of the quarantine, the rapid securing of OAS cooperation and NATO support, but above all

[45] Sixteen out of 18 Soviet dry-cargo ships en route to Cuba, presumably those containing quarantined items, reversed course and returned to the Soviet Union. (*Hearings,* 13.)

[46] Theodore Sorensen has suggested that if the OAS had failed to provide the necessary vote authorizing a Cuban quarantine, "the Soviets and possibly others might have been emboldened to challenge the legality of our action, creating confusion and irresolution in the Western camp and giving rise to all kinds of cargo insurance and admiralty questions that this nation would not enjoy untangling." (*Decision-Making in the White House,* 24-25.)

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to the speed and impressiveness of the U.S. conventional military build-up in the southeastern states and of the alert measures taken by U.S. strategic forces around the world. There is no doubt that these preparations were carefully noted by Moscow, and we can probably take at face value Khrushchev's statement of December 12, 1962, that he took his decision to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba after receiving urgent word that a U.S. attack was imminent. These preparations must have persuaded him that he had to act quickly in order to limit his losses. Evidently Khrushchev was unwilling to gamble further on the possibility that the U.S. Government would ultimately stop short of direct military action, for losing such a gamble would have meant accepting far greater local losses, and perhaps even risking general war.[47]

Whether it was mainly conventional U.S. military superiority in the Caribbean area or overall U.S. strategic nuclear superiority that won the day—a hotly debated question in the aftermath of the crisis—does not strike this writer as a useful way to pose the problem. The United States possessed superiority of both types and brought both to bear in the crisis: the presence of one reinforced the effectiveness of the other. The *immediate* military threat confronting the Soviet leaders was, of course, that posed locally to Soviet forces in Cuba and to the Castro regime. But this threat was amplified by U.S. strategic superiority, which made credible the announced determination of the U.S. Government to employ force locally if other measures, such as the quarantine, proved inadequate, and to retaliate against the Soviet Union if Cuba-based weapons were launched against targets anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. Extraordinary alert measures taken by the Strategic Air Command, including such conspicuous ones as the dispersal of B-47's to auxiliary civilian airfields, underscored this determination. Manifest U.S. strategic superiority rendered Soviet strategic deterrence of a local U.S. attack on Cuba inoperable.

It may be true that even a strategic balance less favorable to the United

[47] In regard to the role played by the danger of general war in Khrushchev's decision to withdraw Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba, Secretary McNamara testified before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in February 1963: "... we had a force of several hundred thousand men ready to invade Cuba ... had we invaded Cuba, we would have been confronted with the Soviets ... had we been confronted with the Soviets we would have killed thousands of them ... had we killed thousands of them the Soviets would probably have had to respond ... they might have had nuclear delivery weapons there [that] might have been operational and they might have been launched ... in any event, Khrushchev knew without any question whatever that he faced the full military power of the United States, including its nuclear weapons ... we faced that night the possibility of launching nuclear weapons and Khrushchev knew it, and that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons." (*Hearings,* 31.)

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States—say, one of acknowledged parity—would have been sufficient to support the policy implemented by the U.S. Government in October 1962; that is, the Soviet leaders would still have been unable to deter a U.S. attack on Cuba by credibly threatening strategic retaliation against the United States. But U.S. strategic superiority also made it too risky for the Soviet Union to play or, under the circumstances, even threaten to play the Berlin trump card. While some Western observers feared that the Soviet Union might attempt to dissuade the United States from calling the Soviet hand in Cuba by threatening to retaliate in Berlin, the Soviet leaders apparently feared that a threatening Soviet move in that city, *particularly* in the midst of a crisis in the Caribbean, would be dangerously provocative. Emphasizing that the Cuban crisis "had brought the world one step, perhaps only half a step, from an abyss," Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Supreme Soviet in December 1962: "This [Cuban] crisis . . . made many people think how the whole matter might have developed if yet another crisis in Central Europe had been added to the critical events around Cuba."[48] Indeed, Soviet quiescence in Berlin during and immediately after the Cuban missile crisis demonstrates the severe limitations of even overwhelming local military superiority in the hands of a strategically inferior power when the issue at stake is of central, not peripheral, importance to the opponent.[49]

The role played by Berlin in the Cuban crisis during the fall of 1962 dramatizes the curious role that threats, expectations, fears, and hopes regarding that city have played in the cold war since Khrushchev in November 1958 opened the long second round of the East-West struggle over the divided city. Much of Soviet foreign policy behavior since that time has been interpreted as maneuvering to secure a stronger position from which to impose on the West a Soviet-preferred solution of the Berlin "problem." Many regarded the Cuban missile deployment as designed chiefly to improve the Soviet bargaining position in the renewed crisis that was expected to be raised by the Russians after the U.S. elections in 1962. Since the Soviets appeared to be so intent on securing better leverage in Berlin, it would seem that they regarded it as too risky to proceed there without such leverage. Yet many who believed that Berlin was the real objective of the Soviet missile deployment also believed there was great danger that the Soviet leaders would retaliate in

[48] *Pravda,* December 14, 1962.

[49] For an illuminating discussion of this point and its relevance for decisions regarding the extent to which NATO should rely on conventional weapons for the tactical defense of Europe, see Bernard Brodie, "What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?" *The Reporter,* May 23, 1963, 25-33.

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Berlin for any local defeat inflicted upon them in Cuba by the United States. The logic is strange: U.S. strategic superiority and the Western allies' determination to preserve their rights in West Berlin made it too risky for the Soviets to employ their local military superiority in order to impose a settlement; yet the West must proceed with great caution elsewhere lest it provide the Soviet Union with a pretext for imposing its will in Berlin, or compel the Soviet leaders to do so, even against their better judgment, in order to "save face" for a defeat in some other part of the world.[50]

However, the Soviet leaders have never needed pretexts for plucking ripe fruits from the vine. The foreseeable consequences of a Western defeat in Berlin provide more than enough incentive for the Soviet leaders to administer it if they think they can do so safely. Khrushchev's need to "save face" has, in this writer's opinion, been grossly exaggerated; in any case, the Cuban missile crisis was not the first occasion on which Khrushchev seemed to be in need of "face-saving." The four preceding years of bluster and retreat in Berlin had certainly been "humiliating" enough.

Hopefully, one lesson that both sides have learned from the Cuban experience is that, so long as the West maintains a favorable strategic balance, the Soviet Union cannot use West Berlin as a hostage to cover Soviet offensive moves and probes in other parts of the world against strong Western countermeasures. "Hostage Western Berlin" should not be confused with "Hostage Western Europe." The Soviet threat to strike Western Europe in the event of a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union is highly credible because the ultimate catastrophe to the USSR would have already occurred when the threat would have to be executed; but to retaliate in West Berlin for some lesser Western "provocation" might cause that very catastrophe to be brought down upon the Soviet Union when it could otherwise be avoided.

[50] Walter Lippmann continued to argue after the crisis that "it would have been an incalculable risk to invade and occupy Cuba at the risk of retaliatory military action against Berlin, action which could have escalated into nuclear war." Yet the Soviet Union evidently yielded because its leaders found it highly credible that the United States would assume this "incalculable risk." According to Lippmann, "the United States prevailed in Cuba because, after nuclear power had been neutralized, it had powerful conventional weapons." ("Cuba and the Nuclear Risk," *The Atlantic,* February 1963, 56, 58.) But if U.S. nuclear power served no function other than to neutralize that of the Soviet Union, it is difficult to understand why preponderant Soviet conventional military power has not enabled the USSR to prevail in Berlin.

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MULTIPOLAR POWER SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY*

By KARL W. DEUTSCH and J. DAVID SINGER

IN the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position. Regardless of one's interpretation of the term or one's preference for or antipathy to it, the international relations scholar cannot escape dealing with it. The model is, of course, a multifaceted one, and it produces a fascinating array of corollaries; among these, the relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system is one of the most widely accepted and persuasive. That is, as the system moves away from bipolarity toward multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be expected to diminish.

To date, however, that direct correlation has not been subjected to rigorous scrutiny by either abstract or empirical test. For the most part, it has seemed so intuitively reasonable that a few historical illustrations have been accepted as sufficient. This is, on balance, not enough to support a lawful generalization; it must eventually be put to the historical test. This will be done eventually,[1] but in the interim this hypothesis should at least be examined on formal, abstract grounds. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to present two distinct—but related—lines of formal, semi-quantitative, argument as to why the diffusion-stability relationship should turn out as the theoretician has generally assumed and as the historian has often found to be the case.

I. A Probabilistic Concept of International Political Stability

Stability may, of course, be considered from the vantage point of both the total system and the individual states comprising it. From the broader, or systemic, point of view, we shall define stability as the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur. And from the more limited perspective of the individual nations, stability would refer to the probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming en-

* Research used in this article has been supported in part by the Carnegie Corporation.

[1] Data-gathering on this topic is currently being carried on by David Singer.

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gaged in a "war for survival." The acceptable level of this probability—such as 90, or 95, or 99 per cent—seems to be intuitively felt by political decision-makers, without necessarily being made explicit, but it could be inferred by investigators in the analysis of particular cases. A more stringent definition of stability would require also a low probability of the actors' becoming engaged even in limited wars.

This probabilistic concept of political stability differs from the stability concept used by L. F. Richardson, which was that of classical mechanics. Richardson's stability referred simply to any set of conditions under which the system would return to its equilibrium state; instability meant to him any state of affairs that would not so return, but rather would continue to change until reaching some limit or breakdown point of the system. A low rate of exponential growth of arms expenditures, of two competing powers—say, of 2 to 4 per cent a year—would be "unstable" in Richardson's terms, but might be compatible with a political stability for the indefinite future, as long as national per capita income or other indicators of the system's absorption capacity grew at least at the same rate. In that case, of course, the per cent for defense taken from the average per capita income would remain unchanging or might decline, with no untoward effects upon the internal financial or political stability of the states concerned—or upon the stability of the relation between them, as long as both continued to grow at similar rates.[2]

Richardson's essentially non-political stability concept and the political and probabilistic concept proposed here will lead to more closely similar results, however, if we reformulate Richardson's increments of arms expenditure of two rival states not in terms of dollars but in terms of per cent of national income. An arms race proper would then be defined as one in which the rival states stimulate one another to divert *increasing proportions of their national income* to military preparations—a practice with obvious political and economic limits, well before the entire 100 per cent of national income is consumed by military spending. The chief practical case investigated by Richardson, the arms race preceding World War I, was in fact of this nature, since the growth rate of the aggregate arms budgets of the two main coalitions was of the order of 15 per cent per year, in contrast to income growth rates of the order of only 5 per cent in the principal countries.

The political definition of equilibrium that we have just proposed is

[2] This argument does not take into account, of course, the effects of any radical changes in the quantity or effectiveness of weapons, or of the quantitative increase of currently available weapons of mass destruction to very high levels.

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quite compatible with the language used by Morton Kaplan.[3] In Kaplan's formulation, equilibrium and stability can be defined only in terms of particular variables, which must be chosen in advance. Thus, if we focus our attention upon the absolute level of armaments—say, in terms of a constant dollar expenditure at constant prices—the system would be stable, and a system in which the rival powers allocated constant proportions of their gross national products to armaments would appear to be unstable in these terms. If, however, these percentages of GNP themselves were chosen as the critical variables, the system would once again appear as stable.

The rest of this article will be presented in four sections. In the first, we link up the independent variable (number of independent actors) with the dependent one (stability of the system) by means of an emphasis on "interaction opportunity"—our intervening variable. In the second section, the interaction opportunity concept is extended to the point where it impinges on the degree of attention that any nation in the system may allocate to all of the other nations or to possible coalitions of nations. In the third, the multipolar and bipolar models are connected with Richardson's model of arms races and similar kinds of escalating conflicts. In the final section, these arguments are subjected to a new scrutiny, with the time scale introduced as a limiting factor.

II. The Accelerated Rise of Interaction Opportunities

The most obvious effect of an increase in the number of independent actors is an increase in the number of possible pairs or dyads in the total system. This assumes, of course, that the number of independent actors is responsive to the general impact of coalition membership, and that as a nation enters into the standard coalition it is much less of a free agent than it was while non-aligned. That is, its alliance partners now exercise an inhibiting effect—or perhaps even a veto—upon its freedom to interact with non-alliance nations.

[3] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Relations* (New York 1957), 6-8. Kaplan has formalized many classic formulations of balance-of-power theory. For outstanding examples of these, see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (3rd edn., New York 1960), 167-226; Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York 1962), 11-93; Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics* (6th edn., New York 1958), 70-72, 275-78, 577-79, 591-92; Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore 1962), 117-32; and Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago 1942), II, 743-46. For other attempts at formalization, see George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 23-56, 187-202; Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca 1955); and, for significant recent contributions, Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor 1960), and Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston 1963).

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This reduction in the number of possible dyadic relations produces, both for any individual nation and for the totality of those in the system, a corresponding diminution in the number of opportunities for interaction with other actors. Although it must be recognized at the outset that, in the international system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such opportunities are as likely to be competitive as they are to be cooperative, the overall effect is nevertheless destabilizing. The argument is nothing more than a special case of the widely employed pluralism model.

In that model, our focus is on the degree to which the system exhibits negative feedback as well as cross-pressuring. By negative—as distinguished from positive or amplifying—feedback, we refer to the phenomenon of self-correction: as stimuli in one particular direction increase, the system exhibits a decreasing response to those stimuli, and increasingly exhibits tendencies that counteract them. This is the self-restraining system, manifested in the automatic pilot, the steam-engine governor, and most integrated social systems, and it stands in contrast to the self-aggravating system as seen in forest fires, compound interest, nuclear fission, runaway inflation or deflation, and drug addiction.[4]

The pluralistic model asserts that the amplifying feedback tendency is strengthened, and the negative feedback tendency is weakened, to the extent that conflict positions are superimposed or reinforcing. Thus, if all clashes and incompatibilities in the system produce the same divisions and coalitions—if all members in class Blue line up *with* one another and *against* all or most of those in class Red—the line of cleavage will be wide and deep, with positive feedback operating both within and between the two classes or clusters. But if some members of class Blue have some incompatible interests with others in their class, and an overlap of interests with some of those in Red, there will be some degree of negative or self-correcting feedback both within and between the two classes.

This notion is analogous to that of cross-cutting pressure familiar to the student of politics. Here we observe that every individual plays a fairly large number of politically relevant roles and that most of these pull him in somewhat different attitudinal, behavioral, and organizational directions. For example, if an individual is (1) a loving parent, (2) a member of a militant veterans' organization, (3) owner of a factory, and (4) a Catholic, the first and third factors will tend to de-

[4] For an application of these and related concepts to a range of political questions, see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York 1963).

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flect him toward a "coexistence" foreign policy, the second will pull him toward a "holy war" orientation, and his religious affiliation will probably (in the 1960's) produce a deep ambivalence. Likewise, following Ralf Dahrendorf's formulation, if status difference is a major determinant of conflict exacerbation, and an individual is head of a family, a bank teller, and president of the lodge, he will coalesce with and against different people on different issues.[5] In each of these cases, his relatively large number of interaction opportunities produces a set of cross-pressures such as largely to inhibit any superimposition or reinforcement. The consequence would seem to favor social stability and to inhibit social cleavage; increasing differentiation and role specialization in industrial society has, in a sense, counteracted the Marxian expectation of class warfare.

Thus, in any given bilateral relationship, a rather limited range of possible interactions obtains, even if the relationship is highly symbiotic. But as additional actors are brought into the system, the range of possible interactions open to each—and hence to the total system—increases. In economics, this accretion produces the transformation from barter to market, and in any social setting it produces a comparable increase in the range and flexibility of possible interactions. Traditionally, social scientists have believed—and observed—that as the number of possible exchanges increases, so does the probability that the "invisible hand" of pluralistic interests will be effective. One might say that one of the greatest threats to the stability of any impersonal social system is the shortage of alternative partners.

If we assume, then, that any increase in the number of independent actors *is* conducive to stability, the question remains as to the quantitative nature of this correlation. Is there any particular level at which the system cannot be made more stable by the addition of new actors, or less stable by the loss of existing actors? Is there, furthermore, some critical level at which small changes become crucial? Our response must be based, of course, on the degree to which each single increment or decrement affects the number of possible dyads, or bilateral interaction opportunities, in the system. That effect is found by applying the standard formula for possible pairs: $\frac{N(N-1)}{2}$; thus, in a purely bipolar system, only one dyad or pair is possible, while a tripolar situation produces three pairs, four actors produce six pairs, five produce ten possible pairings, and so on, as shown in Figure 1.

[5] Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (June 1958), 176-77.

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

FIG. 1. INTERACTION OPPORTUNITY

This figure indicates rather dramatically the degree to which the number of independent actors affects the possible number of dyads, and thus interaction opportunities. Even as we move from bipolarity to a tripolar system, the interaction opportunities within the system triple, and when another single actor is added the possible dyadic relations increase by three, and so on, with each addition in the actor column producing an increment of N–1 in the interaction opportunity column. Intuitively, the student of international politics would note that until N reaches five, there is an insufficient number of possible dyads, and that beyond that level the stability-enhancing increment begins to grow very sharply.

So far, we have operated from the conservative assumption that all nations have identical interests, concerns, and goals, and though we would not want to exaggerate in the opposite direction, one cannot overlook the diversity that does exist. A landlocked nation can hardly offer fishing rights in its coastal waters, an agricultural surplus nation will seldom purchase those same foodstuffs, two underdeveloped nations are most unlikely to exchange machine tools, and a permanent member of the Security Council cannot be expected to give much for assurance of a seat in that organ. Every nation's needs and supplies differ, and the more nations there are, the greater will be the number and diversity of trade-offs available to the total system. As possible trade-offs increase, the greater the possibility for compensatory and

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stabilizing interactions to occur. That is, in a system characterized by conflict-generating scarcities, each and every increase in opportunities for cooperation (i.e., to engage in a mutually advantageous trade-off) will diminish the tendency to pursue a conflict up to, and over, the threshold of war.

Finally, membership in an alliance not only exercises a negative quantitative impact on a nation's interaction opportunities, but affects the quality of those that do continue to exist. On the one hand, the pattern-maintenance needs of the alliance will be such as to *minimize* (a) the range of issues over which it will conflict with an alliance partner, and (b) the intensity of such intra-alliance conflicts as are permitted. On the other hand, the establishment of such a clear-cut in-group-outgroup division can only lead to an *increase* in the range and intensity of any conflicts with non-alliance actors.

To summarize, one logical explanation for the correlation between number of independent actors and the probability of armed conflict lies in the realm of enhanced interaction opportunities, observed in terms of their quantity, diversity, and qualities.

III. The Accelerated Diminution in the Allocation of Attention

A second line of argument that should also support the hypothesized correlation between multipolarity and stability revolves around the notion of attention available for conflict. Here we assume that, as the number of independent actors in the system increases, the share of its attention that any nation can devote to any other must of necessity diminish. The argument need not, of course, postulate that each additional actor will attract an equal share of the attention of each of the other actors, or necessarily attract the same share as those already in the system. That share will be a function of many considerations and may vary rather widely. Let us assume, then, that any nation's total external attention—that is, its information-processing and resource-allocating capabilities—will be distributed among all others in the system according to a normal distribution, as illustrated in Figure 2.



Fig. 2. Share of Attention

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In this figure, we suggest that a very few of the total number of actors in the system receive very little of A's attention, that most of them receive a moderate share of that attention, and that a very few receive an impressively heavy share of it. But regardless of the shape of this attention distribution curve, the fact is that every actor claims *some.*

If those receiving a minimal share of A's attention were to disappear into a coalition, this would have only a minor impact on the amount of attention now left over for A to redistribute among the remaining independent actors. But if coalition were to occur among some of those receiving a greater share of that original attention, A would then be able to deal with the members of that coalition with fewer demands on its information-processing and energy-allocating capabilities; as a consequence, that remaining for allocation to the other actors in the system would be appreciably increased.

Now the limited attention capability of each nation in the system must be allocated between two different sets of relationships. First priority will tend to go to all of those dyadic relationships in which it is a partner, while the dyads of which it is not a member will receive a lesser, but not insignificant, degree of attention. Some recent illustrations of this latter demand might be found in the attention which the United States has expended on the Soviet-Yugoslavian, British-Egyptian, or Indian-Pakistan dyads, or which the USSR devoted to the Arab-Israeli, Cuban-American, or Franco-Algerian pairings. Regardless of membership or non-membership, each nation must spread its attention among most of the dyads in the system.

What, then, is the effect of any trend toward or away from bipolarity upon that distribution of attention? In Figure 3, we plot that distribution according to the assumption that, with each single addition to the number of independent actors, the total number of dyads in which nation A is a member will also increase by one, following the formula N−1. With each increment in the number of dyads of which A may be a member, the amount of attention available for any one such pairing will drop, as shown in the upper (solid line) curve. Thus three actors produce two possible dyads that include A, with an average of 50 per cent of A's attention available for each; four actors produce three such pairs and 33 per cent of A's attention for each; and five actors produce four A-inclusive dyads, with only 25 per cent of his attention available to each.

When we drop the condition that only those dyads of which A (any actor) is a member can constitute a drain on A's attention, and assume that *every* possible dyad will make some such demand, the attention

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

FIG. 3. ALLOCATION OF ATTENTION

curve responds even more rapidly to an increase in the number of independent actors. As the lower (dotted line) curve indicates, each new actor increases the total number of dyads by the $\frac{N(N-1)}{2}$ formula, as already used earlier in Figure 1, with the percentage of share of attention available to each dyad dropping even more sharply.

Why should these rapid decreases in percentage of available attention exercise any effect upon the stability of the system? In communication theory, it is generally recognized that below a certain signal-to-noise ratio, the signal is essentially undetectable; that is, it loses prominence as its strength vis-à-vis the noise (or random disturbance) in the system diminishes. The same general principle would seem to apply to social interaction; as Rapoport and Schelling have pointed out, interaction between any two nations may be viewed as a special case of the interchange of messages between them.[6] Each state in this case would have to treat the messages from its most prominent adversary of the moment as the signal relevant to this incipient conflict in or before its early stage of escalation; and it would tend to treat all other messages, concerning all other pairs of states, as noise of relatively little relevance to this particular conflict.[7]

[6] Rapoport, 213-22; Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 83-118.

[7] Cf. Colin Cherry, *On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism* (Cambridge-New York 1957), 42 and *passim*.

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The general requirement of at least a minimal signal-to-noise ratio would then hold for this incipient conflict, as it would hold for any other communication process; and we shall assume that it is approximated by the ratio of governmental attention to foreign messages from this particular rival, to all other messages concerning other states or pairs of states. Just what this signal-to-noise ratio—or, here, minimal attention ratio—would have to be is a question of empirical fact. Signal-to-noise ratios of 100:1 are not uncommon in electronic communication systems. It is perhaps not excessive to assume that the minimal attention ratio for an escalating conflict would have to be 1:9, since it does not seem likely that any country could be provoked very far into an escalating conflict with less than 10 per cent of the foreign policy attention of its government devoted to the matter.[8]

If we require a minimal attention of 10 per cent for an escalating conflict, the likelihood of such conflicts thus will decline sharply with the decline of the average attention that any one government has available for any one of the remaining actors in the international system.

The decline of this average available attention with an increasing number of actors in the system has been graphed in curves A and B in Figure 3, as discussed earlier. We can now show on the same graph the lines of minimal attention ratios required to permit average probabilities of, say, 20, 10, or 5 per cent for an escalating conflict between any two actors in the system. Several such lines, at the 10, 20, 30 . . . per cent levels of an assumed minimum attention ratio, have been drawn in Figure 3. Their intersections with curves A and B show how quickly the increase of the number of actors will remove an international system from the danger zone, or how fast a diminution in the number of actors will increase the average risk of escalating conflict among the remainder.

As far as it goes, this graphic representation confirms the greater stability of multipolar systems, and it suggests some quantitative findings. It shows that the average share of available attention for any one conflict drops sharply as soon as there are more than three power centers in the system, and more gently after there are more than five such centers; and it further suggests that the stability of the system may depend critically on the *critical attention ratio*—that is, on the proneness of countries to enter into escalating conflicts even if only a small part of their government's attention is engaged in this particular quarrel.

[8] For an earlier version of a related argument about mass attitudes to quarrels with a foreign country, see Karl W. Deutsch, "Mass Communication and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (July 1957), 200-11.

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Thus, if some minimum percentage of a nation's external attention is required for that nation to engage in behavior tending toward armed conflict, and the increase in number of independent actors diminishes the share that any nation can allocate to any other single actor, such an increase is likely to have a stabilizing effect upon the system.

IV. Some Implications for Richardson's Model of Escalating Conflict

The task of this section will be to correlate the propositions concerning the greater stability of multipolar systems in international politics, especially as recently formalized by Morton Kaplan, with the Richardson model of conflict;[9] and to show that the former proposition can be treated as a special case of the general Richardson model.

In the Richardson model of the arms race, or of similar competitive relations, conflict behavior of each of two parties is seen as growing at an exponential rate, similar to the growth of compound interest or to the progress of an explosion. The rate of this growth is described by a pair of differential equations in which one party's increase in armaments—or of other competitive behavior—is perceived as a threat and becomes the motivating input for the corresponding reciprocal or retaliatory response of the other. Thus, if country A had spent in the previous year $90 million on armaments, while its rival B had spent $100, and if A now tries to equal B and increases its armaments budgets from $90 million to $100, and if country B, which previously had spent $100 million, tries to maintain the previous ratio of arms budgets, then B must now spend $111 million in the following year; whereupon A, if its rulers still aim at parity with B, will now increase its budget accordingly to $111 million, forcing B to defend its old proportionate lead by raising its arms budget by $12.3 million to $123.3 million, so that not only the absolute amounts but also the *increases* in arms spending on both sides are growing in every round, and the arms race will accelerate in ever-growing steps until some limit or breakdown is attained.

This simple model would hold equally for bipolar and multipolar systems. In the latter systems, one might imagine that it could apply to every possible pair of nations in rivalry, and thus to 10 pairs in a five-power system, to 15 pairs in a six-power world, and generally to $N(N-1)/2$ powers in an N-power system. If country A wanted at least

[9] Kaplan, 21-53; Rapoport, 15-47; and the same author's essay, "L. F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (September 1957), 249-99. See also L. F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago 1960).

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to keep its proportionate lead against *each* of its rivals, it would have to maintain its level in an exponentially growing arms race with the most quickly growing of these rivals, because this would automatically increase its lead over all the rest. If all powers followed this type of policy, the total pace of arms competition for all countries would be set by the fastest growing competitor.

This model, however, seems too simple. It may be more reasonable to assume that a country is most likely to respond to an increase in the arms expenditure of a rival only in regard to that part which appears likely to be deployed or directed against itself.

In the case of a bipolar world, this consideration would make very little difference. The strongest country, A, would have to fear almost the full amount of the increment in the strength of the next strongest power, B, since in this bipolar world the third and fourth ranking powers, C and D, and all the lesser powers down to N, are almost negligible in their strength in comparison to A and B. These negligible lesser powers would thus not require any significant allocation of B's resources to ensure against the risk of having to fight them, and practically all of B's strength would remain available for use against A, forcing A in turn to increase its own efforts to the full extent required to maintain its own margin of strength in relation to B's growth.

Matters are quite different, however, in a multipolar world. In a four-power system, C and D, the third and fourth ranking nations, are already nearly as strong as A and B, the top and second-rank powers. Accordingly, B may have to allocate more than one-half of its resources —and of its increment in these—to the possibility of having to fight C or D, and thus B may have left less than one-half of its increment for a credible increase in its threat against A. The effect on A's behavior, according to the Richardson model, would be correspondingly less, since A would have to raise its arms budget only to the extent needed to hold its proportionate lead in regard to one-half or less of B's increment in arms expenditure. The arms race in a completely rational world would thus tend to be slower under multipolar conditions than under bipolar ones.

A different line of reasoning suggests the same result. Richardson's original model assumed that the motivation for a state to try to maintain its proportionate lead over the arms level of another was autonomously generated within the state itself. Once the national subsystems of the international political system had this motivation, in Richardson's model, then the consequences of an escalating arms race followed under the conditions that he specified. It was the competitive motiva-

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tions of the national states, in Richardson's thought, that produced the competitive character of the international system. Many writers on international politics, from Machiavelli onward, have taken the opposite view. The larger system, they have maintained, is itself competitive to start with, in that it rewards appropriate competitive behavior and penalizes the failure to compete by the pitiless elimination of the laggards and the weak. Machiavelli's princes, Adam Smith's businessmen, and Charles Darwin's animals all must compete for survival in their respective systems, on pain of being wiped out otherwise, regardless of their subjective motivation. In time, each of these systems is expected to select for survival primarily those subsystems that have responded most adequately to its competitive pressure. Which rival subsystem happened to exercise this competitive pressure at the moment is secondary in each of these theories. If this particular rival had been absent, another would have taken his place and served the same function of offering a compelling challenge to competitive behavior.

This type of thinking has remained familiar in the popular rhetoric of arms competition. The world is such, the argument used to run—or the adversary is such, it has run more recently—that "there is no choice" but arms competition or national doom through surrender or defeat. Regardless of the motivations of its own people, its own political system, and its own decision-makers, any state in such a situation must respond to the challenge of an arms race or else perish.

How strong is this externally derived pressure upon a state to increase its own armaments for the sake of survival, regardless of any other values or motivations produced by its domestic political system? Clearly, it is proportional only to that part of the increment in a rival's armament that is not likely to be balanced by a shift in alliances under a balance-of-power policy. In a bipolar world, a 10 per cent increase in the arms spending of power A must be answered by an equal increment in the arms of B, and the escalation process may then proceed at 10 per cent increments for each cycle. In a world of four approximately equal powers, a rise in the arms level of power A from 100 to 110 would give A's coalition, I—consisting, say, of A plus C—only a strength of 210 against the rival coalition II, consisting of B and D, with a strength of 200. The superiority of coalition I over coalition II would thus be not 10 but only 5 per cent; the offsetting armaments needed by coalition II would only have to be of 5 per cent; the subsequent increments of the escalation would likewise be of this lesser order of magnitude; and escalation would proceed more slowly.

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In a similar six-power world, a 10 per cent increase in the armament of one power would compel an increment of only about 3 per cent in the arms spending of the three members of the rival coalition. A ten-power world in the same situation would only be forced to a 2 per cent arms rise for each of five powers. Generally, every increase in the number of powers would slow down the speed of Richardsonian escalation.

If we drop the assumption of approximately equal powers in a multipolar world, the same general result follows. So long as most powers are free to move laterally from one coalition or alignment to another, their self-interest will favor such balance-of-power policies as to produce very nearly evenly matched coalitions, each of them composed quite possibly of members of unequal power. In such a mobile multipolar world, no government needs to fear a moderate decline in national power as potentially disastrous. It can survive as a second-class power as safely or precariously as it did as a first-class one, provided only that it joins in time the appropriate new alliance or alignment. Arms increases by a rival power, which in a bipolar world might pose a fatal threat, might call in a multipolar world for little more than a quick adjustment of alliances.

V. Some Implications for the Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons

If an increase in the number and diplomatic mobility of actors may slow down the process of arms escalation, it would by the same reasoning also slow down any process of de-escalation. Here, too, a one-sided arms reduction in a two-power world may elicit an equal response by the other power, while in a multipolar world the effect of any such unilateral initiative would be much weaker.

If we are chiefly interested in rapid de-escalation—that is, in partial or complete disarmament—a multipolar world may prove more intractable than a bipolar one; and we may view the emergence of French, German, Japanese, or Communist Chinese national power with justified alarm. If we are mainly concerned, on the contrary, with preventing any rapid escalation of the two-power arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, a shift toward a multipolar world may appear preferable.

At this point, of course, the bare and abstract arguments pursued thus far become quite insufficient. In our analysis of alternative international power systems we have abstracted from all other qualities of the states, governments, and national political systems within them. At the point of policy choice, however, these hitherto neglected aspects

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may be the decisive ones. A bipolar system in which each of the two rival powers is likely to be moderate and cautious in its policy initiatives and responses might be a great deal safer than a multipolar world containing one or several well-armed powers whose governments or politically relevant strata were inclined to incompetence or recklessness. As elsewhere, so also in international politics a stable general system could be wrecked by the introduction of unstable components.

At the present time, the importance of this latter point may well be decisive. Each of the present major nuclear powers—the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—has been politically stable, in the sense that each has retained its particular type of government for over forty years. None of these three countries has been notable for initiating large and reckless military enterprises. Among the middle-level and smaller powers most likely to press for nuclear weapons during the next decade —which include France, Germany, Japan, Mainland China, Nationalist China, and perhaps Egypt and others—there are several whose recent history lacks any comparable evidence of stability in domestic institutions and caution in international affairs. If this stage should be followed by the dissemination of nuclear weapons among a still larger number of countries, including inevitably at least some with still less stable domestic regimes and less cautious military policies, the instability of the international system would be still more dangerous. For these reasons, any successful efforts by the United States and other powers to slow down the dissemination of nuclear weapons would tend to increase the stability of the entire international system. In the present article, devoted to an abstract argument, these matters can only be indicated, but they must not be forgotten.

One other problem, however, should be discussed here: the time horizon under which the stability of international systems is evaluated. A multipolar world, though often more stable in the short run than a bipolar one, has its own problem of long-run political stability, and it is to this that we must now turn our attention.

VI. The Long-run Instability of Multipolar Systems

On the basis of these considerations, it might seem that a multipolar system could last forever, or for a very long time, by always opposing the ambitions of its currently top-ranking member; and this is indeed what some writers have claimed as a virtue of the balance-of-power system. In each of the sections above, however, we have dealt with

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considerations of an essentially short or middle-run nature, with a rather incomplete view as the natural consequence.

There are at least two analytic reasons why this relatively benign long-run outcome cannot be expected. For one thing, if we accept the usual zero-sum assumption of Machiavelli and the classic theory of games—according to which any gain by one contender can occur only through an equal loss by one or more of his rivals—then we must assume that each contending power ordinarily will try to acquire all the territory and population it can at the expense of its rivals, and that it will do nothing to create new rivals for itself. The model thus provides for the possibility of the destruction of states whose rulers misjudged the precise balance of strength at the moment, or whose economies and populations no longer yielded the increasing increments in arms spending and military effort required by the competition, but this model does not provide for the creation of new states. If the probability of states' perishing is small, but larger than zero, and the probability of substantial new powers' arising is zero in terms of this model, then the model will predict a diminishing number of effective contenders, leading eventually to a two-power world or to the survival of a single power, as in the case of the reduction of the many governments of classic antiquity to the two-power clash of Rome and Carthage, and of Rome's final long monopoly of power in the Mediterranean world until new forces entered from outside the region.

The second line of reasoning is based on considerations of statistics. Thus far we have taken probabilities only in terms of their central tendencies, rather than in terms of the variance of possible outcomes and their distribution. If we assume these outcomes to be normally distributed around some mean, then the usual outcome of an increment in threat by power A against power B in a multipolar system will consist in both A's and B's finding enough allies, respectively, to match the power of their respective coalitions and to produce the relatively moderate outcomes predicted by the classic balance-of-power model. In rare cases, however, corresponding to one tail of the distribution, state A will find a great preponderance of allies and become able to destroy its current enemy, B, completely; and in other rare cases—corresponding to the other tail of the distribution—A must expect to find itself facing an overwhelming coalition of adversaries that will destroy it. In the short run, only the moderate central tendencies of the distribution of outcomes of the coalition-forming process will be frequent enough to be taken into account, but in the long run the balance-of-power world must be expected to produce eventually dra-

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matic and catastrophic changes, both locally and at last at the system level. The number of years after which long-run rather than short-run phenomena are likely to prevail will depend on the frequency of international crises, and on the shape of the distribution of balanced and unbalanced coalitions, respectively, as outcomes of the coalition-forming process.

This expectation seems in good agreement with the historical data. No balance-of-power system has lasted longer than a few centuries, and most of the original powers contending in such systems have survived as independent powers only for much shorter periods.[10]

The classic descriptive and analytical views of two-power confrontations and of the balance of power among several contenders have been formalized by several writers. The most prominent models, of the tight bipolar and multipolar world, respectively, can be interpreted in terms of the dynamic model of conflict by Lewis F. Richardson. The results suggest that the Richardson model, with very simple assumptions, can be made to include the bipolar and multipolar models as special cases. This combined model then suggests some general inferences in predictions about trends that appear to accord well with historical data. In the long run, according to this model, even multipolar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power policies are shown to be self-destroying, but both in the short and the long run the instability of tight bipolar systems appears to be substantially greater. It seems plausible that, *if the spread of nuclear weapons could be slowed down or controlled*, a transition from the bipolar international system of the early 1950's to an increasingly multipolar system in the 1960's might buy mankind some valuable time to seek some more dependable bases for world order.

[10] For some historical data, see the discussion of the reduction of Italian city states during the years 1300-1527 from 70 or 80 to 10, in A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London-New York 1945), III, 355-56; cf. also 301-4, 345-48. In addition, see Wright, II, 762-63 ("The Disappearance of Small States").

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THE LIMITS OF FORCED ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE USSR

By LEON M. HERMAN

I

OFFICIAL economic doctrine in the Soviet Union continues to hold fast to the view that growth conquers everything. A rapid rise in the level of economic output remains the magic key to the solution of all problems facing the Soviet Union, large and small alike. First of all, of course, economic growth at the highest possible rate remains an indispensable goal, in the official viewpoint, if the USSR is to be assured a firm position in the forefront of major world powers. There was surely no doubt in Stalin's mind that only a forced pace of growth in the economic capabilities of the Soviet state could prevent a dangerous backward drift in the international power position of Soviet Russia. This theme, as we know, was utilized by the former dictator to the hilt in his fierce drive to mobilize the physical and human resources of his country, and to motivate the political elite, for an all-out campaign against the strategic threat to the survival of the state that he considered to be inherent in economic backwardness.

Nor is this, from the viewpoint of the Soviet leaders, the only pot of gold at the end of the rainbow of economic growth. By displaying to the world a unique record of performance in this respect, the Russian leadership also hopes to persuade world public opinion to equate communism with economic progress. In a world in which the swamp of poverty continues to be the natural habitat of the mass of people, such a reputation would indeed be extremely helpful toward winning a large following for the ideology of communism. In the less-developed countries, above all, this particular feature of the Soviet social order—namely, rapid economic growth—has always been expected by the Soviet leadership to have its most telling historic effect.

There is still another type of objective that the Soviet Union has consciously pursued through its policy of forcing the expansion of its basic industrial capacities at the highest possible tempo. The Communist hierarchy has long anticipated that continued spectacular performance on the part of the Soviet Union in the sphere of economic growth would exercise a demoralizing effect upon the advanced industrial nations of the West. Thus, for example, one "inevitable" outcome of continued

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Soviet successes on the "production front" has always been expected to be an increase in the discontent of the industrial proletariat in the capitalist world. Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev continues to draw inspiration from this enduring Soviet hope. A typical passage from an inspirational address that he delivered to a meeting of Soviet writers and artists articulates it as follows: "Many bourgeois politicians are frankly saying that they are frightened by the rate of growth of Soviet industry, frightened by the influence of the Soviet example on the workers of the whole world. And you and I know very well how convincing our example is to the minds of the workers of all countries."[1]

Internally, too, Soviet politicians have counted heavily upon rapid economic growth as a potential corrective force that would, among other things, ultimately relieve the all too visible strains and stresses in the economic structure. Since all serious tensions in the economy, in the official view, are generated in one way or another by the distortive pressure of physical shortages, it follows that a rapidly expanding scale of production will in time provide the appropriate cure. With the aid of so powerful a panacea, Soviet planners have believed, the Soviet economy will inevitably "outgrow" all the familiar disorders of its own "infantile" stage of development.

This central objective of forced economic growth has been vigorously pursued in the USSR for some three and a half decades—since the late 1920's, to be exact. An objective of this kind has, of necessity, its own conditions of fulfillment. In freely choosing a maximum annual rate of growth as their main goal in the economic sphere, the Soviet rulers thereby committed themselves to a number of inescapable conditions of economic organization. They were bound to (a) a highly centralist policy of decision-making in regard to the proportion of saving and direction of investment; (b) the restriction of consumption in the city and village to a low but tolerable level; (c) the deliberate channeling of the lion's share of labor, material, and capital to the primary, growth-inducing branches of industrial production; and (d) the administrative manipulation from the center of large numbers of production managers at the local level.

In turn, this commitment to a method of administrative allocation of resources, firmly controlled from the center, has over the years given rise to a distinctive set of economic institutions that have become the hallmark of the Soviet production system. The Soviet leaders eventually settled upon these institutions, by means of trial and error, as being most responsive, dependable, and generally suitable for their chosen purposes.

[1] *Kommunist,* No. 12 (1957), 11.

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They are now in fact so firmly implanted in the economic soil of the USSR, as we know from the recent attempts at administrative reform, that the leaders themselves are finding it difficult to carry out any material changes in the basic institutional landscape.

To name just a few, these institutions include a centralized mechanism both for planning production levels in great detail, and for allocating the major physical inputs of the economic process; an arbitrary price system that frustrates most attempts at normal communication between the planners and the enterprise managers; a massive, open-ended bonus system that makes it possible for managers to get their premium pay while, in fact, they evade the true intent of the center; a lack of lateral lines of communication in the economy; and an absence of meaningful economic sanctions for the wasteful use of resources or the violation of established supply schedules.

Readers of the Western literature on the Soviet economy have long been familiar with the curious, but persisting, modes of behavior that this overcentralized system has tended to thrust upon the individual production manager. Although he is the pivotal agent in the process of production, the plant manager finds himself entangled in a bewildering cobweb of administrative fiats. He has been described as resorting to such tried and true weapons as trading favors illegally *(blat)* and as applying improper influence in the course of seeking to achieve his maddeningly detailed assignments. He has been reported as falling back on the tested device of understatement of his production capacities; on the use of the slush fund and the "pusher" *(tolkach)* in the unauthorized procurement of supplies; the padding of production reports; the bribing of inspectors; the falsification of account books.

II

What is both interesting and remarkable at the present time, however, are signs of a kind of convergence of the main lines of criticism of the Soviet economy as they have evolved in the West with a cautiously emerging flow of economic criticism in the USSR. To be sure, criticism in the Soviet Union is still anything but a universal right: one needs an explicit license, besides a great deal of civic courage, to exercise it. However, the more permissive atmosphere of the past few years has made a difference. It has made it somewhat less hazardous for prominent individuals in the USSR to express their personal misgivings in public, even where the explosion of some long-cherished official myth may be involved. In this recent mild rumbling of criticism, the misgivings voiced and the remedies proposed have often been remarkably explicit

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and substantive. Moreover, a discernible note of urgency has been sounded by the several prominent men in the USSR who have recently expressed in print the need for a new approach to the organization of economic planning and managerial practices.

One theme that runs through many of these discussions is the urgent need for more rational ways of making use of the vast economic assets of the country, including its mammoth labor force. Most of the participants in this novel kind of discussion in the Soviet press appear to agree with the admonition of the respected mathematician A. Berg, who has warned that "We cannot permit ourselves the luxury of wasting time, if we soberly consider the tasks that face us and also the difficulties which we must overcome as quickly as possible."[2]

What seems to lend urgency to the present appeals for economic realism in the Soviet press is the clear implication on the part of the participants that the heavy burden of irrationality now weighing down the Soviet economy is inherent in, and swelling along with, the basic administrative apparatus by which forced economic growth has been sustained in the USSR over the past several decades. This is indeed a prominent thesis in the present internal discussion. And, if true, it would certainly tend to impose a heavy handicap upon the Soviet Union in its all-out race against the capitalist method of production, in the face of the counting-house tradition of economic discipline among the market-oriented economies.

One outspoken critic of the present regimen of decision-making in the Soviet economy, the plane-designer O. Antonov, deals most unceremoniously with some of the sacred cows of the economic planning system. He is unmistakably a person who is licensed to give advice in public by dint of his own record as a successful production man. He can also show that he is genuinely interested not only in pointing out the symptoms, but also in tracing the causes of the chronic disorders in the industrial sector of the economy. Antonov holds one major cause of the haphazard, unresponsive mode of production in Soviet industry to be the fact that "the output of the individual plant is oriented toward the warehouse rather than toward the sales counter." This is certainly a familiar theme in Western comment. Because of this tendency, Antonov argues, the production flow lacks the benefit of what he and his engineers call the "feedback factor"—namely, the signal for needed improvements that is normally provided by the plant-consumer. The successful manager in Russian industry, he complains, is one who can prove that he has pumped his full quota of production into the pipeline. This done,

[2] *Pravda,* October 24, 1962.

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he does not need to pay any heed to the reaction of the consumer of his product. His immunity, moreover, is the same, whether the consumer happens to be another important state enterprise or the lowly private customer of the state store.[3]

Antonov is especially critical of the official overall "success indicator" used by the planners to judge, and to reward, the performance of the plant manager. He believes that most of the known irrational decisions made at the plant level stem directly from "this one-sided, ill-conceived indicator"—namely, the "gross value of output" of the individual industrial plant. Among the examples of erratic behavior of local managers under the pressure of the center for ever more "gross output," he cites the following practice: A plant manager keeps regularly at his warehouse an inordinate stock of spare parts and components. Why? First, because the manager does not have faith in the precision of the supply apparatus; and secondly, because when the plant is hard-pressed, when performance is running dangerously behind the plan, these parts and components can be withdrawn from storage and included in the monthly total of new "gross output." This sort of management, in Antonov's opinion, yields the national economy nothing more than "padded figures and confusion, to put it mildly."

Such preoccupation with growth at any cost, Antonov suggests, inevitably impels the Soviet plant managers in the direction of "short-changing the future." He is persuaded that the pressure for volume growth, which continues to be the order of the day in the Soviet economy, can result only in bequeathing serious deficits to the next generation. He warns, for example, that the substandard machine which is turned out in haste today, and forced upon the helpless plant-producer, will serve to produce poor quality goods in the years to come.

Being a practical, production-minded man, Antonov rounds out his argument by offering this rather broad judgment on the choices confronting the Soviet economy: "Such is the dialectic of relations between quantity and quality that by changing our approach in favor of the production of goods of a higher quality, though somewhat reduced in volume, we will assuredly attain a growth in the quality as well as the quantity of goods for the national economy as a whole." To many Russians, such an argument has an appealing ring. It clearly echoes Lenin's well-remembered motto: "Better less, but better!"

This close link between the rush for record quantity output and the neglect of quality of product constitutes a major theme in the current flow of internal criticism. One high official of the cabinet-level State

[3] *Izvestiia*, May 25, 1962.

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Committee on Automation cites a typical experience in his own field—namely, the production of electric motors: "The overwhelming majority of production equipment in the country is powered by electric prime movers, of which there are at present several million units at work. However, the life span of these engines is short. . . . The predominant majority of engines break down as a result of the unsatisfactory execution of the armature and insulation work. Every year we are compelled to spend vast sums on the repair of electric engines and to maintain large staffs of repair men."[4]

Similarly, two Soviet scientists recently reported in the press one of the findings of a new Committee for Quality Control—namely, that "40 per cent of all failures of machinery in the course of operation are the result of low quality of manufacture." There is no real force at work in the economy, they asserted, to assure high-quality output. "The official agencies for technical quality control actually do nothing more than place the tag 'reject' on the finished product and try to influence the production process chiefly through slogans and chants!"[5]

With much the same concern in mind, a group of Soviet scientists not long ago took the unusual step of addressing a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU about what they considered the crucial problem in regard to the supply of fertilizer in the economy. It would do no good, they argued, to try to solve the present shortage by the standard approach: by ordering another increase in output. What must be done first, in their view, was "to take resolute measures . . . to put the utilization of fertilizer in proper order." What really was necessary, they stated, was to provide adequate transport, packing materials, storage facilities, and machines for the application of fertilizers. Because of the lack of these ingredients of an adequate distribution system, the scientists concluded, "the country does not get from the use of fertilizers half of what could be obtained with good organization."[6]

III

It is quite natural, of course, that the most systematic criticism of the growth-oriented economic practices followed by the Soviet government comes from the ranks of the academic economists. They, too, are today recommending strong, if unpleasant, remedies that entail abandoning the present philosophy of maximum growth of output in response to ill-considered production commands. From their writings it

[4] *Pravda,* December 17, 1962.
[5] *Izvestiia,* October 8, 1963.
[6] *Pravda,* November 17, 1963.

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emerges that it is now quite clear to them, as it long has been to Western economists, that Communist economic theory has very little to say outside the area of broad macro-economic decisions. It is wholly concerned with the issues of overall national economic policy, such as rates of growth, fiscal policy, volume and distribution of investment, etc. Even prices are treated by Soviet planners as a macro-economic problem, a matter of financial security for the state. Conversely, there is in Soviet economic theory no rational guide or practical yardstick for resource allocation at the enterprise level.

Yet, the lack of such a yardstick has emerged as one of the crucial deficiencies at the present juncture in Soviet economic development. The distinguished Soviet economist Novozhilov, among others, has been recommending for the past several years, in sober and unvarnished language, that the government turn its back on the present system of detailed quantitative guidance of the economy from the center. The entire system of performance and record-keeping at the plant level in response to commands from the center, he contends, is founded on an illusion—namely, that what is profitable for the enterprise is also beneficial for the economy as a whole. From the standpoint of the plant manager, Novozhilov reasons, most of the assignments he receives fall into either a "profitable" or an "unprofitable" category. Most unsurprisingly, his self-interest impels him to take care of his own balance-sheet first. When that happens, says Novozhilov, the articles that are produced in abundance show a good record for the plant, while the goods of high national economic interest often are neglected in the process.[7]

The main source of distortion, as Novozhilov sees it, stems from the fact that Soviet economic practice has lost sight of the distinction between the receipts and the expenditures of an enterprise—i.e., between input and output in production. "It would be hard to imagine a more gross error in economic calculation," in his opinion. As accounts are kept now, the "gross output" of an enterprise embodies a lot more than the actual work of the given enterprise; it also includes the value of the inputs employed in the process of production. Hence, a plant can generally increase its own "gross output" simply by increasing its expenditures on purchased materials. Thus, he points out, by including materials received from outside in the indicator of output, the present planning system is rewarding extravagance rather than economy in the use of materials, labor, and capital.

There is only one way, Novozhilov suggests, to bring the wishes of

[7] V. V. Novozhilov, *Proceedings of the Leningrad Engineering-Economic Institute* (in Russian), No. 24 (Leningrad 1958), 150-56.

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the state into harmony with the interests of the plant managers. This is to devise a uniform basis for price-setting throughout the economy, and thereby "make the accounting system into a reliable tool of the plan." Once the plant manager was given a reliable, generalized yardstick of value, in the form of meaningful prices, he would, in Novozhilov's opinion, have the necessary incentive to behave rationally. He would then be motivated to fulfill his plan not only for total output but for the given product-mix as well. By working with a set of prices that reflect his own real costs, the plant manager would be impelled to effect savings in costs for his own account-keeping in a way that would reflect a saving of inputs in real terms. He would, moreover, be motivated to make more efficient use of his fixed capital and, above all, would see his genuine economic interest in the installation of more advanced industrial technology in his plant.

IV

Highly significant evidence to the effect that the Soviet method of forced economic growth has begun to reveal its limitations in rather compelling terms has been provided by the recent pronouncements, as well the actions, of Premier Khrushchev. In his widely ranging, often angry address to the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in November 1962, he expressed so many biting criticisms of established economic practice as to suggest a gnawing discontent with the uncertain course of Soviet economic progress.

In this address, Khrushchev showed an acute awareness that the atmosphere of forced, mechanical growth in effect in Soviet plants is all too apt to foster bad production habits. There appears to be, in his view, too little interest on the part of plant managers in the critical elements in a modern economy—namely, in more advanced productive equipment, in inputs of the least cost, in new materials, in products of higher quality and greater durability. Whenever he learned of some remarkable new type of production equipment employed in the West, Khrushchev complained, he was told that "our own engineers are also working on the idea." He was beginning to wonder, he said, whether this "proves our inability to utilize technical progress."

Khrushchev seemed to be displeased, in particular, with the state of affairs in regard to innovation in Soviet industry. The designers, who are found in large numbers in a wide network of Soviet research institutes, appear to be working in isolation from one another, unaware of whether they are repeating each other's inventions or mistakes. There is no clearing house, he complained, no center for the co-

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ordination of new ideas. "Everybody, you might say, is inventing the bicycle all over again." What Khrushchev found most disturbing was that the country's plants, at the same time, were not pressing eagerly for the most advanced production machinery they could get.

It is not difficult to recognize the main source of Khrushchev's discontent. It must have become quite apparent to him by this time that the economic race against capitalism has turned out to be a more complex and taxing undertaking than he had anticipated. It is not necessary to marshal a great array of statistics to indicate that in terms of employment in industry the Soviet Union has for some time "caught up" with the United States. The smaller size of Russia's industrial manpower has long been one of the main "reserves" for the achievement of parity in output. At present, Soviet industry, upon which the lion's share of the nation's investment capital is lavished, already employs 57 per cent more workers than does the same basic sector of the economy in the United States.[8] Furthermore, the number of engineers employed in Soviet industry is more than double that of ours. The annual supply of new machine tools going into Soviet industry also exceeds ours by a sizable margin. Thousands of machine tools, valued at about $100 million, are imported annually from Eastern Europe, and the total number of machine tools in use in Soviet industry (2.3 million units) is at present roughly equal to that of the United States.

V

The chief problem confronting the Soviet policy-makers in industry, however, appears to be the lack of a real, appreciable rise in the productivity of its vast resources, human and physical. At present, the Soviet Union's enormous industrial plant is yielding an annual product that is equal to just about 56 per cent of its United States counterpart. This statement is based on the Soviet planners' own calculations of an average labor productivity in Soviet industry equal to 36 per cent of the average output per worker in the United States.[9]

The institutionalized bias in favor of quantity has also tended, in Soviet practice, to discourage the necessary steady search for new materials, or for new mixtures in the use of old materials, in the production process. It is a matter of record that the most notable innovations in this regard recently carried out in the USSR have been inspired by the example of the West. In one major specific case, the recent shift in

[8] *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 11 (1963), 35.
[9] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 5 (May 1961), 21.

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the fuel balance from the predominance of coal to gas and oil, was undertaken in the light of the better results obtained in the West. This is equally true with respect to the recent shift toward large-scale production of such new products as man-made fibers, new types of synthetic rubber, plastics, and other chemical materials. The same tendency toward emulation, with consciously varied delays, has been displayed by Soviet industrial planners in such fields, among many others, as railway traction, farm implements, fishing trawlers, automobiles, and metal-cutting and metal-forming machinery.

Is there anything inherently wrong, it may be asked, with this observed Soviet practice of allowing the West to develop and thoroughly test a given innovation before putting it into operation in the USSR? After all, the Soviet Union is strong in the advancement of its military technology, well-supplied in volume and variety of weapons. One answer that suggests itself is that the practice of systematic borrowing from the West is manifestly an involuntary rather than a deliberate form of behavior; and that, as such, it places the Soviet Union at a disadvantage in the long-run economic race against the market-oriented economies at work in the democratic societies. For one thing, systematic reliance on foreign innovation surely tends to dry up the springs of creativity among domestic producers. Another and more tangible result is that it builds obsolescence into the Soviet production system: by the time a machine or process is copied and fully mastered by the Soviet plants, in the West that particular piece of equipment or practice has often reached a later stage of design and improved productivity.

The critical elements in the Soviet race for economic parity are certain, in the long run, to be the qualitative indicators in production. For it is abundantly clear that the competition with the West will be determined not by the volume but by the productivity of available economic resources in the USSR. A steadily improving climate of productivity, for instance, has made it possible for the Western nations to raise the standard of national economic performance in recent years. Step by step, in this process, they have in fact expanded the terms of the economic competition with the Soviet Union and its allies. Today, the minimum national economic goals among the advanced Western nations encompass a great deal more than heavy industry and military security. They include such objectives as industrial innovation on the basis of new scientific findings; an economy oriented toward consumer welfare; an abundant supply and variety of housing; steady economic growth; an active exchange of goods with the developing nations; grants, credits,

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and industrial machinery for development; and the maintenance and support of a durable system of alliances.

There is no doubt, of course, that the Soviet Union is determined to increase its own capability in all these spheres of economic endeavor. In the light of their commitment to defend the prestige of their economic system, the Soviet leaders cannot do otherwise. Before the USSR can make an adequate showing in this regard, however, the leadership will have to undertake an agonizing reappraisal of its devotion to the institutions of forced economic growth. It will most likely find it imperative to clean its economic house of the cobwebs of bad practices that have accumulated during the decades of hypnotic preoccupation with the physical aggrandizement of its industrial establishment and the mobilization of a maximum of manpower for the achievement of record levels in the quantity of industrial production.

To paraphrase Gibbon's famous dictum about the security of modern Europe against invasion from Asia, one might say, in this context, that before the Soviet leaders can "conquer" the Western nations economically, "they must cease to be barbarous in their habits." They must abandon the magic horse of hypertrophic growth and settle down to learn the homely art of economic calculus. For it is by means of this art that the nations of the West have learned to husband their human and physical resources in a way best calculated to achieve an acceptable balance between the need for an effective national community and the need for the self-realization of the individual citizen in the modern industrial society.

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THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNE

By JACK C. FISHER

I

THE emergence of the Yugoslav commune is a significant aspect of the distinctive political system that has been developing in Yugoslavia since 1950. The Serbian term *opština—općina* in Croatian —historically referred to a specific area, defined by the collectivity or commonalty of the land and the inhabitants' use thereof. In the prewar period the term lost this meaning and signified only an administrative unit, such as a borough, district, municipality, or community.

After 1950, the word *komuna* was introduced, but in a sense that "implies a defined socio-economic community and not merely a political machine and an autonomous political organization."[1] Thus *komuna* suggests something entirely different from the purely administrative *opština.* In all legal and official documents, the term *opština* is used; in political and economic literature, the word *komuna* refers to a unit that is economically and socially homogeneous and at the same time administrative. The direct source of the word *komuna* can be traced to the Paris Communes of 1871, and indirectly to the fascination of Yugoslav leaders with organs of local government observed in Western Europe (especially Sweden, Switzerland, and England) in the 1950's.

The Constitution adopted in April 1963 employs the word *opština* in the sense implied earlier by both *opština* and *komuna;* this indicates that in theory the administrative-territorial changes that had taken place after 1950 were expected to have transformed purely administrative units into "defined socio-economic" communities. The *opština* has under the 1963 Constitution become a central feature of the effort to find a solution through administrative decentralization to the problems of national diversity and economic and social heterogeneity peculiar to Yugoslavia.

"Communal system" and "communal self-government," as distinct from "commune," are frequently used expressions in Yugoslavia. They are applied to both the *opština* and the *srez,* and are also used to describe smaller political and social units, such as the *stambena* or *mesna zajednica,* a neighborhood association. In accordance with current Yugo-

[1] Jovan Djordjević and Najdan Pasić, "The Communal Self-Government System in Yugoslavia," *International Social Science Journal,* XIII, No. 3 (1961), 390; see also Sreten Bjeličić, *Communal System in Yugoslavia* (Belgrade 1961), 10.

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slav usage, *opština* is translated here as "commune" and *srez* as "district."

Few other countries have attempted to form a viable political state from such a diversity of cultural, social, and political elements as has Yugoslavia.[2] Centuries of foreign penetration and control under various political systems led to great regional variations in administrative practices, economic standards, land utilization, and urban patterns among the three basic cultural areas: Central European, Byzantine-Turkish, and Mediterranean.[3] As one Yugoslav analyst has described the situation: "The various economic and political systems which through the centuries have existed in the present territory of Yugoslavia were so distinct in their nature as to represent, in reality, different civilizations. They left us the heritage of a long tradition of established spatial frames, both with regard to the large territorial units (the historical lands—today's people's republics) and as regards the medium and small territorial units (former *oblasts, okrugs,* districts, and rural townships), with which today, during the formation of the territorial units of our new communal system, we have much concern. . . . For all the areas in which our peoples live, regardless of the cultural area [*civilizacijska područja*], the typical similarity was the existence of a basic territorial unit, the rural commune [*seoska opština*]."[4]

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes initially maintained the distinctive regional administrative groupings that had evolved during the centuries of foreign rule. The centralist Vidovdan Constitution (1921), however, reorganized the country into a single administrative system, comprising 393 districts and 7,085 *opštine.* Above these were various higher-level units, except in Dalmatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina. In 1931, the country was organized into nine *banovina,* which again resulted in an alteration of *opštine* and *srez* boundaries, as a further attempt to undercut the significance of the traditional regional units. The interwar period was marked by bitter conflict between the Serbian-dominated government and the remaining national minorities, especially the Croatians. In order to counteract the growing centrifugal

[2] A valuable introduction to the formation of Yugoslavia is now available in Ivo J. Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference* (New Haven 1963).

[3] For a detailed discussion of the impact of the varying political policies of one of the foreign cultural regions — Central European — on the development of an urban complex, see Jack C. Fisher, "Urban Analysis: A Regional Approach — A Case Study of Zagreb, Yugoslavia," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* LIII (September 1963), 266-84.

[4] Rude Petrović, *Prostorna Determinacija Teritorijalnih Jedinica u Komunalnom Sistemu Jugoslavije* [The Spatial Determination of Territorial Units in the Communal System of Yugoslavia] (Sarajevo 1962), 20, 21.

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tendencies of the Croatian nation, a political solution was reached in 1939 that created a separate Croatian unit, corresponding to the areas traditionally inhabited by this people. The failure of this last-minute compromise, as of the entire interwar political process, was symbolized by the ease with which the Axis occupation forces divided the former state among themselves and set up an independent state of Croatia.

This was the basis on which the new—now Communist—administration had to attempt to create a politically viable state after the war. The initial compromise evolved by the Communist rulers to soften the "particularist" tendencies of the various nationalities, which had been fanned to frantic proportions by the terror of war and the policies of the occupation forces, was a federal system comprised of six republics.[5] Though the new state was federal in theory, the political system was clearly centralized and dictatorial in practice. A recent Yugoslav study has described the period from 1947 to 1951 as "centralistic-directive,"[6] while another account in a publication prepared for foreign consumption clearly states that "the local organs of government, although elected directly by the citizens, existed primarily to implement the law and the decisions of the central organs."[7]

II

The pragmatic instinct of the Yugoslavs and their expressed desire for decentralization through new forms of local group participation gave rise first to workers' councils and subsequently to the communal system. In a period of dynamic economic and social change, there was a determined search for new ways to solve existing problems. Although space does not permit more than passing mention in this article, it should be noted that the series of institutional and administrative changes that occurred during the evolution of the communal system resulted negatively in economic inefficiency and, at the very minimum, in confusion.

The forerunner of the communal system was the transfer of management of industrial enterprises to workers' councils by a federal law enacted in June 1950. The process of decentralization implied by the new law placed the local governmental organs in new and more re-

[5] Evgeni Dimitrov, "Position of the Republics in the Federal System of Yugoslavia," *Selected Problems of Social Sciences and Humanities,* Papers from the Yugoslav-American Colloquium Ohrid, August 27–September 2, 1962 (Skopje 1963), 113-24.

[6] Borivoj Jelić, *System Planiranja u Jugoslovenskoj Privredi* [The System of Planning in the Yugoslav Economy] (Belgrade 1962), part 2.

[7] Bjeličić, *Communal System in Yugoslavia,* 12.

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sponsible positions through the "gradual substitution of bodies of social-government for the state apparatus and its competence."[8]

Prior to the adoption of the new Constitution of April 1963, two federal laws governed the communal system in Yugoslavia: a 1952 Law on the People's Committees (the main organ of administration in both the *srez* and the *opština*),[9] and a 1955 Law on the Organization of Communes and Districts.[10] A basic aim of the 1955 Law was to replace the purely administrative bodies by a "commune" that would increasingly become a "special political form" created to administer the business of society.[11] The new law stressed, first, that all *opštine* were to be equal in status, thus in theory eliminating any administrative difference between the rural and urban *opštine;* and second, that the district or *srez* was no longer to be a higher administrative unit but simply an "association" of theoretically independent communes.[12] It should be remembered that, when reference was made to the "communal system" prior to 1955, "... in reality the *srez* was thought of. The building of self-government in the *srez* was understood as the first step in building the self-government of the *opština.*"[13]

An International Labour Office publication, summarizing developments in Yugoslavia up to 1957 in terms of their effect on the development of workers' councils, makes the following statement relevant to the commune: "From the standpoint of workers' management, the main measures were the establishment of 'producers' councils' [one of two chambers of the communal assembly, to be discussed below] to give the Yugoslav system an element of representation based not on political viewpoints but on the shared interests of the various collectives, [and] the granting of a large measure of administrative autonomy

[8] Stane Kavčič, *Self-Government in Yugoslavia* (Belgrade 1961), 9.

[9] *Službeni List Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije* [Official Gazette of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia], No. 22 of 1952.

[10] *Ibid.,* No. 26 of 1955.

[11] *VII Kongress SKJ* [Seventh Congress of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia] (Belgrade 1958), 146. Cited in *Materijali o Statutima Opština* [Material on the Statutes of *Opštine*] (Belgrade 1962), 89.

[12] The decline in the importance of the *srez* was strikingly underlined by their elimination in the Republic of Montenegro and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo-Metohija: *Službeni list N.R. Crne Gore,* No. 27 of 1957; *Službeni list N.R. Srbije,* No. 50 of 1959. Contrary to the current Belgrade position, a representative from Montenegro at a national congress quite frankly stated: "In Montenegro, districts have not existed for almost four years. Districts in Montenegro, during this very short time, have been completely forgotten.... After the elimination of the districts, there began a significant growth in the incentive of the commune in solving economic, communal, cultural, health, and other problems." *Samoupravljanje u Komuni* [Self-Government in the Commune], Materijali sa Godišnje Skupstine Stalne Konferencije Gradova Jugoslavije, Nis, 30 Oktobar-1 Novembar, 1961 (Belgrade 1961), 152.

[13] Petrović, *Prostorna Determinacija Teritorijalnih Jedinica,* 28.

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to the communes, enabling them to settle the great bulk of public and economic matters at a level as near as possible to the individual undertaking, with regular direct participation by the latter's representatives. . . . Naturally, the introduction of these reforms came up against a variety of obstacles, such as the lack of resources, the shortage of qualified supervisors, survivals of the bureaucratic and authoritarian habits of the earlier period, lack of balance as between different parts of the economic system, etc. Nevertheless, the measures taken during this period were important in that the broad guiding principles for the future development of the whole system of workers' management based on the commune and the independent enterprises finally emerged."[14]

The enactment of the 1955 Law marked the inauguration of the full-scale development of the communal system. Prior to 1955, six distinct types of local administrative units were in existence: provinces *(oblasti* or *okruzi);* cities ranking as provinces; districts; cities ranking as districts; cities within districts; and local committees. The purpose of the new law was to reduce the number and variety of local organs and at the same time ensure "sufficient [economic] strength to maintain all those social institutions which provide an elementary social standard for the citizens at the current level of our development."[15] The structure produced by the 1955 Law reduced 4,519 separate units to a more manageable 1,479 *opštine* and 107 districts.[16]

This was the period when *opština* and *srez* boundaries were in constant flux. To the outside observer, it appeared that the continuous reorganization was pointless and could only cause administrative confusion. It is not possible to do more than briefly review the general characteristics of the system and indicate a few of the major statistical variables important for communal comparison. Recognition of the great variation among communes, however, is requisite to understanding the function of the system. As Kardelj has said: "There are great differences between one developed industrial commune and one agricultural commune. It is clear that there must exist distinct differences both in methods of work and in their form of organization. Differences in position demand a difference in practice."[17]

[14] International Labour Office, *Workers' Management in Yugoslavia* (Geneva 1962), 8.

[15] Vladimir Kokole, *Komuna kao Urbanistička Pojava* [The Commune as a Planning Phenomenon], Annual Congress at Lake Bled, 1963: Savez Urbanističkih Drustava Jugoslavije (Belgrade 1963), 8.

[16] *Teritorijalna Podela Jugoslavije na opštine i srezove sa oznacenjem Sedišta redovnih i privrednih sudova* [Territorial Divisions of Yugoslavia into *opštine* and districts with indications of the Seats of regular and economic courts] (Belgrade 1963), 16, 18.

[17] Edvard Kardelj, "Komuna i Prednacrt Našeg Novog Ustava" [The Commune and

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As of January 1, 1963, the republics comprised 581 *opštine* and 40 districts, as shown in Table 1. Figure 1 (see following page) indicates the distribution of these *opštine* and districts throughout the country.

TABLE 1[18]

	Bosnia and Herzegovina	*Montenegro*	*Croatia*	*Macedonia*	*Slovenia*	*Serbia*
Opštine	106	20	111	61	66	217
Districts	7	—	9	6	4	14

To provide a visual impression of the impact of the various reorganizations on the local units of government, the Central Adriatic area of Yugoslavia—corresponding to the general area known as Dalmatia—may be taken as an example. Figure 2 presents the three territorial reorganizations of the area that reduced seventeen districts in 1954 to five in 1955, centering on the traditional central place-settlements of the region. In 1962, the five districts were reduced to one, incorporating the bulk of Dalmatia and gravitating to the provincial city of Split.

Initially it might appear that the continuous territorial changes materially improved the position of the communes. Petrović, after reviewing a number of variables related to population distribution, concluded that "relatively the greater number of our communes have somewhat more favorable conditions in regard to population concentration by larger settlements than the average for the entire state territory."[19]

A review of 34 major economic variables for 1960 and 1961 reveals, however, the extreme variation that exists among the communes.[20] For example, in 1961, 60 communes had absolutely no industry, while 311 had less than 500 persons employed in industry, and only in 49 communes were there more than 6,000 so employed. Similar comparisons exist for the other variables. The question remains whether there

the Draft of Our New Constitution], *Opština u Novom Ustavnom Sistemu*, Materijali sa Godišnje Skupštine Stalne Konferencije Gradova Jugoslavije, Titograd, 1-3 XI 1962 (Belgrade 1961), 11.

[18] *Jugoslovenski Pregled* [Yugoslav Survey], No. 6 (1963), 247.

[19] Petrović, *Prostorna Determinacija Teritorijalnih Jednica*, 60.

[20] Two excellent statistical publications are recommended to those interested in general Yugoslav economic development and especially in a quantitative approach to the subject: *Privredno Statistički Presek Komuna Jugoslavije u 1960 god.* [Economic and Statistical Pattern of the Communes in Yugoslavia, 1960] (Belgrade 1962), and *Privredno Statistički Presek Komuna Jugoslavije u 1961 godini* (Belgrade 1963). These two publications provide an annual comparison of communal development, the volume and structure of material production, purchasing power of the population, and opportunities for each commune to finance its own public services.

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FIG. 1. DISTRIBUTION OF OPŠTINE AND DISTRICTS, JANUARY 1, 1963

was more or less variation among the *opštine* in 1961 than in 1960. In other words, had economic growth been shared by relatively few or experienced by the majority? The coefficient of variation for most of the variables decreased during the two-year period. Continued administrative reorganization in 1961 (47 *opštine* were eliminated) tended to mute the differences between the developed and undeveloped communes in favor of the poorer majority, but in fact it appears that the developed communes accelerated their lead, significantly widening the gap between them and the underdeveloped areas. Two of the most important indicators of communal strength—the investment fund of the commune and the fund for housing construction—indicate accelerated variation between 1960 and 1961: in the latter year, 392 *opštine*

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

FIG. 2. TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION OF DALMATIA, 1954-1962

had less than 50 million dinars in their investment funds, while 50 had more than 300 million.[21] Similarly, the funds for housing construction, though increased by 52 per cent from 1960, resulted only in greater concentration of capital among the most developed communes; the coefficient of variation increased from 239 to 307 between 1960 and 1961. Nine *opštine* had no housing fund whatever, 373 had less than 50 million, while 53 had more than 400 million.[22]

Though it is not possible to discuss here the variations in and significance of the physical landscape, the reader should keep in mind the varying man-to-land relationships in the mountainous *karst*, the

[21] *Privredno Statistički Presek Komuna Jugoslavije u 1961*, 58-59.
[22] *Ibid.*, 62-63.

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level Pannonian Basin, and the upland areas of Slovenia. History and geography have interacted to produce heterogeneous groupings of economic, cultural, and social variables. Superimposed on this physical and cultural landscape is a political system that itself has been in constant flux as a result of external pressure and internal variability.

III

The Constitution of April 1963 of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia introduced significant organizational and functional changes in the commune.[23] It is not easy to describe the changes, for at least three reasons: (1) differences between theory and practice; (2) the variations in function that exist among communes at different stages of economic and social development in a variety of physical settings; and (3) the complicated question of control, on the part of both local and higher organs, including the implementation of federal and republican policies at the local level.

Article 73 of the 1963 Constitution states that "self-government by the citizens in the commune is the political foundation of the uniform social-political system."[24] Article 96 presents the general functions of the commune:

> —provide the material and other conditions necessary for the work and development of the productive forces;
> —guide and coordinate economic development and the development of the social services;
> —determine and distribute the means for common communal requirements;
> —create the conditions required to satisfy the material, social, cultural, and other common needs of the citizens;
> —coordinate individual and common interests with the general interests.[25]

It is hoped these responsibilities can be carried out by balancing the various centrifugal forces which of necessity must exist within the commune. The most important check is expected to be man himself—the prime producer and the ultimate consumer.[26] The same man who

[23] "In regard to the socialist federal community and the placing of the word 'socialist' before the word 'federal' in the Constitution, it was desired in this way to attract the common interest of all working people and all the nations of Yugoslavia to the further development of socialist relations within the various nations and in the entire Federation." Veljko Vlahović, "Položaj i Uloga Gradjana" [The Position and Role of the Citizen], *O Ustavnom Sistemu Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije* (Belgrade 1963), 91.

[24] "The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (June 1963), 47.

[25] *Ibid.*, 58.

[26] *VII Kongress SKJ*, 1011; cited in *Materijali o Statutima Opština*, 138.

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participates in the workers' council of his enterprise that is struggling for increased remuneration will, it is believed, as a citizen of the commune and member of the assembly of the commune, suggest legislation and other measures to restrict unwarranted increase of salaries above levels of productivity.

According to the Constitution, within the commune individual workers and their organizations resolve fundamental questions of social, cultural, and political life by the process of self-government in production and consumption, according to the principle that *each will receive his share according to his work*. It is emphasized, however, that this "form of economic inequality" is only temporary—the result of a harsh history—and is necessary now as "the sole powerful base for conquering the tendency toward and appearance of monopolistic and bureaucratic deformation of socialist development."[27]

In carrying out their tasks the communes independently pass their own laws, annual plan (*društveni plan*), and budget, and set specific sums aside for various special funds. In conformity with the law, the *opština* independently establishes its own income and assigns distribution. Communes with insufficient means for their tasks and the maintenance of minimum required social services are guaranteed additional funds from republican and federal sources.[28] This principle applied in practice, however, is somewhat more difficult to interpret: what is the minimum standard for a commune in developed Slovenia or for one in underdeveloped Macedonia? This question has never been satisfactorily answered.

The communal organs are required to ensure compliance with federal and republican laws except where competence is expressly reserved to the higher organs. Every *opština* independently passes its own statutes based on federal and republican constitutions, which specify the rights and duties of the commune, and establishes the manner in which they will be realized. Communes may mutually cooperate, utilize their funds for joint projects, and create institutions to administer common needs.

The 1963 Constitution clearly tips the formal administrative scale in favor of the commune. In its words, the commune shall "execute other powers of the social community, with the exception of the powers determined by the Constitution as being the rights and duties of republics

[27] "Nova Uloga Države u Razvoju Socijalističkih Odnosa i Uspostavljanje Osnove za Razvoj Samoupravljanja" [The New Role of the State in the Development of Socialist Relations and the Reestablished Principles for the Development of Self-Government], *Politika* (Belgrade), October 26, 1961.

[28] Kardelj, "Komuna i Prednacrt Našeg Novog Ustava," 16.

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or of the Federation."[29] Higher administrative organs do not have direct operational or administrative superiority over the communes.

In order to carry out the various functions and duties assigned to it, the *opština* has a number of administrative and consultative bodies. The name of the highest functional body was changed under the new Constitution. The standard name *narodni odbor*, or "people's committee," was eliminated and in its place *opštinska skupština,* or "communal assembly," was substituted. Prior to the 1963 Constitution, the people's committee was the "basic and most important institution of local government."[30] The change was considered necessary owing to the increased social role and responsibility projected for the commune and the feeling that this classical Communist term for the highest organ of local government, the people's committee, no longer reflected the "new reality": "... the very name *odbor* [committee] is too narrow for such wide self-governing rights and responsibilities. It suggests more the meaning of power, administrative and operational direction, etc., while the name *skupština* [assembly] would probably more fully describe the new relations and role of the organ as the coordinating body and unit of self-government."[31]

The communal assembly is the highest representative body and organ of government in the commune. It is composed of a communal chamber or council, and a chamber of working associations or communities. The communal chamber is elected by all of the citizens, while the chamber of working associations is elected by all working people, not only those in economic enterprises, but also those in education, cultural activities, social welfare, health services, etc. This was another basic innovation of the new Constitution. Previously there had been a chamber or council of producers, elected only by those working in economic organizations. By the change it was hoped that the interests and specialties of all types of enterprises would be represented in the assembly and reflected in its legislative acts. The tenure of office for an assembly member is four years; half of the house changes every two years.

The communal assembly elects a president from among the members of the assembly. The president holds office for a maximum of four years. Subordinate to the president and in charge of the commune's

[29] "The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic," 59.

[30] *Report on Local Government in Yugoslavia,* issued by the Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation, Government of India (Jaipur 1960), 19. This is an excellent account of the formal character of local government prior to the new Constitution.

[31] Dragutin Kosovac, "Uvodno Izlaganje" [Introductory Exposition], *Samoupravljanje u Komuni* (Belgrade 1961), 62-63.

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administration is a secretary, who is appointed for four years and may be reappointed.

IV

In the discussion so far, the characteristics of the communal system as expressed in the Federal Constitution have been presented. One of the most important effects of the new administrative system—and this should be underlined—is the freedom that the communes have in organizing their particular mechanism of power, self-government, and control. This is an important departure from the past. Formerly, federal and republican regulations established the organization and responsibilities of the people's committee. Although the new Federal Constitution sets the main guidelines, it is through the statute of the local individual commune that a realistic understanding of the functional organization must be gained. "The characteristic theme concerning the organization of the communal assembly and its organs in current drafts and outlines for new communal statutes is originality and variety and the concreteness of their ordinances. . . ."[32]

Generally each communal statute has four or five major sections. The first section, "General Regulations," specifies the commune's area and administrative center and reemphasizes the fundamental social-political concepts outlined in the Federal Constitution.[33] The second section, "Social-Economic Relations," relates the developmental aims of the communes to resources and methods: "The statute establishes, in the field of social-economic relations, the fundamental social and economic organization of the *opština,* the rights and duties of the citizens, the social and economic position of producers and self-governing organizations, their mutual cooperation and relation to other self-governing bodies in the *opština;* the social principle in distribution, as well as in control and supervision of the work of the economic organizations within the scope of existing measures of distribution; the principles guiding social and economic development in respect to concrete conditions and possibilities for development and the general direction of the wider social-territorial units; the principles of required adoption of an annual social plan, perspective and orientation plans of the *opštine* and working organizations, and the program of development of local communities; the principles and conditions for establishing independent funds; the basic principle for conducting credit policy in harmony

[32] *Organizacija Opštinske Skupštine u Statutima Opština* [The Organization of the Communal Assembly in the Statutes of the Communes], Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije (Belgrade, June 1963), 1.

[33] For an outline of a model communal statute, see *Materijali o Statutima Opština,* 3-56.

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with the economic development of the commune; the fundamental rules concerning the right of workers' collectives to cooperate, join, and undertake mutual tasks in so far as it is in their business interests."[34]

Other sections of the communal statute are concerned with the nature of communal services and their organization. Rather than generalizing for all communes, one specific case has been selected and the significant articles from the statute have been extracted. The institutional set-up of the commune is presented in Figure 3. The *opština* selected is Novi Sad—an urban *opština*—the capital of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina in the Republic of Serbia.

The first two sections of Novi Sad's statute correspond to those described above. The third section, "Social Standard and Communal Services," specifies the services necessary to supply the needs of the commune's population. Article 62 states:

> Communal economic organizations are founded for and required to be concerned with the following activities:
>
> —to supply the settlements in the area of the *opština* with the basic retail food products for daily consumption, such as bread, milk, meat, fats, fruits, and vegetables.
>
> —to extend services of social [collective] eating facilities.
>
> —to supply the citizens with electric and fuel energy, gas, water, and sewage disposal, public transportation services within the area of the *opština*, and city- and chimney-cleaning services.
>
> —the building and maintenance of public roads of the fourth class, squares, and sidewalks in the area of the *opština*.[35]

A further article generalizes the social services that are required: "In harmony with conditions of established law, there are founded in the *opština,* to satisfy the interests and needs of the citizens and working organizations, institutions of social services in the areas of education, including both adult and pre-school, cultural activities, physical culture, health, and social security."[36]

The fourth section, "Organization of Self-Government in the *Opština,*" presents the organization and functioning of the various organs of the Communal Assembly. Figure 3 was prepared on the basis of this section.

As has been indicated, the Communal Assembly comprises two chambers, the Communal Chamber and the Chamber of Working

[34] *Društveno-Ekonomski Odnosi u Statutima Opština* [Social-Economic Relations in the Statutes of the Communes], Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije (Belgrade, June 1963), 1.

[35] *Prednacrt Statuta Opštine Novi Sad* [The Draft Statute of the *Opština* of Novi Sad] (Novi Sad, April 1963), 14.

[36] *Ibid.*, 18.

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

FIG. 3. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNE

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Communities; each chamber, in the case of Novi Sad, has 70 members. There are nine administrative departments in the *opština.* These are the organizations concerned with carrying out the policies and decisions of the Communal Assembly. The intermediary units between the Assembly and the various administrative bodies are councils *(savet),* the broad policy-makers for the administrative organs and specialized professional agencies—i.e., the Planning Commission, etc. It should be noted that each council is concerned with a separate field of activity, such as industry and handicrafts, agriculture, commerce, etc. The function of the councils is to set the general policy, both legislative and operational, coordinate the work, and exercise supervision over the various enterprises within the council's sector of responsibility. The councils are composed of members appointed by the assembly and by organizations directly involved in the respective fields.

It should also be noted that there are four organs directly responsible to the Assembly (see Figure 3). The distinction between the terms "committees" and "commissions" is a new one for many communes. Where the distinction does exist, there is a desire to call attention to varying functions. Committees are concerned with supervision of the work of the councils and administrative and working organizations in the area of the *opština,* while commissions are operational units of the Assembly.[37]

In summary, the councils, as representative bodies, take decisions on any matter that amounts to policy determination or the application of policy to political questions. The commissions and committees, in the case of Novi Sad, ensure that the regulations and decisions of higher organs, and of the Communal Assembly itself, are put into force and also act in the preparation of proposals for the Assembly. The administrative organs are responsible for the direct implementation of all laws, regulations, and decisions of the Assembly.

V

As a concrete example of how the system works, the field of city planning has been selected. In Novi Sad, there are three major professional organizations concerned with city planning activities (see Figure 3), as is the usual case throughout the country: the City Planning Commission, the Fund for Housing Construction, and the Office for Communal Construction. The Planning Commission is concerned with working out the master plan for the city, supervising its implementation and conducting research on general problems concerned

[37] For a description of their activities, see *ibid.,* 26, 27.

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with urbanization within the area of the *opština.* The Fund for Housing Construction is the major credit organization for housing, setting basic policy and norms. The Office for Communal Construction—not yet a universal institution throughout the country—supervises the work of various technical departments, such as those responsible for sewage and water, roads, etc. It coordinates all construction activity in the area of the *opština,* including the "preparation of the ground" for construction—i.e., it ensures that all required underground facilities are installed prior to construction.

When the planning mechanism works well, as it does in the case of Novi Sad, the commune's administrative Department for Communal and Housing Affairs acts as a registration office. After all of the technical details have been satisfied within the specifications laid down by the three offices concerned, the investor (the term is used for either enterprises or individuals) receives a building permit from the administrative office for a specific site. In pursuing his private interests—i.e., building a house, buying an apartment, etc.—a citizen must comply with the regulations governing the transaction. Though the regulations apply universally, the speed or priority of the process may well depend upon one's status in the commune. In other words, if "citizen X" does not like a specific regulation, there is little he can do about it. The administrative department—in this case, the Department for Communal and Housing Affairs—is thus a local state organ that records the event and ensures that both the citizen and the agencies involved have complied with relevant regulations.

It should be noted that in the above example the Council for City Planning has no function. The Council, composed of fifteen local citizens, usually meeting once a month, is concerned with broad issues of policy, not the day-to-day activity of the Planning Commission. When, for example, the city plan is ready either for adoption or revision (according to most republican laws, an approved plan must be revised at least once every five years), the Council for City Planning—not the City Planning Commission—"is required to place the proposal for the plan in public discussion prior to its consideration by the communal assembly."[38] Public discussion includes at least two operations: (1) review of the proposed plan by a professional group of technical experts appointed by the Council and publication of their findings; and (2) public displays of the plan and discussions by the broad mass of the population. Through local associations, the citizens present their criticisms and recommendations to the Council. The views are summarized

[38] *Ibid.,* 16.

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by the Council and forwarded to the Planning Commission, which is obligated to indicate why the recommendations are or are not to be considered.

There are a number of local neighborhood institutions which may, and often do, offer criticism on various subjects before the Communal Assembly: the apartment house councils, the "voters' meetings," and the local community or neighborhood units. The apartment house councils are administrative organs of individual apartment houses.[39] The voters' meeting, representing a number of city blocks, usually holds sessions once every three months to inform the public of various proposals. The local community (*mesna zajednica*—or *stambena zajednica*, as it was called prior to the new Constitution) is "a self-governing community of citizens of rural and urban settlements," in which "the citizens directly participate in self-government in activities that satisfy the basic communal, cultural, health, social, and other needs and desires of the community."[40] Kardelj has observed that "*mesne zajednice* [local communities], that is, *stambena* [housing] and *seoska* [rural] communities, have primarily three functions: first, *mesna zajednica* is a unit of the city plan; second, it is a unit and form of self-government in the commune; and third, it is a carrier of the widening material-technical base for the everyday life of the family and the individual."[41]

To return to our example involving the adoption or revision of a city plan, the three citizens' groups discussed above can—and do, because of their varying positions on the administrative scale—view the same proposal from various perspectives. Within the limits of a number of controls to be discussed later—emanating from above, not from the commune itself—there is apparently a desire on the part of Yugoslav political leaders to respond to, and actively stimulate, realistic public discussion on local issues, including holding special referendums. In Kardelj's words: "If the voters' meeting [*zborovi birača*] is considered as a political grouping whose thoughts, position, and cooperation are necessary for the effective functioning and adoption of important decisions of all organs of the commune, it will less seldom happen that

[39] The reader desiring detailed information on the legal operation of the apartment house councils and all matters relating to apartment occupancy are referred to *Zbirka Propisa iz Stambene Oblasti* [Selected Regulations from the Housing Area], *Službeni List* (Belgrade 1962), and Svetomir Petković, *Komentar Zakona o Stambenim Odnosima* [A Commentary on the Laws about Housing Relations] (Belgrade 1962).

[40] *Mesne Zajednice u Komunalnom Sistemu i Zadaci Socijalističkog Saveza* [The Local Community in the Communal System and the Goals of the Socialist Alliance] (Subotica, December 1962), 1.

[41] Edvard Kardelj, *Samoupravljanje u Komuni,* 19. For the implications of the *mesna zajednica* in city planning, see Jack C. Fisher, "Planning the City of Socialist Man," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners,* XXVIII (November 1962), 251-65.

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the voters' meeting is consulted merely for formal approval of already settled and non-debatable positions and measures. Therefore, it must be especially assured that the voters' meetings are realistically consulted during the phase of preparation and that there are placed in discussion before the voters' meetings—instead of complicated and, for the citizens, unintelligible ordinances and regulations—clearly expressed solutions to important questions, with the relevant political and economic consequences of each of these solutions, so that in consulting the citizens, political decisions will result."[42]

There are a number of cases where the city plan, as well as other proposals, have been changed by objections from one or all of the above groups. From an examination of conflicts throughout the country between local groups and planning commissions, an important criterion applicable to most areas of activity in the country emerged. When the concept or underlying principles of the proposed master plan for the city were in fact challenged by the criticisms of a local group, the plan was usually not altered. When, however, the group's recommendations involved areas or changes that would not directly alter the fundamental concept of the plan, then favorable reception was in many cases forthcoming. Recommendations by local groups are potentially effective—whether these be the communes themselves, local communities, voters' meetings, or apartment house councils—when the desired action conforms with general policy of higher governmental units *or* the group itself has the necessary resources to carry out the project. Thus, as the material base increases, the commune can be expected to have greater freedom in carrying out projects of purely local interest. Where resources are insufficient or the proportions of the undertaking demand outside help, the concurrence of "higher social-territorial units" is necessary. This may well be the essential principle of the communal system in Yugoslavia, as it most certainly is the policy in practice.

VI

In the preceding discussion an attempt has been made to provide something of the history and organization of the Yugoslav commune or *opština* under the Constitution of April 1963. These conclusions emerge from the discussion to this point:

(1) The existing constitutional structure provides a legal framework for direct citizen participation in the work of the commune. In theory, the citizen participates in the political process through a dualistic role as producer and consumer.

[42] Kardelj, *Samoupravljanje u Komuni*, 51.

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(2) There is a desire to ensure a minimum standard of social services throughout the country, even though quantitatively and comparatively this has never been clearly defined. This means, in effect, that those communes with an insufficient resource base will be provided with outside funds to finance minimum standards of schooling, health facilities, etc.

(3) Nevertheless, though there is a definite policy of financial assistance to underdeveloped communes, the level of services—above some theoretical minimum—will be dependent upon the economic capacity of the individual communes, thus providing an obvious inducement for greater productivity and local investment.

There remains, however, one additional factor which has been referred to only briefly here and is discussed even more vaguely in Yugoslavia: the general direction of economic and social development must be in harmony with the overall policies of the "wider social community." If the system of controls emanating from above is not recognized, then the communal system is not and cannot be understood. Kardelj has asserted that "There is no self-government and freedom without responsible organized *social control* to determine that each actually lives within the framework of his rights and not at the expense of others, and second, there is no self-government without centralization and good organization of those functions that by nature must be centralized. We have always maintained, and today it is no less important to state, that for us neither centralization nor decentralization in and of itself is an absolutely good or an absolutely bad thing. . . . It is impossible to combat bureaucratic centralism successfully if we do not fight against particularist bureaucracy. What is more, there is no doubt that the society that allows the debauchery of particularist bureaucracy in its enterprises and communes will end with the victory of bureaucratic centralism in the republic and federation. The simple truth must never be forgotten that society is a living organism, and that in its organization each organ should have its own established function."[43]

"It is true," Kardelj has written elsewhere, "that supervision or control is a necessary thing. Without social control and inspection it is not possible to ensure either a single system or the healthy development of our community. . . . It is in this manner that the basic activity of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Alliance of

[43] Edvard Kardelj, "Iz Exspozea na Sednici Savezne Narodne Skupštine od 28 Maja 1962 godine" [From an Exposition on the Session of the Federal Parliament], *Materijali o Statutima Opština,* 105.

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Working People, the Trade Union Alliance of Yugoslavia, etc., should develop. If we but think this way, there will be no difficulty in finding an adequate solution for the mechanism of social supervision."[44]

Control, therefore, is envisaged as necessary in two directions: (1) control by the commune over local institutions and economic organizations, (2) supervision by the republican and federal government to ensure compliance with central policies. Since the control exercised by the communes themselves has already been discussed, the broader social-control mechanism concerns us now.

How can higher administrative organs ensure that their policies and regulations are carried out by the "independent communes"? What mechanism do they employ, when the entire spirit of the Constitution stresses the independence of the commune and the dependence of higher organs on it? From observation, it is apparent that there are three mechanisms through which control or pressure is being applied: (1) directly on the commune, by the Socialist Alliance of Working People; (2) on all investors, by the investment and credit policy outlined in the annual federal plan and directed by the Federal Planning Commission and the banking establishment; and (3) on industrial and other organizations, by the Trade Union and the Economic Chamber.

The policies followed and positions taken by the Socialist Alliance, the Trade Union, and the entire investment pattern, centrally determined in Belgrade, are the major source of indirect control and supervision. It should be noted that we are referring to social and political policy involving investment and developmental positions, not supervision that ensures compliance with overt public laws or affects the determination of economic or criminal offenses. These institutions act, or are expected to act, as counterforces to the localist or particularist positions and interests of the voters' meeting, the local community, the enterprise, and the commune.

In all of this, the institutional role of the Party, except in times of declared crisis or danger, is what might be described as "actively passive." The local cell of the League of the Communists takes few direct positions on specific proposals, but individual members are expected to demonstrate by example and discussion the "merits" of the question under discussion. The cell may thus be described as a latent, but not inactive, force ready to be called upon should the need arise. Its role may be explained in part by the following factors: (1) the genuine measures against Party monopoly that were taken during the 1950's; (2) the lack of Party discipline on the local levels, coupled with the

[44] Kardelj, "Komuna i Prednacrt Našeg Novog Ustava," 20.

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common tendency for local loyalties to prevail—reinforced, of course, by a system that focuses allegiance on republican Party organizations;[45] (3) the tactical advantage of never actually taking an overt position on a concrete proposal and thus always being in a position to arbitrate, without previous formal commitment; and (4) the fact that the complete monopoly of power exercised by the Party during the early postwar period is no longer necessary. This monopoly can formally be shared with other organizations—of its own making—without in any way undercutting the Party's overall security.

The new system, as it is now evolving, stimulates the basic organ of local government, the commune, to entertain its own development plans in conformity with policies laid down by the federal government. The pressures are for the most part not direct, not administrative in the classical Communist sense; they are indirect, often exerted by local citizens following the directives of the above-mentioned social-political organizations.

It can be argued that these controls are especially necessary in a period when extreme variations in economic development exist. It is obvious that individual factories administered by a workers' council might often put private gain ahead of a centrally determined public good. Under the model, they are brought into line not by administrative coercion but by economic and political pressure.

When despite objections an individual enterprise, commune, or local community makes a decision contrary to higher policy, usually they are not disciplined, particularly if the body in question itself has the necessary resources to implement its decision. Thus in reality the great part of any opposition to central policy involves insignificant sums for projects having only local implications. As an example, federal policy has stressed the production of finished meat products, owing to a relatively favorable international market. Thus the local Communal Assembly of Novi Sad—located by chance in a rich livestock area—was influenced to build a new meat-packing plant with very favorable credit terms. If it had elected to build a new chemical plant rather than a meat-packing plant, the commune's ability to obtain favorable credit terms would have been limited. Conversely, a commune lacking a proper regional livestock base might also have elected to build a slaughter house, owing to the favorable credit terms. Though the

[45] For an example of the most recent political crisis, in which opposing positions were expressed through republican Parties, see Jack C. Fisher, "The Reconstruction of Skopje," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, xxx (February 1964), 46-48.

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agency responsible for making the decision would, it could be expected, attempt to discourage the commune in the latter example, all too often communes without adequate resources have brought strong political pressure to bear so that they too could share in the collective fruits of the land. This touches upon one of the most difficult consequences of the communal system. It appears that the government's attempt to stimulate economic integration is hampered by the "independent communes," each seeking its own interest and concerned only with measures to increase its own tax revenue. This is at the moment evolving as one of the major problems facing Yugoslav economists.

What is the role of the republic under the communal system? Owing to the existing disparity in economic and natural resources, the republic acts today as a cushion between local needs and federal policy. At this stage of development, the republic has a vital coordinating role. Republican ordinances interpret federal law for the specific economic and social realities of the communes. The stress, as underlined in the Constitution, is on a uniform administrative system allowing for varying levels of economic development and social standards.

In view, however, of the projected development of the communal system, one might question the future role of the republics. The predominant role of the *opština* under the Constitution has, in theory, if not yet in fact, lessened the republic's importance. The squeeze on the republics is manifested in two directions: ". . . on the one hand, by the rights of the Federation and, on the other, by the rights of municipalities [communes] as basic autonomous units. . . . The republican executive council and the republican administrative bodies have lost the right of control over the legality of municipal and district decisions enjoyed earlier."[46] In view of this deemphasis of the republic, one can foresee the time when the commune could be regarded as the ultimate form of local government under full communism.

A uniform administrative system, the communal system, is the means by which political and social integration is to take place. The republics are gradually losing control and responsibility to the communes. Thus to the list of items that will be absent under the stage of full communism must be added the republics—and at the head of the list. Though it is politically too explosive a matter to be actively dis-

[46] Hamdija Ćemerlić, "Relations Between the Federation and Its Constituent Units in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Third Yugoslav-American Seminar (Zadar 1963), 21, 23.

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cussed today, the commune does offer an institutional means by which to ease out the republic gradually, while sub-republic autonomy is encouraged.

VII

In summary, the development of the communal system in Yugoslavia was made possible by post-1948 politics, but made necessary by the heterogeneous grouping of nationalities, the varying levels of economic and social development, and the long shadow of the past. In accepting the Soviet-inspired federal solution, Yugoslav authorities were prepared in 1946 to grant "cultural determination," but sought to ensure uniform economic and political direction by means of a central apparatus with sufficient force. This solution did not survive for several reasons: (1) the nature of the Yugoslav "revolution" was significantly different from those in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. The local partisan groups that emerged throughout the country provided a leadership in which mutual trust and respect were never betrayed. (2) There developed powerful internal pressures for greater regional latitude. (3) A changed external situation placed the Yugoslavs on the side of the non-Stalinists and thus of implied liberalization. In contrast to the Soviet republican system, where centrifugal pressures have found no outlet, the Yugoslavs have been attempting to build an economic and political system that provides regional autonomy within the framework of federal supervision. This essentially has been the nature of the Yugoslav pragmatic experiment since 1950, and especially since 1955. Once the end was decided upon, however, there appeared no ideal means to achieve it. So-called centralist and non-centralist approaches have developed. In the case of every federal solution to a problem, there is a tendency for that solution to be viewed in the provinces as another "centralist Serbian solution."

The communal system was offered as a solution to the conflict of regional interests or, as it is often called in the West, the "nationality question." In this regard, however, it must be emphasized that the prewar nationality question is something quite different from the regional conflicts that plague the country today. There is "cultural determination" by the various peoples of the country; there is no attempt to "Serbianize the population." Regional conflicts, however, have centered on economic and social inequality and, colored by varying historical traditions, often emerge as "nationality questions." The communal system has attempted by diffusion to solve the political aspects of the traditional conflict, while the principle "of each according to his work" justifies the extreme variations in economic standards.

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The communal system has roots running deep in a turbulent past. The system is not yet completely operational, for there are as many variations in functioning as there are major regional variations. Yet the communal system in Yugoslavia appears to be a rational solution, in theory, to the difficult nationality question and may evolve as a unique and interesting political form.

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Research Notes

INEQUALITY AND INSTABILITY

The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics*

By BRUCE M. RUSSETT

I

AT LEAST since the ancient Greeks many thinkers have regarded great diversity of wealth as incompatible with stable government. According to Euripides:

> In a nation there be orders three:—
> The useless rich, that ever crave for more;
> The have-nots, straitened even for sustenance,
> A dangerous folk, of envy overfull,
> Which shoot out baleful stings at such as have,
> Beguiled by tongues of evil men, their "champions":
> But of the three the midmost saveth states;
> They keep the order which the state ordains.[1]

Alexis de Tocqueville, writing many centuries later, declared: "Remove the secondary causes that have produced the great convulsions of the world and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom. Either the poor have attempted to plunder the rich, or the rich to enslave the poor. If, then, a state of society can ever be founded in which every man shall have something to keep and little to take from others, much will have been done for the peace of the world."[2]

Many modern writers echo the same thought. Merle Kling, for example, blames political instability in Latin America on the extreme concentration of economic bases of power in what he terms "colonial economies." Land ownership, he says, is so heavily concentrated that no individual not already possessing great tracts of agricultural land can reasonably hope to achieve wealth through farming. Foreign exploitation of

* This article is part of the research of the Yale Political Data Program, supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. I am grateful to John Shingler and Seth Singleton for research assistance. An earlier version was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1963.

[1] "The Suppliants," *The Tragedies of Euripides,* trans. by Arthur S. Way (London 1894), 373.

[2] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Vintage edn., New York 1954), II, 266.

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mineral resources effectively blocks the ambitious native from that source of wealth. Industry remains rudimentary. Of the possible sources of enrichment, only government is open to competition. Political office provides such a unique source of gain that "large segments of the population are prepared to take the ultimate risk of life, in a revolt, in a *coup d'état,* to perpetuate a characteristic feature of Latin American politics—chronic political instability."[3]

Both Plato and Karl Marx so despaired of the pernicious effects of wealth that they saw no way to abolish the evil except to abolish private property itself. Tocqueville, on the other hand, thought that he found in America a society which had been able to reach another solution: "Between these two extremes [very few rich men and few poor ones] of democratic communities stands an innumerable multitude of men almost alike, who, without being exactly either rich or poor, possess sufficient property to desire the maintenance of order, yet not enough to excite envy. Such men are the natural enemies of violent commotions; their lack of agitation keeps all beneath them and above them still and secures the balance of the fabric of society."[4]

Yet if we check the matter empirically with present-day polities the answer is not so clear-cut. Wealth is everywhere distributed unequally; even in the most egalitarian societies the income of the rich is many times that of the poor. And one can readily point to a number of instances—such as Spain—where, despite an impressionistic judgment that goods are distributed highly unequally, the polity is seemingly stable under the rule of a dictator.

Part of the difficulty stems from a conceptual problem, a lack of clarity about just what is the dependent variable. Is economic inequality incompatible with *stable* government, or merely with *democratic* or "*good*" government? If we mean stable government, do we mean regimes in which the rulers maintain themselves in power for long periods despite the chronic outbreak of violence (Colombia and South Vietnam), or simply the avoidance of significant violence even though governments may topple annually (France throughout most of the Third and Fourth Republics)? Or must "stable" government be both peaceful and reasonably long-term? Finally, what do we mean by the government? A particular individual (Spain), a particular party (Uruguay), the essential maintenance of a particular coalition (France under the

[3] Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly,* IX (March 1956), 21-35. Note that land distribution is only one element of the "colonial economy" defined by Kling.

[4] Tocqueville, 266.

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system of "replastering"), or the continued dominance of a particular social stratum (Jordan)?

Another part of the difficulty stems from the absence of comparative study. Numerous authors have examined the distribution of agricultural land in particular countries or areas, and its contribution to a particular political situation. Several books have drawn together studies giving attention to many different nations.[5] But none of these have been based on the same concepts or have presented data for the same variables in a manner necessary for true comparative analysis. Case studies are essential for providing depth and insight, but generalization requires eventual attention to many cases.

Comparative analysis is dependent on the provision of comparable data. For instance, one may know that in contemporary England the upper 5 per cent of income earners receive over 15 per cent of all current income, even after taxes.[6] Is this high or low compared with other nations? All too often the necessary data simply are not available or, if they are, they are not in comparable form. For another country one may, for instance, know the proportion of income going to the top 10 per cent and top 1 per cent of earners, but not to the top 5 per cent, as in England.

In this article we shall attempt to clarify the problem conceptually, present for the first time a large body of distribution data, and test some hypotheses about the relation between economic inequality and politics. First, the data. We shall be concerned with information on the degree to which agricultural land is concentrated in the hands of a few large landholders. Information on land tenure is more readily available, and is of more dependable comparability, than are data on the distribution of other economic assets like current income or total wealth.[7] Material on land distribution is available for many countries about which we know nothing precise or reliable in regard to income distribution.

[5] See, for example, Kenneth Parsons, *et al.*, eds., *Land Tenure* (Madison 1958), and Walter Froelich, *Land Tenure, Industralization, and Social Stability* (Milwaukee 1961).

[6] Robert M. Solow, "Income Inequality Since the War," in *Postwar Economic Trends in the United States*, ed. by Ralph Freeman (New York 1960).

[7] One must always introduce comparative data, particularly on land tenure, with certain caveats. The quality of data collection is not uniform from one country to the next, and in any case it cannot indicate the quality of the land in question. Nevertheless, while these caveats may be important with regard to a few distributions, they do not fundamentally alter the character of the data shown.

Although a few of the data presented were compiled some time ago, patterns of land tenure normally change but little over the years. Only for Bolivia, Taiwan and, to a lesser degree, Italy is there evidence of a significant change between the year given and 1960.

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In addition, land distribution is intrinsically of major interest. Kling's theory of Latin American political instability was built in large part on land inequality; the United States government has long warned its allies in poorer nations about the need for land reform. In Japan, and to a lesser extent in South Korea, the American military government took upon itself a major redistribution of land with the intention of providing the necessary bases for political democracy.

II

I have discussed elsewhere the uses of various summary statistical measures designed to indicate the degree of inequality in a distribution.[8] Here we shall employ three separate indices, each of which measures somewhat different aspects of land distribution. The first two are directed to the relative size of farms, the last to tenancy.

(1) The *percentage of landholders who collectively occupy one-half of all the agricultural land* (starting with the farmers with the *smallest* plots of land and working toward the *largest*).

(2) *The Gini index of concentration.* We begin with a Lorenz curve (Figure 1) drawn by connecting the points given in a cumulative distribution (e.g., the proportion of land held by each decile of farmers). All farms are ranked in order from the smallest to the largest, so that one can say what proportion of the total *number* of farms accounts for a given proportion of the total *area* of agricultural land. In Figure 1 the cumulated percentage of farms is given along the horizontal axis, and the cumulated percentage of the area along the vertical axis. The 45° line represents the condition of perfect equality, wherein each percentile of farmers would make an equal contribution to the cumulated total of agricultural land. Thus, under complete equality each 10 per cent of the population would have exactly 10 per cent of the land; any two-thirds of the population would have exactly two-thirds of the land. How far in fact the curve for a particular distribution departs from the "line of equality" gives us a visual measure of the inequality involved.

The Lorenz curve provides an extremely useful way of showing the complete pattern of a distribution, but it is impractical to try to compare whole Lorenz curves for any substantial number of countries. But if we measure the *area* between the cumulated distribution and the line of equality we have the Gini index, a simple summary measure of the total

[8] Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, "Indices for Comparing Inequality," in *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research*, ed. by R. L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (1964, forthcoming).

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

FIG. 1. LORENZ CURVES OF LAND DISTRIBUTION: AUSTRIA AND BOLIVIA

inequality of a distribution.[9] The Gini index calculates over the whole population the difference between an "ideal" cumulative distribution of land (where all farms are the same size) and the actual distribution. The higher the Gini index, the greater the inequality.

Though the percentage of farmers with one-half the land is simple and useful, the more comprehensive Gini index, by examining the whole distribution, is in many ways superior. The curves for the two countries in Figure 1, for example, both show virtually the same percentage of farmers with half the land. But below the 50 per cent mark, the distribution for Bolivia is much more unequal than is that for

[9] The Gini number for a Lorenz curve is actually twice the area mentioned divided by the area (10,000 for 100 by 100 axes) of the whole square. Formula:

$$G = \frac{2\int_0^{100} (x\text{-}f(x))\ dx}{10{,}000}$$

where x is the cumulated population percentage and f (x) is the height of the Lorenz curve. Cf. Mary Jean Bowman, "A Graphical Analysis of Personal Income Distribution in the United States," *American Economic Review*, XXXV (September 1945), 607-28. In Table 1 below, the Gini index is multiplied by 100.

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Austria. In Bolivia the top 10 per cent of all farmers owned nearly 95 per cent of the land; in Austria the top 10 per cent of farmers owned only about 65 per cent of the land. The implications for a theory of political stability are obvious. (The Bolivian figures actually apply to 1950. Since that date Bolivia has experienced a social revolution.)

(3) Probably less important than the relative size of farms, but still relevant, is the question of *ownership*. If a farmer tills a substantial piece of land but nevertheless must pay much of the produce to a landlord, the effect may be much the same as if he actually owned a much smaller plot. Therefore we also present data, where available, on *farm households that rent all their land as a percentage of the total number of farms.*

It is even more difficult to find a satisfactory operational definition of stability than to measure inequality. In our effort to account for different aspects of "stability," we shall use several quite different indices.

(A) *Instability of Personnel.* One measure of stability is simply the term of office of the chief executive. As the numerator of our index, we have used the number of years during the period 1945-1961 in which a country was independent; and, as the denominator, the number of individuals who held the post of chief executive during the same period. By subtracting this figure from 17 (the number of years in the period) we obtain what we shall term the index of "personnel instability." It may vary from 0 to 17; in fact, the highest figure in our sample is 16.32 for France.[10]

(B) *Internal Group Violence.* Rudolph Rummel, in his Dimensionality of Nations Project, collected data on the number of people killed as a result of internal group violence—i.e., civil wars, revolutions, and riots —during the years 1955-1957. We have extended the time period to 1950-1962, and have modified the data to allow for the size of the total

[10] With this definition, most of the indices fall between 11 and 17. Our use of logarithmic transformations in the correlations below compensates for this bunching.

In some ways it might have been more desirable to measure the average tenure of a party or coalition, but that solution raises other problems. When a government in the French Fourth Republic fell and was replaced by a new cabinet composed basically of the same parties, was this a new coalition or just the old one under a new Premier? The first answer immediately involves one in difficulties of comparability with other countries' experiences; the second answer would cause France to appear much more stable than any observer would agree was correct.

Measuring the tenure of the chief executive tells nothing about the *form* of government, nor about what Kling (p. 25) describes as concealed instability. A government may appear stable only as long as its repressive techniques succeed; when they fail, it may be violently and suddenly overthrown. Thus Trujillo's Dominican Republic was "stable" for several decades. Nevertheless it is difficult to see how "hidden instability" can be allowed for other than through some definition of a democratic-dictatorial continuum, which we attempt in index D below.

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population in question, making the index deaths per 1,000,000 people.[11]

(C) *Internal War.* As an alternative to the violent-death material, we shall use Harry Eckstein's data on internal war for the period 1946-1961.[12] These data include the total number of violent incidents, from plots to protracted guerrilla warfare.

(D) Quite a different problem is the *Stability of Democracy.* With a few adaptations we shall use the distinctions employed by Seymour Martin Lipset. "Stable democracies" will be defined as states that have been characterized by the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I, *and* the absence over the past thirty years of a totalitarian movement, either Fascist or Communist, which at any point received as much as 20 per cent of the vote. "Unstable democracies," again following Lipset, are countries which, although unable to meet the first criteria, nevertheless have a "history of more or less free elections for most of the post-World War I period."[13] "Dictatorships" are those countries in which, perhaps despite some democratic interludes, free elections have been generally absent. These judgments are impressionistic and do not permit precise rankings from most to least democratic; nevertheless they generally agree with those of other scholars and with widely accepted standards.[14]

Note again that our political dependent variables measure distinctly different aspects—stability of executive personnel, the incidence of violence, and "democracy." No one is by itself an adequate measure of all the conditions to which land distribution has been thought relevant.

Table 1 (see pp. 450-51) indicates the rankings of 47 countries (all those for which distribution data are available) on the first six of these indices. It also gives 1955 *GNP per capita,* in U.S. dollars, and the *percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture* in the most recent

[11] Cf. Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," in *General Systems,* Yearbook of the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory (Ann Arbor 1963). The nature and limitations of the data used in this article will be discussed in Bruce M. Russett *et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964, forthcoming).

[12] Harry Eckstein, *Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation,* a report submitted to the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, Smithsonian Institution (Washington 1962), Appendix I.

[13] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review,* LIII (March 1959), 73-74.

[14] For a similar classification of regimes in the underdeveloped countries, see Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 579-81.

Lipset's categorization is of course crude and subject to a number of criticisms. For example, cf. Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review,* XXVIII (April 1963), 253-64. The alternative index that Cutright suggests, however, really deals with the complexity of political institutions—quite a different matter.

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year for which we have data. The possible relevance of these additional variables will be discussed below.

III

Land is everywhere distributed unequally. In even the most egalitarian states, about four-fifths of the farmers are concentrated on only half the land. Still, the degree of inequality varies widely from state to state. Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients (r) indicating the degree of association between each of the three measures of land distribution and each of the first three indices of instability.[15]

TABLE 2. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (r) FOR MEASURES OF LAND EQUALITY WITH MEASURES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY FOR 47 COUNTRIES

	Personnel Instability	*Violent Political Deaths* (per 1,000,000)	*Eckstein Internal War Data*
% of Farms with ½ Land	.24	.45	.35
Gini Index	.33	.46	.29
% of Farms Rented (44 countries only)	.01	.27	.11

For the three indices of inequality there is in each case a positive relationship to instability, though in two instances the correlation is extremely slight. The highest correlation is between violent deaths and the Gini index. Judged by the standards of most social science this is a fairly high correlation, with a significance level of .001 (i.e., unless there really were a positive relationship between land distribution and instability, this high a correlation would not occur, purely by chance, as often as one time in a thousand). Nevertheless, these correlations indicate that much remains unexplained. Even the highest (.46) gives an r^2 of only .21. (The squared product moment coefficient—r^2—can be interpreted as the percentage of the total variation in one index that can be explained by another.) Inequality of land distribution does bear a relation to political instability, but that relationship is not a strong one, and many other factors must be considered in any attempted explanation.[16] The degree

[15] For the three political variables, I used logarithmic transformations instead of the raw data.

[16] Nor is great concentration of farmland always a prelude to violent revolution in predominantly agricultural societies. Even according to figures cited by the Communists, inequality in Czarist Russia and interwar China was less than in most of the countries listed in Table 1. Cf. V. I. Lenin, *The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy*, in *Selected Works*, III (New York, n.d.), 164-65; and Yuan-li Wu, *An Economic Survey of Communist China* (New York 1956), 119. Wu lists several estimates, the most extreme of

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TABLE 1. LAND DISTRIBUTION AND POLITICAL STABILITY, 47 COUNTRIES

	LAND DATA			POLITICAL DATA			ECONOMIC DATA	
Country	*Gini Index*	*% of Farms with ½ Land*	*% of Farms Rented*	*Personnel Instability*	*Eckstein Internal War*	*Deaths from Civil Group Violence per 1,000,000*	*GNP per Capita ($-1955)*	*% Labor Force in Agriculture*
Yugoslavia	43.7	79.8	0*	0	9	0	297	67
Poland	45.0	77.7	0*	8.5	19	5.0	468	57
Denmark	45.8	79.3	3.5	14.6	0	0	913	23
Japan	47.0	81.5	2.9	15.7	22	0.1	240	40
Canada	49.7	82.9	7.2	11.3	22*	0	1667	12
Switzerland	49.8	81.5	18.9	8.5	0	0	1229	10
India	52.2	86.9	53.0	3.0	83	14.0	72	71
Philippines	56.4	88.2	37.3	14.0	15	292.0	201	59
Sweden	57.7	87.2	18.9	8.5	0	0	1165	13
France	58.3	86.1	26.0	16.3	46	0.3	1046	26
Belgium	58.7	85.8	62.3	15.5	8	0.9	1015	10
Ireland	59.8	85.9	2.5**	14.2	9	0	509	40
Finland	59.9	86.3	2.4	15.6	4	0	941	46
Netherlands	60.5	86.2	53.3	13.6	2	0	708	11
Luxembourg	63.8	87.7	18.8	12.8	0	0	1194	23
Taiwan	65.2	94.1	40.0	0	3	0	102	50
Norway	66.9	87.5	7.5	12.8	1	0	969	26
South Vietnam	67.1	94.6	20.0*	10.0	50*	1000*	133	65
West Germany	67.4	93.0	5.7	3.0	4	0	762	14
Libya	70.0	93.0	8.5	14.8	8	0*	90	75
United States	70.5	95.4	20.4	12.8	22*	0	2343	10
United Kingdom	71.0	93.4	44.5	13.6	12	0	998	5

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Panama	73.7	95.0	12.3	15.6	29	25.0	350	54
Austria	74.0	97.4	10.7	12.8	4	0	532	32
Egypt	74.0	98.1	11.6	15.8	45	1.6	133	64
Greece	74.7	99.4	17.7	15.8	9	2.0	239	48
Honduras	75.7	97.4	16.7	13.6	45	111.0	137	66
Nicaragua	75.7	96.4	n.a.	12.8	16	16.0	254	68
New Zealand	77.3	95.5	22.3	12.8	0	0	1249	16
Spain	78.0	99.5	43.7	0	22	0.2	254	50
Cuba	79.2	97.8	53.8	13.6	100	2900.0*	361	42
Dominican Rep.	79.5	98.5	20.8	11.3	6	31.0	205	56
Italy	80.3	98.0	23.8	15.5	51	0.2	442	29
Uruguay	81.7	96.6	34.7	14.6	1	0.3	569	37
El Salvador	82.8	98.8	15.1	15.1	9	2.0	244	63
Brazil	83.7	98.5	9.1	15.5	49	1.0	262	61
Colombia	84.9	98.1	12.1	14.6	47	316.0	330	55
Guatemala	86.0	99.7	17.0	14.9	45	57.0	179	68
Argentina	86.3	98.2	32.8	13.6	57	217.0	374	25
Ecuador	86.4	99.3	14.6	15.1	41	18.0	204	53
Peru	87.5	96.9	n.a.	14.6	23	26.0	140	60
Iraq	88.1	99.3	75.0*	16.2	24	344.0	195	81
Costa Rica	89.1	99.1	5.4	14.6	19	24.0	307	55
Venezuela	90.9	99.3	20.6	14.9	36	111.0	762	42
Australia	92.9	99.6	n.a.	11.3	0	0.0	1215	14
Chile	93.8	99.7	13.4	14.2	21	2.0	180	30
Bolivia	93.8	97.7	20.0	15.3	53	663.0	66	72

SOURCES:

GNP: Norton Ginsburg, *Atlas of Economic Development* (Chicago 1962), 22.

Land, Personnel Instability, Violent Deaths, and Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture: Russett, *World Handbook* (forthcoming).

Internal War: Eckstein, Appendix I.

*Yale Data Program estimate—very approximate.

**% Area (not farms) rented.

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to which farm land is rented is not a factor of great explanatory power, given the low level of the correlations of rental with all the stability indices.

A more complex hypothesis, closely related to Kling's, might read as follows: extreme inequality of land distribution leads to political instability only in those poor, predominantly agricultural societies where limitation to a small plot of land almost unavoidably condemns one to poverty. In a rich country, the modest income a farmer can produce from even a small holding may satisfy him. Or, if that is not the case, at least in wealthy countries there are, besides agriculture, many alternative sources of wealth.[17] Finally, one might assert that the *combination* of inequality *and* a high rate of tenancy would cause instability. While neither by itself would necessarily lead to violence or frequent change of government, the combination almost inevitably would.

To test these hypotheses we examined simultaneously the effect of GNP per capita, percentage of labor force in agriculture, tenancy, and land distribution on our various indices of political stability.[18] These refinements improved our explanation rather strikingly in some cases. The strongest relationship was between the Gini index and violent deaths; r^2 was raised to .50. By far the most important variables in the equations for "predicting" instability were first the Gini index and then the percentage of the population in agriculture, as suggested by our first hypothesis. The percentage of farms rented again added little explanatory power. Qualifications of this sort help to explain the stability of a country like Australia, despite a highly unequal distribution of agricultural land. Venezuela's land distribution is also very unequal (but no more so than Australia's), yet Venezuela is somewhat

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which was the report of the Hankow Land Commission, which he alleges was Communist-dominated. The Gini indices for Russia and China were, respectively, approximately 73.0 and 64.6.

According to George Pavlovsky, in *Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution* (London 1930), chap. 4, the difficulty in Russia stemmed less from the *relative* size of farm plots than from the fact that the *absolute* size of most holdings was too small to produce more than bare subsistence. Given the technological backwardness of the Russian peasant, this may well be true.

[17] "Rich" countries and "societies where there are many alternative sources of wealth" are to some degree synonymous. Denmark and Australia, two rich nations often thought of as "agricultural," actually have only 23 and 14 per cent, respectively, of their labor forces in agriculture.

[18] The technique used was multiple regression. For a description and application of this method, see Donald Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June 1958), 367-87. This procedure also allows us to test for the independent "explanatory" power of each variable with the other variables *controlled*.

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poorer and has three times as many people (proportionately) employed in agriculture.[19] All the indices of instability are quite high for Venezuela. Nevertheless, even the strongest relationship found among these variables leaves over half the variance "unexplained"—as the sophisticated student of politics might expect. The old saws about equality can be accepted only with caution.

There remains one other possibility yet to be explored—that equality may be related to the stability of a *democratic regime*. That is, there may or may not be sporadic outbreaks of violence; there may or may not be frequent changes of personnel at the highest level; but it is highly unlikely that a nation with a grossly unequal pattern of distribution of a major source of wealth, like agricultural land, will have a consistently democratic government. Table 3 presents a sixfold table showing each of the countries in our sample classified, after Lipset, as a "stable democracy," an "unstable democracy," or a "dictatorship,"[20] and also listed as above or below the median for the Gini index of land inequality.

The results are again quite striking. Of the 23 states with the more equal pattern of land distribution, 13 are stable democracies, whereas only three of 24 more unequal countries can be classified as stable democracies. And of these three, each is a fairly rich state where agriculture is no longer the principal source of wealth. Tocqueville's basic observation would therefore appear correct: no state can long maintain a democratic form of government if the major sources of economic gain are divided very unequally among its citizens. American policy in urging the governments of underdeveloped nations to undertake massive land reform programs seems essentially well-founded. A "sturdy yeomanry" may be a virtual *sine qua non* for democratic government in an underdeveloped land. Nevertheless there are many instances where relative equality of land tenure is not associated with stable democracy; it is no *guarantee* of democratic development. Land reform may provide the soil to nourish free institutions, but the seed must first be planted.

[19] This points up rather sharply the flaw in any attempt to use land distribution as an indicator of the degree of inequality in all wealth for *advanced* economies. Australia is widely acknowledged to be a highly egalitarian society.

[20] Note that these definitions of stability say nothing about the rate of turnover among government personnel, but only about the stability of democratic forms of government. We have included India and the Philippines in the category "stable democracy" because, though independent only since the end of World War II, they met the above test. Nevertheless this decision is open to some question, as political conditions in these countries clearly are *not* the same as in Western Europe. If they instead were classified as "unstable democracies" it would, however, only very moderately change the pattern of the following table.

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TABLE 3. STABLE DEMOCRACIES, UNSTABLE DEMOCRACIES, AND DICTATORSHIPS BY DEGREE OF INEQUALITY IN LAND DISTRIBUTION

Gini Index	*Stable Democracies*	*Unstable Democracies*	*Dictatorships*
Greater than Median Equality	Denmark Canada Switzerland India Philippines Sweden Belgium Ireland Netherlands Luxembourg Norway United States United Kingdom	Japan France Finland West Germany	Yugoslavia Poland Taiwan South Vietnam Libya Panama
Median Equality or Less	New Zealand Uruguay Australia	Austria Greece Italy Brazil Colombia Argentina Costa Rica Chile	Egypt Honduras Nicaragua Spain Cuba Dominican Rep. El Salvador Guatemala Ecuador Peru Iraq Venezuela Bolivia

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FAILURES IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The Case of the Cuban Missiles

By KLAUS KNORR

I

SINCE World War II, two interrelated events have transformed the scope and character of foreign intelligence operations. Governments have become heavily dependent on intelligence estimates in choosing and implementing foreign and military policies. At the same time, intelligence work has become modernized, bureaucratized, and professionalized. The procurement of information has come to depend relatively less on cloak-and-dagger methods and more on the systematic gathering of data from essentially public sources. The professional intelligence bureaucracies—or the "intelligence community," as these services are called in Washington—have accordingly benefited from the infusion of both skilled personnel and conceptualization from a variety of professions, including notably history and the social sciences.

The social science literature on problems of foreign intelligence is nevertheless extremely small.[1] This is regrettable because historians and social scientists have developed and are developing skills that should permit substantial contributions to the theory and even to the practice of intelligence. However, since the work of the intelligence services is necessarily classified, very little material appears in the public domain and academic scholars are deprived of the information on which to base relevant researches.

Occasionally, an interesting document does reach the public. This is the case with the recent Stennis Report on the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to predict the deployment of Soviet intermediate and

[1] Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956); Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton 1949); George S. Pettee, *The Future of American Secret Intelligence* (Washington 1946); Washington Platt, *Strategic Intelligence Production* (New York 1957); Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). There are also the following papers: Max F. Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action," in *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences,* ed. by Daniel Lerner (New York 1959), 158-80; Harold D. Lasswell, "Strategies of Inquiry: The Rational Use of Observation," in *ibid.,* 89-113; Benno Wasserman, "The Failure of Intelligence Prediction," *Political Studies,* VIII (June 1960), 156-69; Allan Evans, "Intelligence and Policy Formation," *World Politics,* XII (October 1959), 84-91; Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," *ibid.,* I (July 1949), 542-52.

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medium-range ballistic missiles (with ranges up to 2,200 miles) in Cuba in 1962.[2]

The following points made in the Report are relevant to the purpose of this research note. The U.S. intelligence services did in fact, on October 14, 1962, identify such missiles—called "offensive" since they were capable of reaching a large proportion of valuable targets in the United States—before they became operational. The revelation came as a surprise to the intelligence community and as a shock to the entire country, although, according to the Stennis Report, offensive missiles had actually been introduced into Cuba "at least a month" before their deployment on sites.[3] Intelligence coverage of Cuba had been intensive throughout the year, and there was plenty of information on the stepping-up of Soviet activities in Cuba, such as the sudden and sharp increase in the number of Soviet ships arriving at the island. By late September, U.S. intelligence had noted the presence of large numbers of Soviet military personnel, surface-to-air missile sites, MIG-21 fighters, and IL-28 (Beagle) light bombers. But this pattern of Soviet deployment could be explained in terms of repeated Soviet declarations that the USSR would defend Cuba against any invasion from the United States. Only in mid-September did some reports of offensive missiles being introduced into Cuba "arouse the suspicion of intelligence analysts";[4] and the photographic reconnaissance laid on as a result eventually produced conclusive evidence on October 14.

The question is: why did the intelligence community fail to warn the government earlier that such a Soviet move was distinctly possible, if not probable, instead of estimating that it was improbable, though not impossible?

II

The Stennis Report attributes the alleged failure to two causes. It notes that the intelligence services tended "to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles."[5] This tendency is understandable, because these reports came from untrained observers who might be unable to distinguish between different types of missiles and whose estimates of physical dimensions might be inaccurate and conflicting; and because the sources of the reports, in view of their possible interest in stimulating an American invasion of Cuba, could not be regarded as

[2] *Investigation of the Preparedness Program,* Interim Report on the Cuban Military Buildup by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington 1963). The Report is usually called the Stennis Report because Senator Stennis was chairman of the subcommittee.

[3] *Ibid.,* 10. [4] *Ibid.,* 7. [5] *Ibid.,* 5; cf. also 10.

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necessarily unbiased. However, the Stennis Report regards the resulting skepticism as only a "contributing factor" to the intelligence error it investigated. The chief factor is seen as the "predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that *it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba.* . . ."[6] Elsewhere the Report refers to the "opinion" and the "philosophical judgment"[7] that accounted for the error. It was a preconception about Soviet behavior that, according to the Report, did not permit "the indications to the contrary" to be "given proper weight."[8]

There is no doubt that by deploying offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union did surprise Washington, including its intelligence bureaucracy. To what extent this surprise was caused by an intelligence *failure* is not, however, clear. Surprises of this kind—and I mean surprises involving spectacular events of great consequence to the surprised party—are common in the history of intelligence. Thus, Soviet Russia was surprised by the German attack in 1941, the Germans were surprised by the Allied landing in Normandy. The United States was surprised by the outbreak of the Korean War and, later, by the Chinese intervention in it (even though Peking had warned us to this effect), and the Russians have told us that they were surprised by the American response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Pearl Harbor is, of course, a classic case of surprise. All these instances have a great deal in common with that of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, including notably that it is hard *in retrospect* to see why surprise occurred.

In Pearl Harbor,[9] as in the Cuban case, the United States was certainly not caught napping as the result of negligence or stupidity. In both cases, furthermore, there was plenty of information that, interpreted *with the benefit of hindsight,* should have prevented surprise, but that was capable of alternative and, to the intelligence specialists, obviously more plausible explanations *before the event.*[10] In each case, it was held subsequently that certain preconceptions had kept intelligence officers from reading the clues aright. As Roberta Wohlstetter observes, it is impossible for anyone to sift signals from noise and to perceive a pattern in a multiplicity of signals unless he has some hypothesis, or hypotheses, to guide him.[11] It is expectations, resting on beliefs about what is likely to occur, that determine what signals receive attention.[12] The intelligence

[6] *Ibid.*, 2; italics added. [7] *Ibid.*, 11. [8] *Ibid.*

[9] In the following, I am referring to Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford 1962). This book is an excellent addition to the literature on intelligence.

[10] *Ibid.*, 390, 392.

[11] *Ibid.*, 56. [12] *Ibid.*, 390, 397.

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specialists studying Japanese moves before December 7, 1941, explained incoming signals in terms of the then "popular hypotheses."[13] Though the outbreak of war with Japan was expected at any moment after November 27, the favorite predictions pointed to Japanese moves in Southeast Asia, not to an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. Aside from the widespread belief that Japan lacked the technical capabilities for staging a surprise air attack there, such action was regarded as a political folly and hence ruled out as a serious contingency. "... we could not believe that a power as small as Japan would make the first strike against a power as big as the United States."[14] Here again, the two cases of surprise are remarkably similar, for anything as provocative as the deployment of offensive missiles in Cuba was regarded in Washington as incompatible with the traditionally cautious Soviet behavior in the military field.

III

Before inquiring further into the conditions leading to the lack of advance warning in the Cuban case, I want to raise a question about the sense in which intelligence services can be blamed for surprises of this sort. The very fact that such surprises have occurred frequently, and ubiquitously, should prepare us to expect surprise; and if this has been the experience with even the most competent intelligence organizations, then it is indeed not clear that they deserve blame for failure in prediction of what is after all extremely hard, if not impossible, to predict.

This consideration raises a serious question with which a theory of intelligence should deal. There is obviously a variety of events—e.g., *coups d'état*, assassinations, military surprise moves—which are very hard to predict (in the absence of lucky information through clandestine channels) because of the special precautions taken by the persons who plan them. Moreover, as Mrs. Wohlstetter states, "the uncertainty of strategic warning is intrinsic,"[15] since the planners may reverse their decisions or undertake last-minute changes in the nature of their actions. There is a further category of events, for which the makings exist in some sense but which are touched off inadvertently rather than by plan. There is still another category of more or less emotional or irrational actions that render prediction obviously hazardous. Indeed, intelligence failure is so easily attributed to the intrusion of irrational behavior that some clarification of this condition is in order.

We must distinguish among rational, emotional, technically mistaken,

[13] *Ibid.*, 393. [14] *Ibid.*, 349. [15] *Ibid.*, 397.

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irrational, and apparently irrational behavior. (1) In rational behavior, means-end calculations intervene between the impulse to act and the act itself. The calculating person or organization obtains and interprets information, identifies and evaluates alternative courses of action and their probable consequences, and chooses the action likely to maximize his values. (2) A purely emotional act proceeds directly from impulse to action. No instrumental calculus mediates between the two.[16] In terms of our definition, emotional behavior is non-rational, but not irrational. (3) The rational actor is fallible in the sense that he makes technical mistakes. For example, he may credit faulty information or misinterpret information. But even though he miscalculates, he calculates; he proceeds rationally. He is acting neither irrationally nor emotionally. (4) The irrational actor acts on the basis of unrealistic conceptions of his environment and of instrumental means-end relationships. He may calculate, but his calculation is irrational. He will think that A leads to B, whereas any rational planner knows that it does not. (5) The behavior of people with a culture different from one's own often *appears* irrational when in fact they act rationally but evaluate the outcome of alternative courses of actions in terms of values that differ sharply from ours. Thus, different societies differ in the value they place on an individual life or on the political integrity of the individual.

These different types of behavior obviously confront the intelligence officer with different problems, and these problems are not made less onerous by the fact that the pure types of action we have distinguished are rare in real life. Real behavior usually represents a mixture of the pure types and falls somewhere on the continuum between rational and irrational or between rational and emotional. Similarly, the instrumental calculations at the core of rationality may be technically more or less correct or mistaken; and in a pluralistic world of culture, subcultures, and deviant value commitments, the hierarchy of values (or the ranking of preferences) may vary more or less between two sets of actors. On the other hand, there is one factor that tends to curb irrational, emotional, and mistaken behavior. I am referring to the increasing bureaucratization of government. Even the individual leader acts within a bureaucratic structure, and there is important evidence to indicate that bureaucracies push behavior toward the rational and non-emotional ends of the spectrum,[17] and employ large resources toward achieving technical correctness in instrumental calculation.

[16] Cf. Richard R. Fagen, "Calculation and Emotion in Foreign Policy: The Cuban Case," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* VI (September 1962), 214f.

[17] Cf. Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics,* XIV (October 1961), 93-117.

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Intelligence work is not helpless in coping with this range of problems. The behavior of important actors (individuals or organizations) will be observed frequently over time, and it may be feasible to ascertain their relevant dispositions under various kinds of circumstances. Even irrational behavior may not completely defy prediction. After all, the behavior of neurotics exhibits certain regularities and these patterns help, in fact, in the diagnosis of the disease. Nevertheless, the indicated ranges of possible behavior impose on intelligence work a most difficult, and often intractable, task. It would obviously be easier if the intelligence professional could always assume pure and perfect rationality.

A sophisticated theory of intelligence that clarified and analyzed this complex of problems could be of considerable service to the profession both in improving its modes of operation, and, perhaps even more, in protecting it from excessive demands and from being tagged with blame for failing to live up to unrealistic expectations.

The foregoing is not meant to suggest that accurate or successful prediction is encumbered only by conditions that inhere in the events to be predicted rather than in intelligence organizations. No doubt, intelligence services are, like all organizations, subject to various inefficiencies that contribute to the experience of surprise. They are also likely to suffer from afflictions that are peculiar to themselves. For instance, an intelligence official would be foolhardy to stake his reputation repeatedly on "long-shot" predictions that would be sure, on a probability basis, to be proved wrong by events often and very noticeably. Roberta Wohlstetter notes the reluctance of intelligence specialists to "make bold assertions."[18] To sort out such conditions as are peculiar to intelligence operations and to explore their differing avoidability would seem to be another task for a theory of intelligence. It might yield useful results, if only for purposes of educating the consumer of intelligence.

These considerations do not imply that certain kinds of surprises are inevitable and that there is no room for improvement in the way intelligence work is organized and conducted. A proper theory of intelligence would delimit the operational areas and conditions that can be manipulated in terms of efficiency. But it seems clear that the practical problem is to improve the "batting average"—say, from .275 to .301—rather than to do away altogether with surprise.

IV

The Stennis Report attributed the failure to predict the Soviet deployment of offensive missiles in Cuba chiefly to certain "preconcep-

[18] Wohlstetter, 395.

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tions" of the intelligence community. So bold a Russian move apparently was considered to be too radical a departure from normal Soviet behavior to be regarded as anything but improbable; and Mrs. Wohlstetter found such preconceptions also at fault in the case of Pearl Harbor. It appears that the Stennis verdict has been widely accepted as essentially correct, even among intelligence specialists.

This verdict deserves nevertheless to be questioned. We must begin with some observations on the nature, function, and drawbacks of preconceived notions in the intelligence business. In dealing with a major target country, intelligence officers naturally approach their task with a *set of expectations* of likely patterns of behavior. In Washington, this is especially true in the case of the Soviet Union, probably the most frequent object of intelligence. This set of expectations is based on a professional knowledge of political structures, processes, and leading personalities in the country concerned. The set is something quite different from, though probably not entirely unaffected by, what is called the "national image" that one society has of another. Such images—part of a society's "belief system"—are usually implanted during the process of socialization. Intelligence officers are products of their society and are likely therefore to partake of this experience. However, precisely because intelligence analysts are professionals, they cannot help but apply to such images tests of proof and disproof that will modify or dispel them. These specialists, in other words, can be expected to rise above such stereotyped views. What I mean by "set of expectations" is rather the distillate of years of experience—by the organization and profession as well as the individual intelligence officer—about a country's likely patterns of behavior. Concerning the Soviet Union and Communist China, which are foremost objects of intelligence work, such experience may not be rooted in a long history of intimate relations, nor benefit from extensive and unrestricted residence, as would be the case with, say, Britain and France. But professional experience gained through intensive and prolonged study of Soviet behavior in many situations, and especially crises, will lead to a set of expectations that, having withstood the test of previous estimates or having been modified as a result of them, should form a solid basis for intelligence.

It must be understood that the formulation of such a set by an intelligence service is both inevitable and indispensable. It is inevitable that, in doing their job, professionals will more or less deliberately build up the set. And it is indispensable because the set is a most valuable tool in performing timely, coherent, articulate and, on a probability basis,

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accurate intelligence. Without it, the current stream of information would be unmanageable and often paralyzingly ambiguous.

Nevertheless, these sets of expectations have their limitations and shortcomings. They have, after all, not prevented the many recorded instances in which an opponent achieved surprise by adopting a course of action that seemed improbable in view of the set of expectations dominant among intelligence officers. In pursuing our problem, we may want to distinguish between "technical surprise" and what, for want of a less repellent term, I will reluctantly call "behavioral surprise." A "technical surprise" is one not incompatible with the prevalent set of expectations. It occurs because the opponent was successful in concealing a particular capability or in keeping a particular course of action shrouded in secrecy. "Behavioral surprise" occurs when the opponent's behavior *is* incompatible, or *seems* to be incompatible, with our set of expectations. There are three causes of "behavioral surprise."

First, as we have noted, the opponent may act highly irrationally, or with unexpected irrationality—a mode that might result, for example, from his acting under unusual stress. Highly irrational behavior is, of course, extremely difficult to predict since it may follow directions that make no sense to the rational mind.

Second, the regnant set of expectations may be unrealistic because intelligence bodies are incompetent or strongly under the influence of "national images" of the outside world that are based more on myth or wishfulness than objective perception. Such lack of realism is not at all rare. Psychologists have noted a general disposition in individuals to exaggerate gratifying features of one's environment and to overrate the probability of desirable events.[19] A well-known example is Hitler's conviction that the British were too decadent to fight. Roberta Wohlstetter cites similar unrealistic preconceptions held in the United States regarding Japan, where there was a pervasive bias toward underestimating Japanese capabilities. Thus, U.S. intelligence analysts estimated Japanese aircraft output at 200 per month, when it actually exceeded 400; Japanese pilot training was considered inferior even though Japanese pilots averaged far more flying hours than their American counterparts; the range, speed, and maneuverability of the Zero single-seat fighter were underestimated; the sonar gear of Japanese destroyers was considered inferior to that of American ones when it was actually five times more powerful; the aircraft capacity of Japanese carriers was

[19] Cf. J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963), 426.

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underestimated, etc.[20] However, intelligence services have also been known to *overestimate* the capabilities of an opponent, a bias that tends to be just as much of a liability in making decisions as systematic underestimates are.

Third, an opponent's pattern of behavior may change as a result of changes in leadership or various other important conditions, and our set of expectations, though realistic in the past, may not register this change quickly and correctly. The set, in other words, may be out-of-date. When we are dealing with a live political entity, there is always a chance that our set of expectations may lag somewhat behind a dynamic reality. To be sure, basic changes in a political system are apt to proceed gradually and are unmistakable when they occur with dramatic suddenness, but their implications for particular kinds of behavior may not be immediately clear. Intelligence professionals should obviously be on the alert for significant change and, generally, take care that their working set of expectations does not become obsolete, rigid, or stale.

The failure of the U.S. intelligence community to predict the Soviet installation of offensive missiles in Cuba was not, in my opinion, the result of any one of these types of "behavioral surprise."[21] To ship such missiles to Cuba required months of complicated preparation—a requirement that is not conducive to a strong component of emotional or irrational decision-making. Nor was there anything in the behavior of the Kremlin, in the course of 1963, indicating an unusual propensity for irrational conduct. Assuming that there was not a substantial gap between the intelligence set of expectations about Soviet behavior and the open literature produced by Western specialists on the Soviet Union (and a gross gap is unlikely), I would infer that the dominant set was sophisticated and realistic. Furthermore, the central assumption that the Soviet government was unlikely to initiate a military move involving the high risk of a strategic confrontation with the United States seems to me to have been borne out by subsequent events, after the missile crisis broke. The Soviet Union reacted to American measures and demands with notable caution.

I conclude from these considerations that there was probably nothing wrong with the "philosophical" set of expectations prevalent in the intelligence community, and that the Stennis Report got on the wrong

[20] Wohlstetter, 337f.

[21] There is some evidence suggesting that the surprise achieved by Japan at Pearl Harbor owed something to an irrational disregard by Japanese planners of the decided U.S. superiority in war potential. Cf. *ibid.*, 350ff.

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track. The most plausible explanation seems to me that this was a case of *apparent* "behavioral surprise." The USSR adopted a course of action that *seemed* to be in conflict with our set of basic expectations about Soviet behavior, but actually was not. Since this kind of condition seems to me to be a frequent cause of intelligence "failure," it requires examination.

A set of expectations refers to a set of *attitudes* and *predispositions* that, we have learned, strongly affects the behavior of the target government. The crucial point to note is that attitudes, though they are powerful in shaping behavior, do not by themselves determine it. Behavior also depends upon the instrumental means-end calculation that we have discussed above. In other words, behavior depends upon the information on which the government in question acts and the values it places on the outcome of alternative courses of action. It is through the mediation of such calculations that attitudes are brought into play. Hence we may go wrong in an intelligence estimate, not because our operational set of expectations is faulty, but because we do not know the information (and perhaps the basic values) on which an opponent acts, or because we simply assume that he acts on approximately the same information (and basic values) which we have and that he will not make any technical mistakes in his calculations.

We do not, of course, know anything about the instrumental calculus on the basis of which the Kremlin acted in this case.* But it is certainly possible and, in my opinion, probable that the Soviet planners did not want to run any dangerous military risk and that they were unaware of doing so when they decided to emplace longer-range missiles in Cuba.

It is, of course, also possible that the Soviet leaders foresaw greater gains from a successful deployment of such missiles than we were able to perceive, and hence were prepared to raise, at least slightly, the risks they were willing to accept. To judge from press reports at the time, American experts did not consider that the installation of about forty rather vulnerable missiles in Cuba would do much to redress the existing imbalance of strategic weapons with intercontinental range. But even if this is a correct inference—which I am prepared to believe—a successful outcome of Soviet missile deployment in Cuba would have conferred very striking indirect advantages on the Soviet Union. Certainly the United States would have suffered greatly in terms of pres-

* EDITOR'S NOTE: Arnold L. Horelick presents a detailed analysis of the probable nature of Soviet calculations in "The Cuban Missile Crisis," the first article in this issue of *World Politics*.

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tige, and many of our allies and a number of neutral countries might have concluded that the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR had been strongly tilted in favor of the latter.

However, if our basic set of expectations about Soviet behavior was correct—as I believe it was—our possible failure to give full credit to the Soviet view of the gains at stake was probably only a contributing factor in bringing about what I called *apparent* "behavioral surprise." It is surely plausible that the Soviet leadership underestimated the risks involved in their move. It must have been difficult for Soviet intelligence to estimate correctly the immensely strong popular feelings in the United States on the Cuban issue. It was an emotional involvement that many of our allies (including Canada) found hard to comprehend and to approve. Is it not possible, if not likely, that Soviet intelligence expected the United States government to splutter, perhaps even to roar, but to consult its allies, who would urge caution, to bring the case before the United Nations, which would lead to long and inconclusive debates, and in the end resign itself to accept the *fait accompli?*

If this speculation comes close to the truth, then Moscow underestimated the risk it was running, and this would signify that the Soviet Union acted on the basis of a Soviet intelligence failure. We must not forget that the USSR gave every indication of having been caught by surprise when the United States reacted as vigorously as it did. This analysis suggests that the intelligence community in Washington failed to discover or guess the conclusions of the intelligence community in Moscow. Whether or not this was a culpable failure is a question I do not venture to answer. Of course, to expect the intelligence professionals in one country to know exactly what their counterparts in another are doing would be expecting entirely too much. Yet one might be justified in expecting intelligence professionals to make allowance, in important estimates, for the possibility of this kind of information gap. We should not assume that "they" necessarily know what we know, and vice versa.

V

The Stennis Report, as I hope to have demonstrated, has raised some interesting questions about the proper production and consumption of national intelligence. The problems they touch upon seem to deserve further study.

One must assume that there exists some sort of operational theory of intelligence, even though most intelligence officers—who, like most other governmental officials, tend to associate the term "theory" with

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"long hair" and ivory towers—are apt to flinch, if not blanch, at the thought. Any problem-solving organization will evolve premises, analytical procedures, rules of thumb, and other intellectual practices that are based implicitly, if not explicitly, on hypotheses about the reality and about the kinds of events and consequences they must cope with. Such theory is informal rather than formal, apt to be fragmentary rather than integrated, the cumulative sediment of experience rather than the product of self-conscious endeavor.

Whether systematic attempts at theorizing on intelligence would improve the production and consumption of intelligence is not, of course, a question answerable in advance. Much would depend on the degree to which the intelligence world lends itself to fruitful interplay between conceptual enterprise and empirical research. The foregoing analysis, however, has highlighted some questions that invite further inquiry. Thus, one might explore the feasibility of distinguishing between kinds of events in terms of their inherent predictability in order to arrive at sophisticated expectations about surprises and, therefore, to understand the need for contingency planning for events that, looking highly improbable but being rather unpredictable, would entail very serious consequences if they should occur.

Likewise interesting would be an attempt to structure in finer detail the range of actual and apparent deviations from purely rational behavior, examine the feasibility of studying the behavior profile of important governments and leaders in this respect, especially under conditions that favor deviation from purely rational behavior, and search for observable indicators of such behavior patterns.

A theory of intelligence might also try to identify and evaluate intelligence practices in terms of efficiency. Thus, in the above discussion we encountered the problems of keeping sets of expectation about important target countries up-to-date and of allowing for critical intelligence failures in the target country. One wonders, for example, whether the Washington intelligence community might not have raised the question seriously during the summer of 1962 as to whether their Moscow counterparts could correctly estimate the strong and highly emotional American reaction to events in Cuba.

A systematic study of intelligence operations, and also of the consumption of intelligence products, would be sure to suggest various other problems. There is, however, one obvious condition that will continue to discourage academic research on intelligence matters. The most productive method of empirical research is sure to be carefully conducted post-mortems of past intelligence performances. There are few solid

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case studies of the kind written by Roberta Wohlstetter. Indeed, a large number of comparative studies could be undertaken only with the co-operation, if not under the direction, of the intelligence authorities and would no doubt necessitate special conditions in view of the classified nature of the material. However, the benefits of such studies could be great and this premise might well justify that they be seriously considered.

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Review Articles

THE UNDERDEVELOPED STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

By ANN RUTH WILLNER

Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States*, The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1962, 91 pp. $3.00.
John H. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries,* New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962, 347 pp. $3.95.
John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, 427 pp. $8.50.

I

IF ONE goal of the newly independent countries and their leaders is recognition and equality, at least in the domain of American political science scholarship they seem well on the way to achieving it. The series of panels specifically devoted to developing countries at the APSA annual meetings, the burgeoning courses in political science curricula on the politics of "emerging states" or "developing systems" and, above all, the increasing flow of works with titles featuring the terms "underdeveloped," "developing," "political development," or "political modernization"—all testify to the rapid emergence of a semi-autonomous offshoot of comparative politics.

Whether this segmentation of comparative politics into one part devoted to the older states and another oriented toward the new polities of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East is either theoretically defensible or strategically desirable is still an open question.[1] Yet it may be defended, if only on the grounds of a necessary division of labor en route to the development of a genuinely comparative framework for political analysis. Apparent similarities among states that have emerged from colonial rule and older but predominantly agrarian states have caused them to be labeled "traditional" or "underdeveloped."[2] And observations that they are undergoing change have given rise to the categories "develop-

[1] See Alfred Diamant, "Is There a Non-Western Political Process?" *Journal of Politics*, XXI (February 1959), 123-27.

[2] See George McT. Kahin, Guy Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review,* XLIX (December 1955), 1022-41; Dankwart A. Rustow, "New Horizons for Comparative Politics," *World Politics*, IX (July 1957) 530-49; Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics,* XX (August 1958), 466-86.

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ing" or "modernizing." The real risk, as I shall discuss below, is that such categorization may become a straitjacket, restricting our observations and conditioning our conclusions.[3]

The interchangeability of these labels, however, and the vagueness of such terms as "nation-building" and "transitional" brought forth by this new segment of the field tempt one to suggest that it may have emerged abruptly, lacking a unifying and coherent conceptual base from which to develop. In the same way as its subject matter, it is engaged in the "search for identity," the quest for a system of analysis of the political phenomena that confront it.

The same analogy, however, may be applied to the whole discipline of political science. For whatever "intact" or "indigenous" or "homogeneous" identity it once may have had has been disrupted by the impact of other disciplines. While its horizons may have expanded as a result of the diffusion of concepts and terminology across disciplinary borders, it is undoubtedly in a state of transition. There is no longer consensus concerning what is the "political," where its locus lies, and how it is to be observed. We do not know whether it will redefine itself in terms of economic models with input-output and equilibrium analysis, sociological models of structures and functions within systems, or, as seems likely, some adaptation and amalgam of all borrowings, or even perhaps find a distinctive domain of politics again.[4] Meanwhile, political scientists feel the insecurity of slight boundary maintenance between the social and the political, debate the inclusion or exclusion of categories of action as political or not, and cannot agree whether they can study politics as legitimately in the small group or business firm as in the national arena.

But the dilemmas of the political scientists who focus on what once were the exotic areas of the world are doubly compounded. They encounter nominally political structures that do not perform the functions they are supposed to and sense rather than see processes that pursue devious and untraceable paths of their own. As if the problems of trying to locate and depict the political system in action were not sufficient, they are called upon to observe and map the changes within it. Moreover, the revolution of rising expectations no longer permits them to

[3] The danger of unwarranted dichotomy might be averted if some political scientists maintained a foot in either camp to ascertain whether and how long two camps are a desirable division of the conceptual situation.

[4] Admittedly, in the flight from single-factor causal analysis, political science is not alone. There is a high degree of substitutability of roles throughout the social sciences, as sociologists count votes and economists seek explanations for innovation in the culture-and-personality theory of anthropologists. See, e.g., Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill., 1962).

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remain modest country specialists or even area specialists. It requires them to contribute more than data to the development of developing country theory. Even an empirical study of politics and government in a single little-known country is no longer complete without its general theory, or suggestions for one, as prologue or epilogue.[5] And so there develops not only a profusion of alternative terms but what appear to be alternative concepts and approaches to the new terrain.[6]

In some respects this is desirable. For new or newly observable phenomena require new tools with which to grasp them. And it is not easy to find even that basic tool—a taxonomic scheme that can encompass and classify the variety of constellations brought forth by the new political entities. On the other hand, the proliferation of models may be reaching the point of diminishing returns. It may be time to settle upon several to offer in the empirical marketplace for real testing and refinement. If so, some caveats are in order. It must not be forgotten that, once a theoretical framework or even a few loose concepts achieve intellectual currency, they become institutionalized. They form the patterns or regularities of belief to which successive generations of scholars and the consumers of scholarship become socialized. More important, they tend to shape the course of future research. The rapid and widespread diffusion of the Weberian-Parsonian schema throughout the social sciences illustrates the capacity for molding thought in this era of accelerating intellectual communication and conversion.

Therefore, if intensive research along comparable lines is to be encouraged, extreme care is needed in the choice of an appropriate conceptual apparatus. The profusion of approaches might lead us to believe that sufficient inroads have already been made into the terrain of developing country politics to permit selection of some of the most promising as routes for detailed investigation. Yet, with all the diversity, one senses a sameness in the tentative maps thus far produced. Particularistic terminology may serve only to disguise an underlying similarity and narrowness of focus. It may be that we continue to look at the same part of the animal while giving it different names. Several recent contributions to the literature on developing countries suggests that (1)

[5] For example, Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962); Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley 1962).

[6] See, for example, the introductory and concluding chapters of Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960); Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in W. J. Siffin, ed. *Toward a Comparative Theory of Public Administration* (Bloomington, Ind., 1957), and "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* v (June 1960), 1-46.

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there are major gaps in mapping out what have already been recognized as salient sectors of the field and (2) a latent ethnocentricism in our formulations tends to distort our perceptions of the process of change and its direction.

II

What is meant by "political development"? The term "development" implies movement or growth over time along some specified set of dimensions from one state of these dimensions to another. Economists know what they refer to by the term; for them it measures increases in such factors as investment, income, and output. What it means in the specifically "political" sense and what are its indicators remain obscure.

For Edward Shils, however, there is no problem. In *Political Development in the New States,*[7] development is defined as the move from tradition to modernity. Modernity means egalitarian democracy, representative government with a welfare emphasis, an orientation to change as a good in itself, scientific and technological advances, economic planning and progress, and rational administration, as well as national sovereignty and a role on the world stage. In short, a developed state is one that approximates American and Western European democracies. Shils sees the drive to reach this goal as the major factor in the public life of new states and the predominant concern of their elites. These elites are hampered in their efforts by numerous "gaps," between the rulers and the ruled, the town and the countryside, the educated and the illiterate, the wealthy few and the impoverished masses. These gaps make for "mutual alienation" and a failure of "mutual identification" (p. 16).

This is neither a systematic study of the determinants of change nor of its political dimensions. It is rather a discursive essay with frequent flashes of brilliance and considerable redundancy. The constantly reiterated *leitmotif* is the inertia of tradition against which the elites zealously strain. Yet the elements of tradition and the ways in which it is manifested are not specified. In a section entitled "Traditionality" we are merely told that the substance of traditional beliefs is "uncongenial to modernity" (p. 31) and does not prize individuality, creativity, the criterion of efficiency, economic progress, etc. Although the essay is couched in terms of the confrontation between the modernized, urban-centered, educated elites and the tradition-bound rural popula-

[7] This essay originally appeared in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (1959) and is reprinted in abridged and slightly modified form in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries.*

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tions, one of the actors, the traditional sector, remains an amorphous, undifferentiated mass.

Shils is far better when he deals with the elites. Here he makes a distinction between its segments, such as the politicians who rule in the early days of independence and the politicized intellectuals, those with the "oppositional mentality" and those who resort to the "politics of withdrawal." He skillfully portrays the dilemmas of the governing elites and the factors that cause them to veer between equally untenable choices rather than selecting and implementing a single model. He shows how they tend toward oligarchy as they continue to "think of themselves as identical with the nation and state and view those who disagree not merely as political opponents but as enemies of the state and nation" (p. 42). Shils is at his most impressive in describing the ambivalences and internal psychological conflicts of the intellectuals, contrasting their desire for rapid economic development and large-scale state action with their distrust of and contempt for politicians, their impatience with and opposition to tradition with their yearning for deeper contact with their indigenous roots, and their aspirations to emulate the West with their resentment of it.

The weakness of Shils's approach is the weakness characteristic of many of the "gap" theorists whose efforts are primarily attempts to find explanations for the failure of democratic forms to achieve more than nominal substance.[8] Traditional institutional analysis, which provided the earliest framework for the study of politics in new states, resulted in a "pathology" approach to political phenomena in those countries. But descriptions of deviations from the idealized norms of American and European democracies are of limited utility. They simply tell us that these countries are *not* like us and not like what they were presumably trying to be. And "gap" analysis and its corollary, "requisite" analysis, are merely more sophisticated and more elaborate variations on the same fundamentally ethnocentric themes.

Gap analysts list the obstacles to democratic functioning and development; requisite analysts begin by specifying the "prerequisites" or attributes of democratic societies. In either case, they mainly tell us about the absence or weakness in these countries of such characteristics as high literacy rates, a strong middle class, organized interest groups, etc. In neither case do they tell us much of what these countries have or are, except indirectly and inferentially.[9] Closely related to this ap-

[8] See Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blakmer, *The Emerging Nations* (Boston 1961).

[9] For example, Millikan and Blakmer, whose study is by far the best example of this type, restrict their description of the traditional society to a mention of the importance

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proach and somewhat in the same ethnocentric vein is the type of trend analysis that tries to assess whether or not these countries are proceeding in the direction of democracy and/or prescribes the necessity for them to do so. Frequently all these approaches are combined in one study.[10]

I do not suggest that questions concerning the absence of democracy, its causes, and the prospects for democracy are not legitimate questions for the political scientist concerned with these countries. Nor do I maintain that policy prescription should not be an activity for him. I do suggest, however, that these are distinct roles which should consciously be kept segregated, for their confusion endangers the effective performance of either. The political scientist as detached scholar asks a different order of question than the political scientist as prescriber or policy-advisor. He is first of all concerned with sets of relationships that may be inferred from observable data—i.e., what are their causal connections, insofar as these can be discerned, and their consequences insofar as they may be predicted, in that order. But when he permits his policy predilections to precede and circumscribe his observations, his perceptions of alternatives become distorted and his value as prognosticator diminishes.

One may approve of the motives of those who wish to spread the benefits of representative democracy throughout the world and agree with Shils that only "political democracy has a chance of overcoming [the gap] . . . by arousing and liberating the capacities of the ordinary people in the villages" (p. 30). But I would hesitate to accept his proposition that the ruling elites of these countries give democracy the highest priority, diverge from it only through necessity, and regard alternative forms as second best (p. 48). For we are well aware that our own politicians play to many galleries and we regard many of their statements with some skepticism. Is it naïve goodwill or a variant of colonial condescension that causes us to ignore an alternative hypothesis—that the leaders of these countries are sufficiently sophisticated strategists to play to the American gallery, particularly in view of their dependence upon us?[11] It is highly probable that these leaders, who have visited and studied our country far more assiduously than we have most of theirs,

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of face-to-face relationships, friendship, family and tribal loyalty, and hierarchal status (p. 5), and the traditional view of politics is briefly equated with the search for status, prestige, and honor (p. 69).

[10] See *ibid.*

[11] I still recall the vivid description by an Asian revolutionary leader in the early 1950's of the mobilization of his followers several years earlier to chalk up on public walls as rapidly as possible quotations from Washington, Lincoln, and Jefferson to impress the momentarily expected American mission from whom they sought support.

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have learned to "code" our expectations and responses better than we have theirs. And some interesting research might be done on their strategies for dealing with Westerners, whether diplomats, journalists, or social scientists.

The danger of misplaced empathy is that it can result in a tendency to project the normative standards of the observer's polity upon actors in the observed context for whom they may be less meaningful. After stressing the strong attachments in the traditional sector to kin and caste, Shils proceeds to state that when a government is considered to represent particular kinship, caste, and local interests, "the citizenry look upon it as neither just nor representative of the national interest" (p. 14). One wonders which segment of the citizenry this is true of. Is it not possible that the vast majority for whom kinship and caste loyalties are a norm have not yet developed a concept of an overriding national interest and thus have no reason to consider such a government unjust? How can we generalize for a whole society on the basis of our knowledge of the reactions of one segment of it, or state as a conclusion what at best is only a hypothesis—that its members react to phenomena in ways that seem "logical" to us?

Perhaps the construction of general descriptive models of developing countries should await the filling in of the "gaps" in our knowledge by empirical data from which valid conclusions can better be drawn. Analysis limited to the polar entities of the small, modernized, urban-centered elite and the tradition-bound, village-based peasantry and the differences between them tends to omit what may be more important questions. What are the similarities between them? What do they share in the way of attitudes and behavior patterns that would throw light on political processes in these countries? Who are the mediating groups between them and what are the mediating influences?

Requisite analysis also leaves something to be desired in filling in the gaps it stresses. To specify as desiderata the identical elements that have already been specified as lacking is, in the last analysis, tautological. It may be quite true that "people must come to accept new forms for the organization of power based on the creation of a minimally effective national government. The balance of social and political power must shift from the tasks and virtues of agricultural life to those of commerce, industry and modern administration."[12] But this tells us little about how to convert a logical imperative into a program of action. A greater contribution would be a specification of the means by which such changes could be brought about.

[12] Millikan and Blakmer, 19.

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III

The more recent systems framework, with its functional approach, partially eliminates the "pathological" and ethnocentric bias from the study of new and rapidly changing countries. It assumes an inherent equality of all societies, in that certain political functions are performed in all, although by differing structures and in different ways. This approach, however, is fraught with the problems of identifying politically relevant components of the system, specifying and labeling political functions, and locating the units or actors by whom they are performed. To know that "aggregation" of interests does or should take place makes it no easier for us to conduct our search for the "aggregators." In practice, political scientists still tend to focus their attention on discrete groups and hope to gain a clearer picture of the performance of functions through an analysis of observable group behavior.

The effort to detach the discipline from parochial classifications and judgments and to develop a broader framework within which the newer polities can be more easily incorporated and compared has also produced a new interest in the construction of typologies. That these tend to be largely terminological hybrids of traditional schemes does not necessarily detract from their potential usefulness. It merely testifies to the inherently mixed qualities of many of these systems and to the difficulty of arriving at mutually exclusive and parallel categories. One of Shils's major contributions in his volume is a sixfold classification of political forms: political democracy, tutelary democracy, modernizing oligarchy,[13] totalitarian oligarchy, traditional oligarchy, and traditionalistic/theocratic oligarchy. He comprehensively, yet succinctly, elaborates on the attributes and presuppositions of each type and its suitability for solving the problems of development. It is not surprising that this scheme has influenced subsequent and often less impressive endeavors at classification.[14] The dangers of permitting classificatory schemes to serve as substitutes for knowledge based upon intensive and repeated observations of reality have been too often stressed to be enlarged upon here.

One of the best efforts to date, in my opinion, to analyze the politics of changing societies both within a comparative framework and from a historical perspective is that of John H. Kautsky in his introductory

[13] This category has since become "modernizing military oligarchy."

[14] See, for example, the concluding chapter in Almond and Coleman. Millikan and Blakmer's trifold scheme of neo-traditional, transitional, and actively modernizing oligarchies for political development has the advantage of simplicity but is also oversimplified for many purposes.

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essay to the series of readings in *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*. He selects a single denominator of change, the industrialization process, and arrives at a formulation embracing the Communist as well as the underdeveloped world and Europe. Nationalism is viewed primarily as a response to and an impetus toward economic change. From the vantage point of the present structure and problems of the underdeveloped countries, he takes a retrospective view of the Russian Revolution as a phenomenon of nationalism, a particular response to the problem of underdevelopment and the desire for industrialization. Similarities are detected in that both the initial Russian modernizing elite and the elites in underdeveloped countries are primarily intellectuals. The Stalinist phase is seen as a subtype of totalitarianism of the intellectuals, and other totalitarianisms represent attempts by other groups to control, counter, or otherwise deal with the changes brought about by industrialization.

The advantage of this kind of formulation is obvious. If we accept its initial assumptions, it offers a variety of historical models against which to assess and try to predict the politics of development. However, as the author himself admits, it does leave constant the variables other than economic change and many of them may be far from negligible.

Kautsky does not offer any startling insights or new data on the politics of developing countries. His contribution lies more in the way in which he has woven together existing materials with coherence, economy, a lack of jargon, and yet has made sufficient distinctions to avoid the distortions of oversimplification. He employs the group or class approach and his major purpose is to trace the effects of economic change on these classes and their interests. He does not limit himself to the dichotomous classification of tradition-bound masses and modernizing elites but begins with a section on traditional societies in which he distinguishes the old aristocracy, the old middle class of craftsmen and workers, and the peasantry. He adds the groups produced by the colonial impact—the native industrial capitalists, the white-collar workers and intellectuals, the industrial workers—and aptly describes how the grievances of each converged in nationalism. He enlarges upon the changing positions and conflicts of interest among them in the contemporary period and speculates on the patterns that may emerge as each seeks in the political arena to come to terms with industrial change. His typology of regimes somewhat resembles that of Shils. But his less normative orientation gives his projections more analytical rigor in specifying the conditions under which each is likely to emerge.

One of the virtues of this collection is that the succeeding shorter es-

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says are well selected to integrate with and enlarge upon the major themes. They deal with the role of groups in various areas, especially the role of intellectuals, nationalism, and Communist appeals and strategy. Another virtue, rather rare in collections today, is that they appear in their entirety.

IV

One of the most significant political groups in the politics of developing countries is the military, and a systematic and comparative study of its political and modernizing roles could contribute much to our knowledge of the politics of these countries. Unfortunately, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* is not such a study. It is a collection of essays by specialists on various areas brought together for a conference on the subject. And it suggests that for some, at least, the military in their areas of interest has not been a subject for investigation in any depth. Several of the essays are far more speculative than informative.

In three essays on Latin America that overlap considerably, John H. Johnson traces the history of the military leader from the "philosopher in uniform" through the rural caudillo to the professional bureaucrat, Edward Lieuwen discusses the causes of the relapse into militarism during the 1930's and the strategy of the military coup, and Victor Alba also traces the stages of militarism and the types of military leaders. Guy Pauker, who apparently still regards reformism and rationality as the norm for a military elite,[15] addresses himself to the question of why the Indonesian army did not fulfill his expectations and advances some rather vague and unsupported hypotheses. David Wilson sees the ability of the Thai military to maintain itself in power as partially the result of its being the "most powerful repository" of traditional attitudes of authority (p. 274). Lucian Pye attributes the rise of military rule in Burma to the inability of administrators and politicians to cooperate and offers some insightful psychological analyses of the internal conflicts of the military. In one of the most informative and reflective essays in the book, Manfred Halpern discusses the military in the Near East as both a segment and an instrument of the new middle class. Essays by Ben Halpern on the unique role of the military in Israel and by Coleman and Brice on the emerging military in Africa complete the volume.

One weakness is the lack of an essay which attempts to elicit and tie together generalizations from the contributions. The careful reader

[15] See Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics,* XI (April 1959), 325-45.

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might note that in more than one place the military gained power through the failure of other competing groups, that it has sometimes served primarily as an instrument of power, that military men often regard politicians as corrupt, and that the military has sometimes served as a conservative force and at other times attempted to change the structure of society.

The only general essay on the military both as a political force and as an agent of modernization is by Lucian Pye. While recognizing the relative lack of any systematic study of either the sociology of armies or the processes of political development and industrialization, he proceeds to make some rather sweeping assertions. He sees the army as the most "modern" institution in transitional societies, playing a key role as an agent of acculturation from tradition to modernity. Using the by now familiar Parsonian categories, he writes: "The very fact that the recruit must break his ties and associations with civilian life and adjust to the more impersonal world of the army tends to emphasize the fundamental nature of this process, which involves the movement out of the particularistic relationships of traditional life and into the more impersonal and universalistic criteria of the industrial society" (p. 80). Acculturation under army auspices is seen to be more effective than through urbanization, providing a higher degree of psychological security and thus lessening the trauma of moving from the "relatively sheltered" world of tradition into the unknown world. It is also seen to be more thorough and broader than that achieved through urbanization, since Asian cities, for example, contain many who live within the traditional orbit.

Suggestive as these hypotheses may be, one would like to see some evidence that the psychic strains of adjustment to military service are any greater or less than those involved in urbanization. Those who have spent considerable time investigating the movement of agrarian villagers to more urban environments would hesitate to draw any sweeping generalizations concerning the extent or degree of the trauma concerned. For the psychic costs depend upon the interplay of a number of factors, such as the social structure and cultural patterns of the traditional milieu and the expectations generated by them, the way in which the transition is made and under whose auspices, and the relative positions of the migrants in both milieus. Furthermore, if one were to accept Pye's first proposition, the second would seem questionable. For if there is strong retention of traditional customs within the urban environment, lesser trauma would result from urbanization than from

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the more accelerated and thoroughgoing process imposed by the army on the new recruit.

Admittedly, either hypothesis is plausible. The problem is the failure to specify the sets of conditions under which one or the other is more valid. This is also true of statements by Pye and others in this volume that army experience is not only a modernizing but a politicizing experience, thus providing a basis for participation in national politics and paving the way for democracy. One might also advance an opposite hypothesis: that politics, and particularly democratic politics, involves the exercise of choice, negotiation, the seeking of consensus—all of which processes would appear to be relatively absent from most of the roles that the army provides.

One cannot help but admire these creative extrapolations, built upon a rather slim empirical basis by the power of logic, the force of intellect, and the gift of intuition. But one wishes that those who venture to serve as guides to what is still recognized as *terra incognita* with respect to systematic research would tread more tentatively. Conjectural charts, especially when impressionistically drawn with bold and assertive strokes, can too easily be mistaken by the unwary for precisely plotted maps. Admittedly, an exploration of a relatively uncharted realm of knowledge must begin with one or a set of assumptions. These are frequently derived analogically from knowledge gained in a familiar context. These assumptions then serve as a starting point around which to organize preliminary investigations of the units of observation in the unfamiliar universe to ascertain whether they are similarly relevant as the basis for further working hypotheses. But when analogically derived assumptions are transferred *in toto* to become the scaffolding upon which to erect a skyscraper of deductions devoid of empirical bricks and mortar, and when what are no more than further assumptions are treated as data, this is dangerous. What may well have originally been intended as suggestive hypotheses emerge by some alchemy as substantive conclusions. That way lies the new scholasticism.

From this volume, we do learn to some extent how and why the military has come to play a prominent role. But we do not know, as many of the authors assume, that because armies of new nations are modeled on those of developed countries, they will therefore exhibit the same characteristics and serve as the basis for further rationalization of organizational life. This may be another variant of the "projective fallacy" of saying that what is valued or takes place in one context holds true for another, without due regard for intervening variables. Sugges-

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tive as many of these essays are, they do little more than point to the great need for empirical research.

V

To dwell upon the shortcomings of current analyses of politics in two-thirds of the world is not dissimilar to dwelling upon the gaps and problems in these countries. Neither tells us how to overcome them. How can we avoid our latent ethnocentric bias that leads us to focus mainly on the lack in the "developing" countries of the attributes of the countries which have "arrived"? How can we deal with change other than as a process along some known dimensions in the direction of familiar Euro-American systems? How can we overcome the normative bias that causes us to attribute to members of these societies goals, motives, and values similar to ours? Or the related projective fallacy by which we predict their possible responses on the basis of what ours would be in similar circumstances? In other words, how can we enlarge our perspectives and try to view the politics of these countries from the "inside out" as well as from the outsider's vantage point?

I do not pretend to know the answers to these questions. Constant awareness of such limiting tendencies can serve as a corrective. Further empirical research should provide better hypotheses. I would like to suggest, however, that the framing of hypotheses should be accompanied by skepticism about whether we know what we think we know. Let us not be so certain that the emperor really is wearing new clothes and try to conceive of the seemingly inconceivable.

For every plausible hypothesis, let us also consider its opposite, or at least some alternatives. Let us consider, for example, that the goals of some seemingly modernizing elites may have been or may be other than they appeared. Could even some of the Western-educated revolutionary leaders have desired democracy and industrialization not as "ends" in themselves, but mainly instrumentally, as means to an acceptance of themselves and their peoples as equal to the leaders and peoples of the older states? Or, if the initial zeal for change in our image had real as well as symbolic importance, could modernization objectives have since sunk to a lower order of priority as it became apparent that they could be attained only at the sacrifice of other and more cherished values? If the desire for independence was indeed an expression of the need for self-assertion and equality-respect in the external world, has this perhaps been satisfied by other means—e.g., by prominent roles on the international stage, by the possession of jet planes and other mili-

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tary hardware that may give these nations almost as much potential influence as their former colonial rulers?

Could the "revolution of rising expectations" be more of a myth than a reality for some societies? If the stability of a regime depends on its capacity to satisfy the expectations of its population, could these expectations be couched in other terms than economic benefits and wider participation in public life? Is the lack of material sustenance of the Indonesian worker somewhat compensated for by the sense of importance he vicariously derives from Sukarno's splendor and international prominence?

Is it possible that for many new states independence has also come to mean cultural independence from the values and standards imposed upon them by colonial domination? Could "modernization" for them really mean, as their leaders assert, development in their own image rather than that which we wish for them? In the words of David Easton: "The typical demands that will find their way into the political process will concern matters in conflict that are labeled important by the culture. For this reason we cannot hope to understand the nature of the demands presenting themselves for political settlement unless we are ready to explore systematically and intensively their connection with the culture."[16]

If the performance of a system or its set of leaders is more adequately assessed, in terms of its potential for stability and change, according to the objectives of its own members and their criteria of evaluation, where shall we find these criteria? One possibility is to restore "tradition" to something more than a residual category. The traditional system as an intact system may have disappeared, but strong residues linger. Styles of leadership may be traditional even though the new technology provides the tools.

What is more important than locating the survivals of tradition is to determine its current ideological content—i.e., what people believe it to be. For in their search for their "national soul," whether in flight from failure or as an assertion of cultural independence from the West, leaders must resort partially to their own traditions and reaffirm these to their peoples. If much has been discarded, much is romantically restored of the grandeur that was or is thought to have been the precolonial past.

A great deal needs to be done in further investigation of the structure

[16] "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 388.

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of traditional political culture.[17] It may be quite different for different societies, and the Weberian-Parsonian models are too generalized to tell us what we need to know. Our ideal type of traditional society at large is far less significant for understanding the role of tradition in current political behavior in a polity than is its members' ideal type of their traditional society and its norms. For they may well evaluate or repattern new forms and concepts in traditional terms.

We might start with a schema involving ideas of legitimacy and decision-making. For example, who and what manner of person should make decisions for society? How should they be enforced? How and by what means should they be arrived at? What strategies of political action are acceptable or non-acceptable?

We might also observe what we would define as political processes in whichever traditional contexts they occur. It might be objected that "bargaining," "conflict resolution," etc., in contexts such as family, tribe, caste, etc., may not be truly political, in that these processes are not here involved in authoritative allocation for the society as a whole, or not performed by the unit monopolizing the coercive mechanism. On the other hand, leaders use symbol systems stressing the family and the village. This would tend to reinforce the notions of the less sophisticated to the effect that government and politics on the national level are analogous to what they know from their own experience. In this way, a study of the political and related processes in smaller group contexts in a polity would give us some idea of how many of its members perceive and evaluate the political behavior of its elites. Also the context might well be a microcosm of political behavior or some aspects of it in the national arena.

I suggest that it is only by studying the indicators of traditionality as well as of modernization and their points of conjunction and interaction that we can begin to understand the "mixes." In this way we avoid prejudging the direction of change and limiting the alternative outcomes that we can envisage. Let us assume that these countries are "proceeding" toward some forms of their own whose lineaments are only barely perceptible now, rather than "developing" or "progressing" in the direction of the more familiar forms. Let us assume that the political end-products at some future points of time may not necessarily resemble anything familiar to us, insofar as the constellation of components or their relationship to each other is concerned. The elements of these systems may be roughly comparable, but their "integration" may be along a set of dimensions quite unlike those we now know.

[17] For an example of a study that incorporates much of this, see Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*.

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THE CHEERFUL DISCOURSES OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

By DAVID KETTLER

Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays,* New York, Basic Books, 1962, 333 pp. $6.00.

> "In our cheerful discourses, better than in the formal reasoning of the schools, is true wisdom to be found."—David Hume, *The Epicurean.*

KARL Mannheim closed his essay on the "Utopian Mentality" by forecasting a time when man will relinquish utopias and thus "lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it." "The disappearance of utopia," he asserted, "brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing." For Western thinkers, the problem raised by Mannheim is no longer a hypothetical one. Faith in utopias is everywhere discredited as illusion —naïve or disingenuous—and the pursuit of utopia condemned as the road to terroristic despotism. But this disillusionment has brought with it a great variety of attempts to show that, contrary to the tradition represented by Mannheim, human meaning in man's affairs does not depend on the striving for human perfection. And many of these attempts have rediscovered the anti-Promethean elements in the classical and Christian traditions, reasserting the claims of a natural or divine order against aspirations of reason now condemned as criminally presumptuous. In all spheres of life, it is said, man must accept the discipline of an authoritative order. To abandon utopias is to repent of pride.

Although such arguments now enjoy a great vogue, they continue to be pursued by the challenge which, in one form or other, has troubled Western thinking since ancient times: each pattern of order which men pretend to derive from nature or God actually reflects man's irrational needs and desires or the custom established in some particular and provincial civilization; neither reason nor faith can discover a true and authoritative pattern of meaning in the human condition. No interpretation of our situation which fails to meet this challenge can be taken seriously. The dilemma created by our disillusionment cannot be met by the resurrection of old illusion.

This is why the work of Michael Oakeshott promises a great deal. He is aware of all these issues. In his essays he undertakes to present a vision

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of human experience which denies the dependence of meaningful human activity on utopian pretensions without calling on the assistance of principles alleged to be superhuman or supertemporal. He identifies himself with intellectual traditions teaching the need for and possibility of accepting with cheerful greatness of mind man's limited capacities. His dominant mood a blend of Skeptic and Epicurean themes, he draws heavily on the work of Montaigne, Hobbes, and Hume and praises the writings of St. Augustine, Machiavelli, and Pascal. These are attractive names to conjure with in our present state of mind, and Oakeshott's elegance of expression enhances the charm of his work. But this attractiveness does not sustain the work; the promise is not fulfilled. Oakeshott's essays merit serious consideration because they reflect our predicaments; but his thought does not comprehend and cannot master them.

As motto for these comments I have used a passage from David Hume which directs us to the central motif in Oakeshott's essays. The metaphor of a "conversation" governs his interpretation of man's situation. In society, according to Oakeshott, men's diverse activities each manifest a distinctive idiom. To partake of an activity is to speak in that mode, as it presents itself to the individual at a particular time and in a particular place. The paradigm of the "conversation," then, applies to two separate sorts of processes: first, the interactions among participants in each of the distinguishable kinds of activities; and second, the exchanges among the "voices" which together make up civilization. "In a conversation," writes Oakeshott, "the participants are not engaged in an inquiry or a debate; there is no 'truth' to be discovered, no proposition to be proved, no conclusion sought. They are not concerned to inform, to persuade, or to refute one another. . . . Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure. It is with conversation as with gambling, its significance lies neither in winning nor in losing, but in wagering" (p. 198). "Acknowledgment and accommodations," not "assertion and denial," mark the relationships among the voices in a conversation (p. 304).

Oakeshott identifies five idioms: the practical (incorporating both the enterprises of gratifying desires and those of moral judgments), the scientific, the historical, the poetic, and the philosophical. Each provides an appropriate mode for that activity which constitutes a man's self; but none can claim for itself a value higher than that of any other; and all are ultimately a dream. There are no absolute criteria of rele-

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vance for any of the conversations; its state at any given time defines the approximate limits within which an activity must move in order to enter in. Oakeshott insists that this is not a static model of human activity. Habit and tradition do indeed constitute the basic elements of the circumstances within which a participant must act to be coherent; but every situation of this sort offers *intimations* of a suitable divergence from the existing—either the recalling of a theme sounded earlier and now neglected, or perhaps a real innovation. The conversations, then, move; but they do not "progress" or "develop," because such terms presuppose some purpose, goal, or end towards which the movement might be seen to tend. And there are, in Oakeshott's view, no such external or terminal points.

The false belief that moral or political conduct ought to be governed by "rational" criteria, derived from some source other than the "intimation" given by the appropriate "conversation," Oakeshott sees as the primary contributor to incoherence in contemporary thinking and acting. At best, he contends, such an error simply disguises the fact that the "rational" criteria presumably being invoked are nothing more than abstract formulations of standards generated by the concrete activities in question; at worst, however, such "rationalism" leads to a pursuit of illusions—a pursuit which is futile, because it cannot attain its stated goal, and which could be vicious, because it threatens to destroy the regular processes of civilization.

The rationalism which Oakeshott condemns is exemplified whenever men define practical situations as problems to be dealt with according to some objective calculus of efficiency, moral principle, or political ideology. It has become the dominant style today, he contends, because men undertake to deal with situations whose idiom they do not know. Yet the worst does not usually happen, because the concrete character of activities tends to override the illusory conceptions men have about them. The diverse conversations are more halting than they might be and the overall conversation is more boring than it has been (because the practical and scientific voices all but drown out some of the others), but civilized society is sustained. So Oakeshott's talks about civilization are really cheerful, after all. Priding himself on a cool temperament, disdaining presumptuous illusions, he upholds urbanity and cultivation. We can enjoy our activities, he explains, if we do not overvalue them, if we do not aspire to the unattainable. We must be sensitive to the idiom and intimations of the conversations we enter, and courageously accept the fact that there is nothing more.

Oakeshott is particularly concerned to apply this approach to the in-

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terpretation of politics. In this activity, he contends, fallacious rationalism is most widespread and most pernicious. He writes: "Politics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a collection of people who, in respect of their common recognition of a manner of attending to its arrangements, compose a single community" (p. 123). Like other activities, it must be understood as a conversation properly carried on by those whose education and temperament equip them to learn the idiom and heed the intimations appropriate to their own time. More specifically, he contrasts a "jump to glory style of politics," operating on the principle that "to govern is to turn a private dream into a public and compulsory manner of living" (p. 186), with a conservative understanding, according to which "The image of the ruler is the umpire whose business is to administer the rules of the game, or the chairman who governs the debate according to known rules but does not himself participate in it" (p. 187). He leaves little doubt that his own understanding of his situation follows the latter pattern. The "legislator," he adds, "is understood to occupy a judicial office" (p. 193) and it is his task to introduce a detached, even ironical, voice into the sometimes passionate conversation which is civilized society.

Oakeshott's essays reflect the peculiar difficulties which face any serious writer who attempts to devise a comprehensive world-view today. The Utopian humanist vision has gone; the objective principles of universal order are not credible; and the only recourse appears to be flight into the relative securities of some socially defined role. This basic phenomenon provides the theme for that whole contemporary literature which alternately condemns the donning of masks and spurs us on to the search for identity. What is explicit in Oakeshott and implicit in so many other writers is that these are not alternatives at all: playing a role masks nothing; it defines the identity being sought.

On this foundation, a humane man like Oakeshott constructs a gentle and urbane liberalism. He accepts his own role, while conceding the legitimacy of many others. Liberty is the right to be what one is and to act accordingly. Civilization is a condition in which the plurality of social roles is acknowledged and respected. Mischievous meddling arises from the vain search for ordering principles behind or beyond the ongoing civilizational reality, from the effort of the barefoot to raise themselves by their bootstraps. With elegance, wit, and self-awareness, Oakeshott has set forth the assumptions underlying contemporary pluralism and its conservative implications. For him this perspective derives from the role of the academic man, and his work tends to disarm an

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academic critic because it reveals a very nice appreciation of the humanistic traditions which play so important and creditable a part in university life. Thus Oakeshott appears as a writer who speaks to our condition: he seems to respond to the intellectual problems which face us in a way which uniquely reflects our integrity as men of letters.

But these appearances deceive: Oakeshott's way is ultimately an evasion. First, it falsifies our political experience; and second, it loses contact with the ongoing conversation concerning the interpretation of these experiences. In the final analysis, it becomes clear that Oakeshott really does not know where and who we are.

Oakeshott himself has written, in his perceptive appreciation of Hobbes, that for the political philosopher, "Human life . . . appears generally . . . as a predicament. . . . Every masterpiece of political philosophy springs from a new vision of the predicament, each is the glimpse of a deliverance or the suggestion of a remedy."[1] Oakeshott's own political speculations, however, reveal a vision donnish in the derogatory sense, one which fails to comprehend our predicament. Politics in our time cannot be portrayed as a genteel conversation; in our experience the play of words is too frequently broken by the scream of anger, the moan of pain, or the silence of perplexity. Continuity and compromise certainly form part of our political experience; but so do abrupt change and radical decision. We may be disillusioned with utopias; but our political tasks require us to comprehend an environment charged with revolutionary expectations. However things may have been in some golden age, political function today imposes the responsibility for choices which shape and do not simply maintain the arrangements of society. What every revolutionary challenge makes clear is that "order" is always purposively structured: it is an order according to some implicit principles, intended or not. Defense of a given order thus involves defense of one set of principles against others; the homely justification derived from familiarity ceases to have any relevance when those who feel victimized by some given order deliberately reject it. Political activity is not judicial. Precisely the integrating principles of existing orders are everywhere called into question, and the coercive, destructive, creative effects of power are thrust upon our attention. To portray all this as some sort of dreadful aberration arising out of bad breeding is to banalize our predicament.

Oakeshott's approach would appear to have particular appeal to students of international politics. No other area of study elicits so intensely the considerations which we have seen to underlie the attractiveness

[1] "Introduction" to Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford 1957), x-xi.

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of Oakeshott's argument: disillusionment with Utopian ideals, skepticism about the universal claims of competing schemes of "natural law" and the like, and an urgent striving after some ordering principle able to prevent intellectual and actual chaos. And a conception of international politics as a conversation among participants attuned to a peculiar idiom and dedicated to the maintenance of the conversation itself corresponds closely to the view implicit in the diplomatic tradition. But precisely the materials of international politics most clearly reveal the inadequacy of Oakeshott's framework. In the past, the international conversation has from time to time "intimated" a recourse to violence, and war has been an accepted and indispensable part of the "idiom;" in the present, at key points, this mode of conversation is incompatible with survival. A new language is being imposed on the discussants, and no one knows how to speak it. Moreover, there are new participants, revolutionary nations, who jeer at the established decorum and jibingly expose the premises on which existing orderly procedures rest. They deliberately reject canons of good taste and propriety. Those canons cannot define and comprehend the situation; nor can the conversation be adjourned to another place or time. Oakeshott provides a useful corrective to provincialism and oversimplifications of one sort, but he cannot deal with the critical tasks of our time.

Oakeshott opposes his own understanding of politics to a simplistic rationalism which no one takes seriously. We need not now examine whether even utilitarianism was ever as naïve as all that; we do know that no serious political thinker since the middle of the nineteenth century has doubted that a complex tension marks the relationship between continuity and innovation, that the new is in some sense generated by the old. In an interesting note to his essay on "Political Education," Oakeshott acknowledges this fact with regard to John Stuart Mill; but the same applies to the intellectual traditions associated with such names as Karl Marx and John Dewey. Oakeshott's fight against "rationalism" is largely a fight against straw men. Despite his many invocations of stern symbols of intellectual and moral courage, he has sought refuge from confronting the tensions and decisions which plague political life. And in this he has systematically bypassed the work of most of those now thinking about politics.

In considering the writings of Oakeshott, then, we discover a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, he is clearly marked as a contemporary by his attempt to fill the gaps left by the collapse of utopianism and dogmatism with a philosophy based on a courageous assessment of our identities and a respect for integrity. On the other hand, the vision

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opened from this perspective strikes us as antique and irrelevant, ignoring the key questions we face and our efforts to deal with them. There is a radical disparity between the form and the content of his thinking. The source of the difficulty lies, I believe, in Oakeshott's failure to understand the nature of the activity in which he is engaged. The effort to seek orientation to the world of practice, the attempt to find meaning in reality, cannot be assimilated simply to the traditional role of the academic scholar.

The interpretive enterprise of social and political theory has been carried on by intellectuals animated by moral responsibility, and it makes no sense apart from that impetus. Unquestionably, that spirit has often led to grave errors: worship of illusion instead of sober appraisal of reality, intoning glib or murky moralizing slogans instead of the painstaking search for a human perspective, delusions of omnipotence instead of accepting the intellectual's place as gadfly, critic, and conscience. But the alternative to responsibility remains complicity. In postulating a radical disjunction between theory and practice, Oakeshott has misinterpreted his own task and misjudged the very considerations which lead him to argue as he does—or to argue at all. Thus the writings of a man doubtlessly honest, humane, and sensitive too often strike false notes of affectation, complacency, and moral callousness—particularly when we attend his words against the background of the great events of our time: the attempts to stave off thermonuclear devastation and the terrible efforts of suffering multitudes to obtain a decent human existence. His conception of his own activity derives primarily from the Epicurean tradition; his discourses are set in philosophical groves. Oakeshott's work dramatically raises again the question which was debated in Roman antiquity and which the Scottish moral philosophers reopened for modern thought in their violent attacks on their dear friend David Hume: how is it possible to eliminate illusion without becoming a "traitor to the cause of mankind"?

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SIMULATION, REALITY, AND THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By SIDNEY VERBA

Harold Guetzkow, Chadwick F. Alger, Richard A. Brody, Robert C. Noel, and Richard C. Snyder, *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, 248 pp. $5.50.

Harold Guetzkow, ed., *Simulation in Social Science: Readings,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, 199 pp. $3.95.

Richard A. Brody, "Some Systematic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study Through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (December 1963), entire issue, 126 pp. $2.00.

THERE was a time when a book was a book. It had a beginning and an end. It was the final, fully polished result of careful thought and told you something you did not know (or, at least, told it better). Now things are different. Rather than a clearly defined book, one has a collection of papers. Rather than having a beginning, it is likely to be a group of beginnings, of plans for research, of tentative hypotheses, of suggestions, of approaches. And rather than having an end, it is likely to hope for or promise other volumes that will carry on the suggestions of the first.

The books I shall be discussing are of the new variety. They are tentative, they overlap, they suggest beginnings but few conclusions, and one finishes them with the sense of a lack of fulfillment. But in reading these books it became clear, at least to me, that this is just what we need. We need a discipline that is constantly moving, where one work feeds into another, where every new idea is tentative and is brought forward so that it can be superseded.

The three works under discussion grew out of the simulation research carried on under the auspices of the International Relations Program at Northwestern University. The *Simulation in International Relations* volume by Guetzkow *et al.* consists of seven papers that report on the development of the Inter-Nation Simulation as a research and teaching tool. The papers discuss the rationale for such an attempt to simulate the relations among nations, present its theoretical underpinnings, and describe its operation. The study by Richard Brody, to which the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* devoted its December 1963 issue, represents a major attempt to use the Inter-Nation Simulation for the ex-

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ploration of a problem of great substantive interest—the effects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the international system. And the book of readings, *Simulation in Social Science,* edited by Guetzkow, contains a collection of papers on the uses of simulation techniques in other branches of social science. The three works together give a good indication of the present state of simulation research in the social sciences.

I

A simulation is a model of a system. Other models, as Brody suggests, may attempt to represent a system through verbal means, mathematical means, or pictorial means. Like simulations, they involve the abstraction of certain aspects of the system one is studying and an attempt to replicate these aspects by other means, such as words or mathematical symbols. But the simulation model differs in that it is an *operating* model. Once the variables that have been selected are given values within the simulation and the relations among the variables are specified, the model is allowed to operate. It may operate through the interaction of people who play roles within the model; or it may operate on a computer. The rules given to the human participants in the simulation or the computer program represent the premises of the model. Its operation produces the implications.

There are many forms of simulation, and where simulation shades off into other forms of study or model-building is hard to specify and probably not too important. A vast array of subjects are being studied by means of this technique. Represented in *Simulation in Social Science* are simulated electoral systems, bureaucracies, small groups, nations, international systems, economic systems, as well as bus terminals and jet fighter duels. Some of the simulations are carried on solely by computers. A set of relationships among variables is programmed into the computer as well as the initial values of the variables. The computer then "solves" the model by calculating the ways in which the variables of the model vary over time. The initial state of a market can be programmed into a computer as well as the rules by which the market operates. The computer then charts the patterns of development of the market over time. Or a simulation can be a man-computer simulation. In this case the computer usually acts as a large calculating machine that feeds back to the participants in the simulation the implications of their activities. Thus, rather than having an economy programmed on a computer, management "teams" may make economic decisions—within the rules of the

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simulated economy—and the computer can calculate what the results of their decisions are. Or simulations can be purely human ones, in which participants are given a set of rules that they then follow in interaction with each other.

One major variation among forms of simulation has to do with the extent to which the simulation is highly controlled or free. Essentially this involves the extent to which the simulation is set up with carefully specified rules and few, if any, free parameters. In such a simulation, the operation of the model consists of a series of deductions from the programmed assumptions about the data. The results may be unexpected in that the implications of the assumptions were unclear, but they are determined by the assumptions. At the other extreme, a simulation may be rather loose in structure, with a large number of free parameters. The way in which it develops over time depends upon variables that have not been programmed by the researcher. In general, the former type of highly controlled and deductive simulation is more likely to be purely a computer simulation, while the freer form of simulation is likely to involve human participants. Simulation studies involving human participants vary, however, from some that are quite loosely programmed—like the RAND studies of political gaming[1]—to some in which the subjects participate according to very strict rules.[2]

II

The usefulness of simulation cannot be evaluated in the abstract. If it can contribute to social science, it will do so in relation to particular problem areas. Probably the largest attempt to use simulation research as a tool for political analysis has been in connection with international relations, and the most advanced specimen of this work is the Northwestern Inter-Nation Simulation. This body of research affords an excellent opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. For one thing, there has been quite a bit of experience with the Inter-Nation Simulation. Though it is obviously a tool of research that will undergo great modifications, it has already been put through repeated runs. One can begin to obtain a fairly reliable estimate of how it works.

Secondly, the Inter-Nation Simulation at Northwestern lies between the poles of the highly structured, deductive computer simulation and

[1] Joseph M. Goldsen, *The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round* (Washington, D.C., The RAND Corporation, D-3640-RC, May 1956, mimeographed).
[2] Morton A. Kaplan, Arthur L. Burns, and Richard M. Quandt, "Theoretical Analysis of the 'Balance of Power'," *Behavioral Science*, v (July 1960), 240-52.

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the looser political gaming. The environment in which the players operate is rather stylized; the nations they represent have fictitious names, and there is a programmed relationship between what they do and the strength and security of their nation, as well as between the latter and their chances for remaining in office. On the other hand, the players are allowed to operate with much freedom. They may form alliances, found international organizations, become aggressive or pacific as they wish. In fact, one of the fascinating aspects of these simulations is the way in which the decision-makers of the various nations assume different roles in the international system—a choice that is to a large extent up to them.

A third reason for interest in the Inter-Nation Simulation as a potential contributor to political theory lies in the particular choice of free and controlled variables for the simulation. Most of the closely programmed variables and relationships among variables are related to the internal structure of the simulated nations. The nations are set up with both internal and external decision-makers, the former being the ultimate national authority. There may also be an alternative decision-maker, ready to replace the incumbent should he be thrown out of office. The values of the variables involved in the internal state of the nation—the economic condition of the nation, its military capacity, the degree of decisional latitude the decision-makers have, the satisfaction of its citizens—are programmed variables whose initial values are set by the researchers, and which vary according to fixed rules. In contrast, relations among the variables connected with the international system—the closeness of alliances, the amount of trade, international conferences—are not programmed by the researchers. Thus there are fixed rules within a nation for the relationship between the satisfaction of its population and the chances that the decision-makers will be able to stay in office, but no fixed rules as to when international suspicion and hostility will lead to war. In the Inter-Nation Simulation, therefore, the relations among nations are heavily influenced by the internal states of the nations and much of what is interesting in the simulation involves the effects on the international system of these intra-national patterns. This contrasts fairly sharply with the Kaplan, Burns, and Quandt "balance of power" game,[3] in which the various nations are not differentiated internally, and in which the actions of the players are largely in response to the international situation. The Northwestern approach seems to me to be preferable both in terms of realism and in terms of

[3] *Ibid.*

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the opportunities it affords for the exploration of the relations between the internal states of nations and the relations among them.[4]

The last and most important reason why the Inter-Nation Simulation is a useful focus for an evaluation of the potentialities of simulation is that it has been designed with the explicit purpose of the development of theory about the relations among states. Unlike some attempts to simulate international relations that have been designed largely as teaching tools or have had as their purpose the analysis of some particular policy problem, the Inter-Nation Simulation has been closely identified with theoretical concerns.[5]

III

Simulation exercises are difficult to design, expensive to conduct, and time-consuming. Why bother? Why go to all the trouble of creating an artificial political world when the real world of politics is all around

[4] Most of the research discussed in this review involves the attempt to study the relations among states through the use of simulation. But simulation is applicable to studies of the internal politics of nations as well. In fact, though the Inter-Nation Simulation was designed explicitly to study international relations, some of its most interesting aspects — not fully explored by the experimenters, since this was not their prime interest — involve the simulation of office-holding and the transfer of power within nations.

The most direct application of simulation research — in this case, computer simulation — to internal political systems has been in connection with the study of electoral systems. (See Ithiel Pool and Robert Abelson, "The Simulmatics Project," in *Simulation in Social Science,* 70-81; William N. McPhee and Robert B. Smith, "A Model for Analyzing Voting Systems," in William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser, eds., *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* [New York 1962], 123-52; and McPhee and Jack Ferguson, "Political Immunization," in *ibid.,* 155-79.) But attempts to simulate interaction patterns within complex social systems of the sort reported by James S. Coleman ("Analysis of Social Structures and Simulation of Social Processes with Electronic Computers," in *Simulation in Social Science,* 61-69) may represent some of the most potentially important uses of simulation for the analysis of political systems.

[5] For an example of simulation with a primarily policy-analysis relevance, see the RAND Corporation report cited in footnote 1 above. For examples of simulations focused largely on teaching, see Bernard C. Cohen, "Political Gaming in the Classroom," *Journal of Politics,* XXIV (May 1962), 367-81; and Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Norman J. Padelford, "Three Experiments in Political Gaming," *American Political Science Review,* LIII (December 1959), 1105-115. The Northwestern Inter-Nation Simulation also has teaching potentialities and has been used for that purpose as well. (See Chadwick F. Alger, "Inter-Nation Simulation in Undergraduate Teaching," in *Simulation in International Relations,* 150-89.) In fact, the Inter-Nation Simulation appears to be particularly apt as a teaching device. As Alger points out, the technique is useful in getting students to view international relations from an abstract and theoretical point of view. They come to see the relations among states in terms of general principles rather than specific events, and come to appreciate the problem of bringing conceptual and theoretical order out of the chaos of politics. This, of course, can be done through ordinary teaching techniques, but the advantage of participation by students in a simulation exercise is that they become deeply involved. As those who have taught undergraduates international relations know, what students expect from such a course is current events, drama, inside dope, and a close connection with the contemporary realities of international affairs. Theoretical approaches and abstraction are harder to communicate.

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us?[6] The main reason is that, while there is certainly enough politics in the real world to observe, it is very difficult to make much sense out of it. The political world that strikes our senses is confused and chaotic. Simulation has as its goal the improvement of our ability to order and explain these political phenomena. How does it do this? As with all attempts to understand a phenomenon, simulation involves an abstraction from reality of what are considered to be the salient features of that reality. These variables are then programmed into the simulation. If the variables selected are those that are significant for the process under study, if no significant variables are left out, if no additional distorting variables exist in the simulation, and if the variables are properly replicated within the simulation—they do not have to *look like* the variables in the real world as long as they *operate* like them—the simulation model will be isomorphic to the real situation and it will operate like the real-world phenomenon that is being modeled. Thus the major problems in simulation research are selecting the aspects of the real world to simulate, replicating them in the model, making the model "work" and, above all, connecting the model back again with the real world.

The first task of abstracting those aspects of the international system that one wants to place in a simulation involves a major dilemma of such research. One major distinction between types of simulation that was discussed above was between simulations that are highly structured and deductive in form and those that are looser in structure. In a sense this involves a distinction between simulations that are more or less faithful reproductions of reality. Highly structured simulations perform the important task of simplifying reality in the model. What goes on the model is much clearer than what goes on in the real world, because all the relationships have been carefully specified. And that is exactly what the purpose of model-building is. But in order to create such a purely deductive simulation it is necessary to abstract quite a bit from reality and to take variables that are quantifiable. The very fact that the researcher has to make explicit all the variables he puts into the simulation means that they will be relatively few in number. High-speed computers allow for more complex analyses, but the need of explication is a great force for the limitation of the number of variables. And once one has abstracted in this manner, the problem becomes a

[6] The use of the term "real" in contrast to the simulated world may be a bit misleading. The simulation is, of course, also real — there are real people interacting or real computers computing. And we all know that "games" may be deadly serious. The terms "real" and "reality" are used here to contrast what goes on in the simulation with what is simulated. They have no metaphysical implications.

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matter of finding a link back to the real world. The simulant is clear and elegant, and one's understanding of the simulation itself may be great, but what has it to do with international relations?

The other horn of the dilemma is illustrated by the political gaming studies that attempt to mirror reality in all (or most of) its complexity. In these political games there is little abstraction. But the loss here is of clarity and parsimony. The simulation looks as complex and is as hard to analyze and explain as was the real world. Thus, little purpose may be served by creating a simulation so abstract that it cannot be connected to real political phenomena, or by creating one that contains all the ambiguity and confused chaos of the real world.

In this respect, the Northwestern Inter-Nation Simulation represents a compromise. It lies between the abstractions of the computer models and the reality-grounded political games of The RAND Corporation. The participants are deliberately left free in many respects—free, as Guetzkow puts it, to "outthink the simulators"—yet they are not completely free. Much of the activity within the simulation is highly structured and controlled. Such a compromise, of course, leaves this type of simulation open to criticism from both sides. On the one hand, too much goes on within the simulated sessions that cannot be explained; on the other, the simulation is too simple—it does not reflect reality. Yet, at this stage of our knowledge, such a compromise solution (like the compromise position between the grand theorists and the fact-oriented empiricists that "middle-range theory" represents in sociology) may be the most fruitful approach.

IV

Simulations can best be understood if their relation to other work in the social sciences is made clear. Simulations are not substitutes for other types of model-building. For one thing, an adequate simulation of a social process requires an adequate theory about that social process; and it is in terms of this theory that one selects those aspects of the political phenomenon that one wants to replicate. In a sense, a simulation exercise always involves at least three levels: it is an attempt to create a simulated world that matches one's verbal or mathematical model about some real social process. The way in which the simulation works may in turn lead one to change or abandon this verbal or mathematical theory, but the various kinds of model-building are inseparable. The prose and mathematical descriptions of the Inter-Nation Simulation found in the book by Guetzkow and his associates are, in a sense, essays in international relations theory.

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Furthermore, not only is simulation research dependent on other modes of model-building, but there are also similarities between the intellectual processes involved in the design of a simulation of international relations and other forms of study of the subject. Consider the problem of the selection of the significant variables to program into a simulation. It clearly represents a simplification of the real world and presents severe problems of selection. But so, indeed, does any attempt to create theory about or even to write prose about international relations—or, for that matter, anything else. Totalities cannot be described. One must select aspects of the phenomenon. And the description and/or theory will be useful insofar as the aspects of the phenomenon that are important for the *problem at hand* have been selected.

One can take the parallel farther. The same dilemmas that affect simulation studies can be found in verbal models of international relations, and with the same consequences. On the one hand, there is a large amount of abstract theorizing that involves highly structured models of international relations. The problem with such theorizing is always that of connecting it to reality. The model floats, as it were, above the plane of reality, and the connecting links are missing more often than not. It may help to clear one's thinking about some problem in the real world of politics, but its relation to concrete problems is tenuous indeed. On the other hand, the kinds of simulation that are highly realistic involve problems closely related to those of narrative historical accounts of international affairs. They are true to the real world of politics, but they do not add up to much.

Another issue in which there is a close parallel between the choices one must make in designing a simulation study and in carrying on more conventional analyses of international relations has to do with the role of quantitative measurement. On the one hand, one can think of studies of international relations that use only a few quantifiable variables and others that use many variables and little quantification. In the former case, the difficulty is that one is not sure what it is that one can and ought to measure. One ends up measuring that which is measurable, often without regard for its significance or relevance. On the other hand, without measurement, statements as to the relationship among variables become difficult, if not impossible, for there is no clear and precise way of describing changes in the values of the variables. Within simulation studies this may be less of a problem, in that the simulation is much more under the control of the researcher. He can control the data output, administer tests and questionnaires to the participants almost at will, and generate a large amount of measurable data that

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would be missing in another kind of study. But a similar problem exists, as is illustrated by the contrast between some of the core (highly programmed) variables in the Inter-Nation Simulation and some of the free variables. Though the former are easier to measure, much of the most interesting action within the simulation involves the free behavior of individuals—say, at oral conferences—which is much harder to capture and quantify. One of the reasons why these free variables are left in the simulation is that one does not know enough about the nature of the problem to program all the significant relations. Some important relationships are expected to "emerge" from the operation of the simulation. An attempt to program all such variables—or an attempt to write a closed, logically consistent theory of international relations—would represent a premature closure in a field where flexibility is needed.

This raises another dilemma in simulation and non-simulation studies of international relations, a dilemma related to the state of the field. Is one's research designed for exploratory purposes or to test clearly defined and previously specified hypotheses? This is a major choice in research design for any kind of research, and is a major problem in simulation research. Most such studies—as is probably appropriate at this stage of development of the discipline—have been of the former variety. Few simulation studies have involved the experimental test of hypotheses, in which experimental treatments are administered in one run of the simulation while another run is used as a control. Rather, the bulk of the work with the Northwestern simulation has been of an exploratory nature. The simulation is run in order to see what pattern of activities emerge. More recent work with the technique, however, has involved more experimental manipulation, as will be discussed below.

Thus, in many ways the design of a simulation involves the same set of problems as does any attempt to bring order out of the confusion of the real world. There are differences, however, between prose analyses of international affairs and simulation studies. In some respects, prose is more flexible. The prose writer can add a variety of aspects to his consideration with more ease than the designer of a simulation can build them into his simulation. On the other hand, the simulation has the advantage of being a working model. Once it is designed, one can test it to see if it does indeed resemble the operation of the real world it is attempting to model.

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V

What kinds of contributions to theory-building can simulation studies make? One of the major contributions of simulation research to the development of theory in international relations is implied in the above discussion. It is connected with the initial design of such a simulation. The process of designing a simulation forces the designer to explicate his model of international relations. At times this may involve not so much the creation of new perspectives on the subject, as the explication of traditional wisdom. One is forced to make explicit what may have been the implicit assumptions about the subject matter—in order that these assumptions may be placed in the operating model. This explication of traditional wisdom, indeed, may be one of the most useful tasks in contemporary social science. In part such explication is useful because much of traditional wisdom may be wrong or contradictory, and the explication will help us to spot these failings. On the other hand, much of traditional wisdom about international relations may be very good, but since the structure of that knowledge is implicit—the ways in which important factors are sorted out from unimportant ones, the ways in which they are weighed, and so forth, are not explicated—the knowledge may not be too useful. If one is forced to design a replica of what one intuitively understands about international affairs, one may be better able to make that knowledge explicit. Furthermore, the replica is to some extent self-correcting. Just as one could not describe a familiar landscape fully, but could recognize the fact that an important feature was missing if shown a sketch, so might the observer of a simulation recognize that some significant aspect of the real world was missing, the importance of which he had not made explicit.

But the explication function is not much different from the same function that would be performed if one tried to write a precise verbal or mathematical model of the same phenomena. Where a simulation differs is that it goes on from there. The explicated model is set to work, and, over time, generates data on subsequent states of the simulation. One then has information on the operation of the simulation—just as one originally had information on the operation of the real world of politics. But of what use are these data gathered from a simulated world? We may have information that particular actors in a contrived model of the international system behaved in a certain way—they went to war, they formed alliances, they were overthrown in a revolution. But why go to all that trouble to collect data about an unimportant

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world that exists within the confines of a simulation laboratory? In some sense, this is the crucial question about the uses of simulation research.

To answer this question we have to look first at the kinds of data that are generated in simulations. The data thus generated differ from those generated by real political events in several important ways. In the first place, one can generate in a simulation study data about certain kinds of situations that happen rarely in the real world, or perhaps that have not happened yet. One of the problems in carrying on research in the real political world is that some of the situations one wants to explain happen so infrequently that one cannot obtain enough cases to allow the development of generalizations. In a simulation study, one can replicate some of these rare events and run the simulation over and over again as long as the researcher's funds and patience hold out. One can repeatedly simulate particular types of international system of which there are few historical examples, or even the outbreak of a world war. Or one can simulate events that have not yet taken place—such as international conflict in a multinuclear world, or, as Brody has done, the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, while such techniques as survey research or content analysis have given us relatively precise methods of dealing with political events that occur in great numbers—voting decisions, attitude changes, symbol manipulations—simulation techniques may be most crucial for macro-political phenomena that occur less frequently. Thus, for example, simulation techniques have been used to deal with the macro-phenomenon of electoral outcome. Whereas survey studies provide a wide range of data on individual voting decisions, the study of the electoral system on the macro-level involves different problems; and several attempts to apply simulation techniques to these problems suggest that this may be a fruitful approach.[7]

Another difference between simulation data and real-world data is that the former are clearer and simpler. There is less going on in a simulation than in the real world, and what is going on is under greater control. Suppose one wants to observe the reactions of the decision-makers in one nation to the actions of another nation in the real world. The very identification of the decision-makers is difficult, as is the observation of their behavior. Furthermore, they are involved in so many complex interactions at the same time that one cannot be sure they are reacting to the particular stimulus one has in mind. In the simulation, on the other hand, where the flow of interactions is more limited

[7] See the works on electoral systems cited in footnote 4 above.

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and under control, one can obtain more unambiguous results. Furthermore, data generated in a simulation can be observed more carefully and precisely. One has almost total access to the history of the simulated world; one can measure attitudes, record conversations, and monitor messages at will. And since the number of actors involved is limited and clearly specifiable, one can record an almost total history.

Most useful of all may be the possibility of compressing time. Single sessions of the simulation may be made to represent periods of time from a few days to a few years. And time is a valuable commodity for the researcher. Studies of attitude formation or political socialization ideally ought to involve the observation of individuals' life histories; but, as has been said, to study a life history takes a lifetime. In international relations, the researcher may be interested in patterns of alliance formation or disintegration that take quite a long time to develop. In relation to the practical questions of policy, he may want to project swiftly into the future before the future arrives—to analyze, for instance, the implications of nuclear proliferation before that happens. The simulation can allow a condensation of time in this respect—subjects can play out the events of a year in a short period of time. The researcher has the world of his simulation in his grasp in a way not available for the researcher who works on the real political world.

The various studies carried on with the Inter-Nation Simulation exhibit these advantages. The patterns of alliance formation are clear; the motivations for the formation and disintegration of alliances are also clear. The participants are given a variety of tests to tap their attitudes at various points in the simulation; the message flow among the nations is recorded and subjected to content analysis; and the participants are asked to write historical accounts explaining their actions. The simulator has complete access to data on the state of the domestic economy and politics of the various simulated nations—and since these are simplified and stylized economies and polities, such data are manageable. The more policy-oriented studies using the simulation project their international systems well into the future, thus taking advantage of the ability to compress time. And, above all, the various measurements and observations can be taken repeatedly and with careful concern for time sequence. One can gather a complete account of the way in which the system changes over time, and of the sequence in which various aspects change.

Thus, simulation research generates very useful and highly controlled data about social processes within the simulation. This suggests one answer to the question of why one should bother to collect these data:

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the social processes within the simulation are interesting in and of themselves. The close study of a simulation is a way to generate and test theories *about simulations*, and this kind of behavior is not uninteresting. The participants in the simulation are real people and their behavior is real behavior. This focus, though, would place international relations simulations in the same class of studies as those small-group experiments where the prime object of study is the set of relationships that develop within the laboratory. But these simulations are different. Their explicit purpose is to contribute to an understanding of something that goes on outside the simulated environment in the multifaceted world of international relations. Of what use are the data generated in a simulation for the understanding of the real world of politics?

To answer this question, one must first look at the ways in which simulation exercises differ from the real political phenomena, and attempt to assess the effects of these differences. The differences between the real world of politics and the simulated world of politics are many. Only certain aspects of the political world are copied in the simulation. The participants in the simulation are different people from those who participate in the real world of politics. Not only are they different individuals; they are sharply different in backgrounds—often they are college or high school students, rather than the experienced and mature participants in real political interaction. Perhaps more important than this is the fact that their past experiences of interaction together and their future expectations of such interaction are different. Before the simulation began, they had not met; after it ends, they rarely meet again. The extent of ego-involvement in such a situation would be substantially less, one would guess, than in situations in which future commitments to interaction were involved. Furthermore, of course, the stakes are not real—war does not bring death in the simulated world, nor does the loss of office bring banishment. And time may be severely compressed.

It is easy to point out the ways that simulation exercises are different from the real world of politics. That the differences exist goes without saying—that is, after all, what simulation is all about. But it is a bit more difficult to specify the implication of these differences. That a simulation does not "look like" the real world is not important. What is important is the question of whether it *operates like the real world in the respects that are relevant to the study at hand*. The last qualification is important. A model airplane used in a wind tunnel does not look exactly like the real thing; it is smaller, to begin with, and many details are left out. Nor does it operate like the real thing; it has, after

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all, neither pilot nor radio nor many other features of a real plane. This means it is hardly a useful model for the analysis of pilot reaction to emergency situations. But it may be a very useful model for the analysis of the lift characteristics of the wings or their stress under high-speed conditions. Similarly, if the international relations simulation can operate like the real world in those respects that are relevant, the lack of match in other respects makes little difference. For some problems, for instance, the personality, background, and future expectations of the participants might make no difference—if, for instance, one were studying certain aspects of communications networks—and the fact that the participants had different characteristics than those whom they were replicating in the real world also might make no difference.

But the problem remains of how one knows that the differences between the simulation and the real world are not such as to make the simulant an inadequate replication of the real world. How can one tell that the data that are generated are applicable to real political situations? Essentially this is a question of how one goes about validating the results of a simulation exercise. One way of validating them—a way that is not very precise but may be important—is merely to observe a simulation in progress and ask whether it looks like the "real thing." Do those involved exhibit the emotional reactions that one expects from actors in real life? Do they, for instance, become excited at tense moments in the simulation, elated at success, dejected at failure? Such comparison of the simulation with the emotional reactions one would expect in a real situation is a useful negative check. If the same involvement is generated, this does not suggest that one has necessarily successfully modeled the real world of politics; but, if it is absent, it does suggest that in certain respects that might be important the simulated world is not isomorphic with the real world. From the reports of the Inter-Nation Simulation it seems clear that these simulations do manage to achieve "reality" in many of these respects. The participants appear to be involved and concerned with the outcome.

It is thus possible to see if certain kinds of behavior that one might have expected to be produced in the simulation are in fact so produced. But how can one measure the impact on the simulation of those aspects in which it is different from the real world? Suppose involvement is lower, or higher: does it matter? Suppose the participants are high school students, as in several of the Inter-Nation Simulation runs: does it matter? In order to answer this question one must weigh the impact on the relevant results of those dimensions in which the simulation differs from the real world. One way to do this is to set up several simula-

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tion exercises that vary in the extent to which they are different from the real world of politics along significant dimensions. One could then observe what consequences for the operation of the simulation are involved in moving back and forth along this continuum. In this way one can isolate those aspects of the simulation that are the most distorting in their effect. Furthermore, insofar as one knows the way in which a particular difference between the real world and the simulation affects the operation of the simulation, one can take that into account in applying the results of the simulation exercise.

In the Inter-Nation Simulation, for instance, one simulation run was conducted with career diplomats and journalists, while most of the others were conducted with high school or college students. The ways in which the former differ from the latter are revealing. The differences tell us something about the simulation, and they also tell us something about the real political world. The professionals were more involved in keeping in power and in doing well—this despite the fact that for them, as well as for the students, the simulation was a game. One suggested reason for this is the fact that the prestige of the professional participants was involved. They were people who felt they ought to be successful in such activity and who, in some cases, knew each other before the simulation. Therefore, how they performed in the simulation affected their esteem in the eyes of others. And this turned out to be significant in motivating the higher levels of performance. The lesson for simulation design and the implication for real politics are important. Motivation to perform well is probably related to ego-involvement, but the latter, in turn, may vary independently of the seriousness of the international situation. What may be more important is the amount of prestige the decision-maker feels is involved in his performance. This also suggests that "seriousness" can be built into a simulation by appropriate manipulation of the setting, even if the wars do not involve real deaths or the trade real exchanges of goods. It is unfortunate, however, that further exploration of this problem has not been undertaken in simulation research, and that the particular simulation with professionals involved a number of other differences from the runs with high school and college students, so that the points made can be considered only tentative.

Though the isolation of the ways in which deviations from reality affect the operation of the simulation may help check on its validity, the task still remains of validating the simulation by comparing its operation with the operation of the actual international system. The test is crucial, for unless this can be done, the relevance of the simulation

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to problems of international affairs remains quite uncertain. But the task is difficult. One must compare the operation of the simulation with the operation of the real world of politics. Does the same process take place in each? If, for instance, one is studying the reasons why alliances break up, or the effects of trade on friendship among nations, or the impact of differences in military capability on the structure of alliances —to cite some kinds of problems that could be studied in a simulation —one would compare the simulation with actual international relations to see if the two are operating according to the same rules. But this involves several questions. In the first place, with what events does one compare the simulation? Secondly, in what respects do the real-world event and the simulated event have to match before one can conclude that the simulation has been validated? And lastly, how does one interpret a success or failure in matching the simulation and the real political world?

If one wants to compare the operation of a simulation exercise with some external criterion, one can attempt to see whether or not one can reproduce within the simulation patterns of events that have already taken place or patterns of events that have yet to take place. One can simulate a situation in the past to see if the same developments take place within the simulation as took place in that historical situation; or one can simulate a set of events that has not taken place yet, in which case the test of the simulation is its ability to predict these future patterns. The body of research connected with the Inter-Nation Simulation offers examples of each.

The research by Brody reported in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* represents an important attempt to use the simulation to predict a future state of the international system.[8] Brody changed the Inter-Nation Simulation somewhat in order to simulate the spread of nuclear weapons experimentally. He differentiated between nuclear and conventional weapons, whereas the earlier simulation exercises had not done

[8] Further research along these general lines is currently being carried out at the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute at La Jolla, California, under the direction of Wayman J. Crow and Lawrence N. Solomon. (See Wayman J. Crow, "The Use of Inter-Nation Simulation in Experiments," paper read at a symposium on "Social Psychological Studies of International Behavior," at the 17th International Congress of Psychology, Washington, D.C., August 1963.) Their purpose is to test out several strategic doctrines by programming into a simulated world various types of nuclear capabilities. Their work involves somewhat more overt experimental manipulation than is the case in many of the earlier simulation studies, and may represent the next stage in simulation work.

This research suggests an important policy use of such simulation. If one can develop enough confidence in the validity of this form of research, it can be used to test out possible policies in cases where a real world test of the policy is not possible. One could observe to see if the predicted effects of the policy do indeed take place.

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

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so. The number of nations participating was expanded to seven. At the beginning of the simulation, the nations were divided into two relatively hierarchical and cohesive blocs—each dominated by a nuclear power which was also the largest nation in terms of economic potential. The blocs were set up so that there would be more communications within the blocs than across blocs, patterns of distrust would be essentially inter- rather than intra-bloc, and most communications would be with the nuclear power in one's own bloc. The experimental manipulation was the spread of nuclear weapons to the other nations of the bloc. The following happened: the amount of threat perceived external to the bloc declined, the amount of threat internal to the bloc increased, and the patterns of communication changed so that the new nuclear powers now communicated as frequently with the opposition bloc leader as they did with their own bloc leader. In other words, the system changed substantially from a cohesive and hierarchical bipolar one to a looser more fragmented system. The simulation has now generated a prediction about the impact on the international system of nuclear proliferation. One must wait to see if in fact such is the impact of such a proliferation (if such proliferation takes place).

An example of an attempt to simulate a past situation is illustrated in the work of the Hermanns, who attempted to simulate the outbreak of World War I.[9] Though the names of the nations and the historical details were varied so that the participants would not be aware of the actual situation that was being reproduced, the simulation was designed to resemble the world in the summer of 1914. The "history" of the world which the participants were given was drawn from the history of Europe in the decades prior to 1914; the five participating nations had histories and characteristics closely modeled on Great Britain, Prussia, France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia; and not only were the decision-makers for each of the simulated nations told to imagine themselves as diplomats with the characteristics of the leading decision-makers of those five nations, but an attempt was made to match the participants in the simulation in terms of their own psychological makeup with the psychological characteristics of the leading decision-makers at the time, insofar as these characteristics were revealed in biographical and autobiographical material. The validation of the Inter-Nation Sim-

[9] Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann, "The Potential Use of Historical Data for Validation Studies of the Inter-Nation Simulation: The Outbreak of World War I as an Illustration," prepared under Contract Ni23(60530)25875 A for the United States Naval Ordnance Test Station (China Lake, Calif., August 1961, mimeographed).

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

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ulation then becomes a comparison of the history of the simulation with the history of the world after 1914.

Both studies cited above are preliminary studies, and the future of simulation research does not depend on how closely the particular exercises fitted reality. (For the record, war did not break out during the 1914 simulation, but in one run of the simulation it did appear imminent, and in the other some timely moves by the participant representing Lord Grey of England led to a reduction of tensions. As for the multinuclear situation, it is too early to tell, but certainly the behavior of France and to a lesser extent Britain has not been incompatible with the model's prediction.) They do illustrate, however, many of the problems of relating simulation studies to actual political happenings.

One issue that is raised in making these connections has to do with the aspects of the simulation and the real world that are intended to be matched. It should be perfectly clear by now that the real political situation cannot be matched in the simulation in its entirety. The simulation will attempt to predict certain aspects of the real world. One of the major distinctions apparent in these validation exercises has to do with whether the predictions are micro- or macro-aspects of the international situation. Predictions involving macro-states of the system refer to aspects of the overall patterning of the relations among the nations—whether or not there is war, whether or not alliances survive, and so forth. Micro-aspects of the system refer to the rates of individual actions that form the processes underlying these overall macro-patterns of international relations—the frequency of various types of message flow, the tension level of the decision-makers, and so forth. In general, though there is great need for understanding international relations on the macro-level and the simulation technique has certain advantages for that purpose, it may be that the most fruitful simulation work will involve comparisons with the real world in terms of the micro-processes that are involved in international relations.

One reason for this is that the ability of a simulation to predict, say, the outbreak of war at a particular point of simulated time is quite limited, since a macro-event such as the outbreak of war is the result of a great many forces. And even if one could design a successful simulation in that respect, it might not be useful for future situations, which would not match the historical one in many important ways. But if the situation can be decomposed into its many subprocesses, such as communications flows, emotional states of decision-makers, and so forth, and the relations between these subprocesses and the macro-processes

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of the relations among states be specified, it may be possible to develop more widely applicable principles that can deal with many political situations. Both the Brody and the Hermann study also involve the analysis of micro-processes, and in many ways these micro-processes represent the more interesting aspects of the simulation.

In general, it is crucial for the future development of simulation studies that attempts be made to predict from them to the real world and these predictions be tested out. Only in this way can they be improved as tools of analysis. But the matching of the simulation and the real world contains many complexities. Suppose one simulates a particular situation and the results of the simulation do not match the real world. What does this mean? On the one hand, it might mean that the two systems are not isomorphic. Some significant process (significant for the problem at hand) was left out of the simulation, or some process has operated differently in the simulation than in the real world. These processes might include many that tend to contaminate experimental results involving human subjects—such as the tendency of participants to act the way they think the experimenter wants them to act. Or it might mean that though the processes have been properly identified and operate properly in the model, the variables involved were given incorrect initial values. Or—and this is the toughest problem in validating such simulations—the simulation might be a quite accurate replica, but stochastic processes are operating both in the real world and in the simulation that make the outcomes probabilistic in each case, and the match between them, therefore, doubly probabilistic.

Within the Inter-Nation Simulation, several of the programmed relationships are probabilistic—for instance, the chances of a decision-maker remaining in office is assigned a probability that is directly related to the satisfaction of the citizens of his country. And similar processes may exist in the real world. In a sense, this means that if history were to be repeated, it might come out differently. In the attempt to replicate the pre-World War I situation, for instance, in one of the runs of the simulation, the participant playing the role of Lord Grey decided to call an international conference at which Austria-Hungary was induced to withdraw her demands on Serbia. This is not the way things really happened, but they might have—and, indeed, historians have suggested that this is how they would have happened if England had acted with more foresight. Thus the lack of convergence between the simulation and the real world may be due to any of a number of causes. The consideration reinforces the argument in favor of a focus on micro-processes where one's goal is not to predict the overall out-

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come, but to predict tendencies in the subprocesses. Because the subprocesses involve many events, the probabilistic features are less of a bar to prediction.

Or consider the opposite result. We attempt to replicate an international situation and the outcome matches the real world. War breaks out when it should, or the alliance shatters under pressure as it should. This suggests that we have accurately replicated the real world and that similar processes are working in the two settings. But, aside from attesting to our inventiveness in copying the real world of politics, of what use is our knowledge that we have successfully reproduced certain real world processes? Suppose war had broken out in the simulated summer of 1914; we knew that all along. Yet the success of attempts to reproduce real processes in the simulation laboratory does have important theoretical implications. The main implication for the development of theory is not that we have achieved the same result as in the real world, but that we have done so through a simulation exercise that involves the explicit selection of certain variables as well as the explicit specification of the relation among the variables. If those aspects that we have selected produce the result we have predicted, then we have some evidence—though far from conclusive evidence—that we have isolated and specified the significant real-world processes that lead to the results in which we are interested. The location of these processes may take a lot of experimenting with the simulation. In the work of the Hermanns, for instance, the personality of the decision-makers was an important variable. In the work by Brody, on the other hand, it plays little role. Repeated runs that pay more or less attention to these variables might begin to tell us how significant personality variables are; and, more precisely, which personality variables are important under what circumstances. Thus the test of a simulation, like the test of any theory, is its ability to generate confirmable hypotheses in the real world.

The relation to other kinds of theorizing becomes clear here. Ordinarily one creates a verbal or mathematical theory; from the theory one deduces certain hypotheses that one then tests in the real world. If the hypothesis is confirmed in the real world, it adds credence to the theory; if it is not, it suggests the theory needs revision. Since one cannot manipulate the real world and since general theories are not themselves directly testable—only hypotheses derived from them are—the crucial test of a theory is whether or not the real world operates *as if* the theory were correct. A simulation adds an important link between theory and the real world. It can be *designed to work as if the theory were correct;* and in this way can generate the implications of

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

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the theory. In a sense, it answers the question: "If my theory of international relations is true, what can I expect the future state of the international system to look like?" One can then use these implications as hypotheses to apply to the real world.

The double application of a theory to the simulation and the real world is useful. The disconfirmation of an hypothesis in the simulation, we suggested, was more ambiguous than real-world disconfirmation. On the other hand, the confirmation of an hypothesis in the simulation may be less ambiguous in meaning than confirmation in the real world. It is true that the confirmation of an hypothesis in a simulation may, like the disconfirmation of an hypothesis, be due to uncontrolled contaminating factors that lead to the acceptance of an hypothesis that ought to have been rejected, but the artificial confirmation of an hypothesis by uncontrolled factors is less likely than its artificial disconfirmation. Furthermore, the major advantage of the confirmation of an hypothesis in a simulation over and above its confirmation in the real world is that one has control of the processes that led to its confirmation. It is less likely, therefore, that the predicted result is due to some other social process. In the real world, on the other hand, the confirmation of an hypothesis or a theory is always ambiguous, in the sense that some other rival hypothesis might have explained the same result.

In the social sciences generally, and in international relations in particular, we suffer not from a paucity but from a plethora of theories and hypotheses. In a simulation exercise, the rival hypotheses are less plausible in that the researcher has control over the initial conditions that led to the result. Similarly, the researcher has control over the direction of causality between variables. Consider Brody's work on the spread of nuclear weapons. The weapons spread leads to a weakening of the bipolar alliance structure. But surely an alternative hypothesis would be that the weakening of the bipolar structure leads to much nuclear proliferation. Is France more distrustful of the United States because it has its own nuclear weapons, or did it build these weapons because it was distrustful? Brody's research, by controlling the time sequence of the events, shows unambiguously (at least for the simulation) that the weapons spread leads to the fragmentation of the alliance structure. This does not mean, necessarily, that the opposite is not true as well—if Brody had introduced tensions within the blocs, it might have led to greater efforts to obtain an independent nuclear position—but the important point is the demonstration that the causality goes one way at least. A simulation study that matches a real-world situation

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

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

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thus involves the testing of the hypothesis twice, in the simulation and in the real world, with the real-world test having the advantage of reality and the simulation test the advantage of lack of ambiguity.

VI

The work associated with the Inter-Nation Simulation does, in my opinion, represent an important part of the current efforts to understand international relations. It is a crude and primitive instrument, but in a crude and primitive field it is useful. Furthermore, it shows potential for growth and improvement. The most impressive aspect of the works under review is not the level of analysis their experiments have reached, but the fact that they are at a much higher level than when they began.

The Inter-Nation Simulation offers a promise of more precise and controlled understanding of international relations, as well as of experimental manipulation. But one ought not to expect a sudden breakthrough in which new theories are suggested or older theories suddenly rejected. Crucial experiments are likely to be rare. The results of these studies have been less than clear in the past and will probably remain so in the future. Hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed, true, but the statistical results are often weak. But such results are to be expected, given the state of the discipline. The crucial experiment that discomfirms or helps to confirm a theory does not depend merely on the development of experimental techniques. It depends as well on the existence of highly sophisticated theories that are capable of such confirmation or disconfirmation. That social science experimentation does not produce results as sharply significant as the Michelson-Morley experiments is a reflection of the fact that our theories are not well enough developed.

At this stage of development, the contribution of simulation research will have more incremental payoffs. It will help us build to theory as well as, in a tentative way, to test it. If it can continue to develop and change, and if it can be maintained as part of a larger process of theory-building, in which various modes of theorizing, simulations, and empirical research all work together toward a common goal of understanding international affairs, its contribution may be significant indeed.

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THE SOURCES OF COMMUNIST APPEAL

By JOHN O. FORRER

Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1960, 299 pp. $5.00.

"THIS book is not a genealogy of political ideas. My main interest has been to find out what makes Marxism alive and relevant in certain societies, while elsewhere socialism and communism remain the creeds of insignificant sects or intellectual coteries." These words from the Preface of Adam Ulam's *The Unfinished Revolution* set the framework for perhaps the most valuable analysis of the appeal of communism that has yet been attempted.

The pursuit of such a goal needs no justification in 1964. The fact that over one-third of the world's population lives under Communist rule continues to make it an important area of inquiry for any thoughtful member of the non-Communist community. The cold war has rendered it imperative that intellectual and political leaders of the Western alliance give serious consideration to the nature of the appeal of communism if they hope to adopt proper policies to inhibit or prevent its spread.

Yet despite the unquestioned need for such studies, almost no attempt has been made to fill this gap in Western understanding. Since 1950 numerous studies of Communist movements in particular countries or geographic areas have been published, each of which has had something to say about the nature of the Communist appeal.[1] However, the discussions of appeal are usually tangential and hence incomplete, the conclusions of the several studies appear contradictory in several respects, and rarely is any attempt made to interpret findings in one country in the light of conditions in other areas of the world. *The Unfinished Revolution* stands alone as an effort to develop a comprehensive and consistent explanation of the appeal of communism for peoples of widely differing backgrounds and cultures in widely dispersed areas of the world. For this reason, Ulam's study is the logical starting point for any inquiry into the nature of the appeal of communism.

[1] Especially useful among these studies have been Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1957); Gabriel Almond's study of the Communist Party in France, England, Italy, and the United States, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton 1954); Lucian W. Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton 1956); and R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton 1961).

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Ulam's thesis is that Marxism is relevant not as a set of absolute economic laws or as a description of the irrepressible process of history, but rather as a social psychology that speaks to the needs and fears of the people in a society which is in the process of industrialization. He emphasizes the error Marx and Engels made in assuming that they were writing about a society which was in the advanced rather than the beginning stages of industrialization, but he denies that this removes the relevance of Marxism for other societies in a similar beginning state of industrial development. In fact, a central contention of the book is that one must never assume that an inaccurate dogma is an inconsequential one: "The surplus-labor theory may be 'wrong' from the point of view of a non-Marxist economist, yet it implies the supreme value of human labor and individuality in the midst of societies where the worker views himself as an adjunct of the machine. The economic historian may patiently prove that under capitalism the fate of the worker has not grown worse, but this Marxist 'error' still communicates to the worker in an *industrializing* society his loss of the stability and security he enjoyed in his previous status of peasant or craftsman" (p. 9).

For Ulam, therefore, Marxism is important not as a theory of economics, history, or sociology, but as a system of thought. As a system of thought, he feels it can be understood only by understanding the intellectual traditions that comprised the thought of Marx's day. The relevance of Marxism for succeeding generations then becomes clear when we "realize how recurrent the kind of social and intellectual situation of Western Europe in Marx's time has been in other parts of the world up to our own times" (p. 10).

Ulam sees three key sources of Marxism in the social conditions and intellectual traditions of early nineteenth-century Western Europe, and particularly England. Socially, he finds a militant anti-industrialism bred of a real cleavage between city and country. He illustrates the terrors of the city for a country boy; the loss of, and consequently distrust of, property which the country dweller experienced in moving to the city; the frustration and apparent dehumanization he experienced when he came to work in a small, hot, crowded building; the natural antipathy to the state which developed when the state appeared to support, or at least to condone, the disagreeable conditions of the workers. At the same time, however, industralization in a general sense was espoused, so that Ulam sees a sort of Marxian dialectic in that industrialism is at once *the* good and *the* evil in society. The Marxist re-

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sponse to this situation is equally paradoxical—the recovery of the peace of the past by intensive development of the evils of the present.

Politically, Ulam feels that Marxism has a certain kinship with Chartism and its pragmatic orientation toward practical goals rather than revolutionary theory. Intellectually, he sees a response to liberalism, especially the English liberalism of 1820-1860, which he characterizes as embracing uncomplicated materialism, belief in economic "laws," and a passion for industralization. Most important of all, he sees a reaction to socialist and anarchist movements or tendencies of the day.

Marxism is somehow the grand synthesis of all of this background and Marx's own "intuitive appraisal of [the] social and political psychology of various classes" (p. 132). It is the grand indictment of liberal society and yet at the same time admits the values and ethos of liberal society—accepting industrialization, rationalism, and individualism, but rejecting the bourgeois system of property which came with them precisely because the role of property denied the worker his essentially liberal values. This synthesis of the social, political, and cultural environment of the industrializing English society is what Ulam feels gives Marxism its "... universal power of survival and influence. After 1850 there will be many societies and countries where similar economic and political conditions will bring forth ideas and sentiments similar to those found in Chartism or in Saint-Simon or Proudhon. But the would-be innovators and revolutionaries will be presented with a doctrine and movement that already expresses some of their aspirations and revolt. *Complete* opposition to industralization or its opposite, *complete* acceptance of industry and the state, will almost always confine the influence of Marxism to that of a small sect, while other types of socialism attract the majority of the working class. But in societies where anarchism has ceased to be a practical response and trade unionism of the English type has not yet been firmly established, Marxism will in fact become the vanguard of socialism" *(ibid.)*.

Although the principal concern of this review article is with the contribution of *The Unfinished Revolution* to an understanding of the appeals of communism, it is perhaps important to comment on one aspect of this generally excellent account of the genesis of Marxism. Communists since the days of Lenin have maintained that Marxism was the perceptive amalgamation of German philosophy, French socialism, and British political economy, and much modern non-Communist scholarship has tended also to emphasize the theoretical roots of Marxism. Ulam, by contrast, emphasizes the importance of existing conditions and actual experiences in the formulation of Marx's ideas.

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He almost completely ignores the philosophical derivation. While it seems clear that one cannot fully understand even the *Manifesto* or *Kapital* solely in terms of an inverted Hegel, augmented by a liberal dose of Proudhon and Adam Smith, it seems equally clear that such philosophical roots cannot properly be ignored. Ulam does admit at one point that Marx embraced socialism philosophically before "discovering" the class struggle and evolving his economic theories, but the general tenor of his remarks suggests that Marxism was nothing but a response to nineteenth-century European society.

This transition, from the highly appealing notion that Marxism was a reflection of the social and intellectual psychology of England in 1840 to the rather questionable notion that Marxism was actually a product of these conditions, is particularly unfortunate because it is unnecessary. Ulam suggests that communism's observable appeal to underdeveloped countries but not to advanced societies is due to the appeal of Marxism to an industrializing society. It is not necessary to prove Marxism a product of such a society in order to support the theory; it is more than sufficient to show merely that it fits the climate of such a society, that in fact "Marxism to a remarkable degree reproduces the social psychology of the period of transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial society" (p. 8).

Having indicated why Marxism has a relevance for any industrializing society, Ulam now seeks to explain why all countries do not become Communist. His answer is that the Marxist period is of limited duration and that orientations soon develop which tend to counteract this trend. By itself, the appeal of Marxism will never be great enough to succeed in establishing a Communist form of government. Only when external events such as war serve to break down the existing form of government during the period of transition will it be possible for a Communist government to assume power. If no such events occur, the maturing of industrialization will produce either what Lenin called a trade-union philosophy that prefers reform within the system to overthrow of it, or a strong spirit of nationalism.

To illustrate the validity of this portion of his thesis, Ulam traces the development of Marxism from 1850 to 1920. He shows how England and continental Europe passed through the transition stage before Marxism could become dominant, so that by 1890 the basic assumptions of Marxism no longer fitted the real world. Better standards of living made the postulate of ever-increasing misery appear invalid; universal suffrage seemed to mean that the state, the supposed agent of the capitalist class, was in fact controlled by the more numerous

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working class; and the beginnings of the welfare state were further evidence of progress within the capitalistic structure previously undreamed of. He also points to Japan, where rapid industrialization in a society still possessing a preindustrial social structure produced all of the predicted economic tensions, but where uninterrupted development soon caused these tensions to be released in nationalism, not Marxist socialism. Only in Russia did events occur (World War I and the breakdown of effective national government) that permitted the receptivity of the people to Marxism to turn into actual support of a Communist state, and even here Ulam illustrates definite tendencies toward a non-Communist development that would likely have prevailed in the absence of the war.

Having shown why Marxism appeals to industrializing societies, and having suggested the conditions under which this Marxist appeal is likely to result in a Communist state, Ulam now turns to the future. What, he asks, will happen to the states which do adopt a Communist form of government? His answer is that while Marxism has a particular relevance and appeal for the industrializing society, it ceases to have meaning or appeal for a country which has largely completed the task of modernization. Tracing the development of Russia from 1925 to the present, Ulam shows the manner in which Marxism was the unifying force (through the Communist Party) in the consolidation of the nation and the justification in the minds of the people for the deprivations they endured for the sake of rapid industrialization. He feels, however, that with the achievement of a highly industrialized society after World War II, Marxism began to lose its meaning. The dictatorship of the proletariat showed no signs of withering away, and Marxist doctrine offered no advice as to how to help it do so. The people began clamoring to share the fruits of their labors, and they became restless under the police-state terrorism. When the police terror was largely removed after Stalin's death, spontaneity, one's job and family, getting ahead, and other non-Marxian interests became more and more important to the people. In the face of such events, the Russian leaders had to find a new rationale for communism or admit that it had lost its meaning for Russia.

The answer that Ulam suggests the Russians have adopted is international communism, a striking parallel to Lenin's theory that capitalism postponed its collapse by colonialization. If Russian communism can show a successful appeal to other nations, the Russian people will continue to support it. If not, Ulam feels, communism will slowly lose

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its grip on Russia, as it will on other Communist societies when they reach the stage of advanced industrialization.

Ulam's thesis can thus be described as one of "industrialization." He suggests that Marxism makes its appeal to people who are undergoing the transition from preindustrial to industrial society. All societies pass through this Marxist period during which old patterns and ways are being torn up and new impersonal ones substituted. Whether this psychological adjustment results in the overthrow of the existing government in favor of communism depends on the accidents of history and the speed with which trade unionism and improved working conditions develop. If a Communist government is formed, it will still have the task of industrialization under a dictatorial system. And as this industrialization is accomplished, the *raison d'être* of the Communist government withers away. It tries to justify its faith now by evangelizing that faith in other countries. If this fails, Ulam thinks that Marxism will then have ceased to be of use to the society, and that even the leaders will eventually decide to give it up.

As is to be expected with a pioneering effort such as this one, there are many elements of the industrialization thesis about which skepticism is in order. For one thing, the suggestion that Marxism has outworn its usefulness in Russia and therefore will slowly fade away seems as much a statement of hope as a prediction of fact. It seems to ignore the previous ability of Lenin and Stalin and other Communist leaders to reinterpret Marxism in the light of current situations and needs, and it assumes that the international Communist movement is merely a holding action rather than the next logical step toward an industrialized world socialist community. In spite of the economic fallacies of Marx's thinking, a society where everyone gives according to his ability and everyone receives according to his need can still hold great appeal for many elements of mankind. One may hope that Professor Ulam is correct, but to date there appears to be little empirical evidence to support such a position.

Another weakness in this reasoning is the suggestion that Marxism appeals to the people of an industrializing country in 1960 (Algeria or Cuba or China or Ghana) because the doctrine reflects the philosophy and social conditions of industrializing England in 1840. This implies a correlation between the economic, social, and political forces of nineteenth-century England and twentieth-century Ghana which I think is far from clear. The liberal tradition of England is almost completely lacking in the background of the new African nations, or even of countries such as India, Vietnam, and Cuba. Socialist doctrines, political

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economics, etc., are equally foreign to most members of such societies. One wonders whether England is not a special case rather than the generic model of all industrializing societies.

As was suggested earlier, such criticism does not invalidate the industrialization thesis. As long as the labor theory of value is meaningful to twentieth-century industrializing societies, it does not matter whether Marx derived it from Adam Smith, from astute observation, or from philosophical intuition. In this sense, the entire first part of *The Unfinished Revolution* is irrelevant to the central theme of the book, and the author's time might well have been better spent analyzing several of the underdeveloped societies where Marxism is presently making a strong bid.

A more serious fallacy of the thesis is that Marxism often does not seem to be making its appeal to the peasants and the laboring class of these emerging countries. Rather, in many cases it seems to appeal to the young intellectuals, the middle-class intelligentsia who were the leaders of the fight for independence and are the guides of the new state. In such cases one wonders whether the appeal really stems from Marxism's ability to reproduce the social psychology of the transition society, or whether it may not lie in an entirely different direction—perhaps in Russia's rapid industrialization, which appeals to the nationalistic desires of the leaders to achieve an industrialized society, and hence world power and status, as quickly as possible. Ulam attributes much of communism's success since World War II to Russia's military power, and certainly this has been the vehicle for taking over China and for successes in Laos, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe. To the extent that communism has been welcomed in these areas, however, one suspects it has been Russia's success in industrializing as much as Marxism's relevance to industrialization that has been the motivating force.

The book also can be criticized for a certain tendency to digress from the central point. For long periods the reader may think he is pursuing a study of nineteenth-century England or a history of communism, before the industrialization theme emerges in the end. The final chapter, which contains Ulam's conclusions and recommendations for action (to which we shall return), is uncomfortably brief after the extensive analysis that precedes it. Similarly, the whole analysis of post-World War II Communist activities would be just as logical if the crisis of Marxism in Russia were explained on grounds completely apart from industrialization. There is a tendency for the main point to become buried by these many side excursions that at times is rather disconcerting.

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In spite of these limitations, much in *The Unfinished Revolution* merits commendation. If there is a tendency to digress into long historical accounts, the history is nonetheless interesting and well handled. If the post-World War II analysis is compatible with other theses besides Ulam's own, these final 75 pages are nevertheless an excellent brief analysis of events from 1945 to 1960. The explanations offered for Russia's insistence on dominating all Communist parties in spite of the fact that in so doing she was instrumental in preventing Communist success in France and Italy are brilliant, and the insights into relations between Moscow and Yugoslavia are equally enlightening. Above all, enough of the industrialization thesis stands up under scrutiny to suggest that at least a partial truth is contained therein.

If Ulam's book has one major weakness, perhaps it is that in the end he tries too hard to simplify a complex subject. Implicit in his entire effort is the assumption that communism has one and only one basic source of appeal, but there is no reason to assume that this is so. Similarly, Ulam assumes that in searching for this source of influence one can equate the movement (communism) with the doctrine (Marxism), when it is clear that there are other aspects of the movement which could also contain elements of its appeal.

The distortions which such oversimplifications have introduced can be seen when one looks at the findings of some of the narrower studies conducted in the past decade. Practically all such studies observe that the Communist movement is not a homogeneous mass of equally dedicated individuals, but rather that every party must at least be broken down into what R. V. Burks terms the hard core and the soft periphery.[2] The hard-core elements, which are relatively small in number and are composed primarily of middle-class professionals and intellectuals, often appear to be attracted by the philosophical appeal of Marxism.[3] The more numerous members of the soft periphery, on the other hand —usually a predominantly lower (but not necessarily laboring) class group—are apparently little affected by this doctrinal appeal. Rather, they are attracted either by particular political stands endorsed by the Communists or by the meaningfulness and security derived from party membership itself.[4]

[2] Burks, introduction and chaps. 1 and 2.

[3] See, e.g., Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley 1959), 537ff.; or Pye, chap. 9.

[4] See, e.g., Arnold C. Brachman, *Indonesian Communism* (New York 1963), 304; Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford 1962), 180; or Burks, particularly chap. 2.

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To put the matter another way, it is certainly true that included within the Communist ranks are many people who are suffering from the social and psychological shocks associated with the early stages of industrialization, and Ulam has probably hit upon the major source of communism's appeal for this group. But within the movement there are also groups seeking relief from social maladjustments entirely unrelated to industrialization (e.g., the ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia or the Chinese in Malaya). There are also large numbers of people supporting communism as a protest against present governmental policies (as in France and Italy) or because the Communist Party is the only political organization promoting major social, political, and economic reforms (Robert Alexander contends that this is the principal source of Communist appeal in Latin America). And there are many individuals who join solely for the sense of meaning, importance, and fellowship which the Party itself provides. Any universally applicable theory of the source of communism's appeal must encompass all such factors, not just one of them.

While the industrialization thesis does not meet this test of comprehensiveness, it may nevertheless contain a more universal element than even Ulam himself realizes. In the last analysis, it is not industrialization *per se* to which Ulam attributes Marxism's relevance. Rather, it is the feelings of isolation, regimentation, and depersonalization that industrialization produces, feelings which are possibly best expressed by the word "alienation." Perhaps this is the ultimate basis for communism's appeal. Perhaps it is primarily a movement which appeals to the alienated members of society, to persons who are so disturbed by social, political, or psychological difficulties and are so poorly integrated into the existing fabric of society that they are willing to support a party which advocates the total reconstitution of that society.

The alienation theme is not a new one,[5] but it does seem to be one

[5] Gabriel Almond suggested it ten years ago in the following eloquent, if somewhat emotional, passage from *The Appeals of Communism:* "Thus we may describe the various types of Communist parties in terms of the kinds of alienations which have contributed to them, and appraise their potentialities according to the extent to which these alienations are distributed throughout the society. In England and the United States, the kinds of alienations which appear to have fed the Communist movements were those incidental to the acculturation of certain ethnic groups, the essentially private alienations of broken families and unhappy childhoods, or the temporary alienations of economic and political crisis. In France and Italy, we are dealing with societies which have failed to relate large elements of the population to dignity and meaning, and where the Communist parties draw upon historically endemic feelings of estrangement and hopelessness among certain social groupings. In Southeast Asia, and potentially in the Middle East, in addition to the estrangements of class and status, there are the alienations of race, of ethnic and cultural discrimination, which build up a potential that is frightening in its scope and intensity. The Communist movement draws the destructive

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acceptable umbrella under which can be grouped all of the various forces motivating persons to support communism. Perhaps it warrants further consideration, especially in the light of Robert C. Tucker's analysis of the philosophical roots of Marxism, in which he demonstrates how basic the concept of alienation is to all of Marx's writings.[6] If Ulam is correct that Marxism is "about" industrialization, it is equally true that Marxism is "about" alienation, and it is also true that both the Communist Party organization and the flexibility of the party's short-run political program are ideally suited to attracting the alienated elements of virtually any society.

Whatever thesis one chooses to adopt, there remains the final task of translating it into concrete proposals for Western foreign policy, as Ulam does in his last chapter. The industrialization thesis suggests to Professor Ulam a two-pronged program of continued diplomatic negotiations to make it clear where the Russians will be risking war if they press their offensive, together with substantial programs of foreign aid to countries passing through the transition period in order to hasten the day when Marxism will cease to appeal so strongly to them.

As with the industrialization thesis itself, such policies seem overly simple, and the latter proposal smacks almost of an economic determinism *à la* Marx. Nevertheless, they are concrete proposals based on explicit theory, and as such they have few rivals at present. Professor Ulam has led the way, and for this he is to be commended. Others now must follow, for the revolution is truly unfinished and the ultimate victor is yet to be determined.

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energies and the desperate impatience from all of these varieties of protest and resentment and harnesses them in the service of a controlled and comprehensive destructiveness. Thus there are met in this movement all the alienations of man, rushing from many and unlike tributaries into a torrent of wrath without end" (p. 381).

[6] Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961).

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